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The ability to guide behaviors and allocate cognitive resources in service of goals or 
rules, termed cognitive control, is an integral part of daily activities, and worse cognitive control 
is associated with a range of poor outcomes. Reward-driven responses can either support 
cognitive control (if reward history and current goals align) or thwart cognitive control (if reward 
history and current goals are at-odds). While reward-related disruption in cognitive control has 
implications for a range of psychopathology and risk-taking behaviors, the specific cognitive and 
neural mechanisms through which reward history and cognitive control interact are not well 
understood. The program of research comprising the current dissertation address this issue by 
using a variety of tasks and neuroimaging methods to better characterize how a history of 
reward-association interferes with cognitive control when reward-driven and goal-driven 
responses are at odds with one another. Specifically, Study 1 serves to examine how individual 
variability in neural activity predicts cognitive control failures when faced with stimuli that have 
a reward history. Study 1 offers novel insights into the role of fronto-striatal regions in 
supporting motor inhibition over previously rewarded stimuli and provides evidence that the 
insula plays a role in relaying reward-learning biases to disrupt cognitive control. Study 2 further 
examines how neural activity while learning a reward-association predicts later behavior and 
changes in neural activity when the stimulus with a reward history is encountered as a distractor. 
iv 
This study provides evidence that neural activity in reward-related regions during learning 
predicts activity in cognitive control regions when encountering the reward-associated distractor 
in an unrewarded test phase. Finally, Study 3 aims to determine whether reward-driven biasing 
that thwarts cognitive control is better characterized by a Pavlovian learning mechanism or 
Instrumental learning mechanism by using tasks designed to assess whether the reward-
associations learned during training exhibit domain-specific or domain-general effects on 
cognitive control. Taken together, this dissertation identifies key processes through which reward 
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The ability to guide behaviors and allocate cognitive resources in service of goals or 
rules, termed cognitive control, is an integral part of daily activities. Cognitive control serves to 
bias processing and responses dependent upon current goals (Baddeley, Sala, Robbins, & 
Baddeley, 1996; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Dosenbach et al., 2006; Rougier, Noelle, Braver, 
Cohen, & O’Reilly, 2005). This ability is particularly important for aligning behavior with goals 
in the context of competing reflexive or motivating responses (Nee, Wager, & Jonides, 2007). 
For example, when driving a car, it is important to maintain attention to the road even if there is 
loud discussion in the back seat, which would ordinarily reflexively capture attention, or if a text 
notification appears on the phone, which might motivate attention away from the road. Cognitive 
control ability is typically assessed using task-based measures that require active monitoring, 
resolution of interference, and response selection, such as the go/no-go task, flanker task, Stroop, 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, and antisaccade tasks, and is thought to be supported by a fronto-
parietal control network, including dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC), and parietal cortex  (Niendam et al., 2012). Given the far-reaching implications 
for cognitive control in daily functioning, it is not surprising that impaired cognitive control is 
associated with a wide range of risk-taking behaviors and psychopathology, including 
pathological gambling, externalizing disorders, substance use disorders, major depression, 
schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder  (Holmes, Hollinshead, Roffman, Smoller, & Buckner, 2016; 
Lueger & Gill, 1990; Salehinejad, Ghanavai, Rostami, & Nejati, 2017; Smucny et al., 2019; 
 
2 
Verbruggen, Adams, & Chambers, 2012). However, the cognitive control difficulty exhibited 
across risk-taking and psychopathology is often in a motivationally salient context.  
Cognitive control is rarely employed in a neutral context. Rather, most stimuli have some 
associated motivational history, such as a history of rewarding social interaction when reading a 
text notification. This motivational history yields a prepotent response (e.g. picking up the 
phone) and cognitive control must be employed to overcome this competing response (e.g. 
maintaining attention to the road). One way of manipulating motivational history is through 
providing or withholding reward. In some cases, reward has been used to facilitate cognitive 
control, particularly when rewards are conferred for achieving task goals (Chiew & Braver, 
2011; Dreisbach & Fischer, 2012; Engelmann et al., 2009; Locke & Braver, 2008). In these 
cases, reward bias enhances performance by supporting faster attentional selection, conflict 
resolution, and response selection (Boehler, Schevernels, Hopf, Stoppel, & Krebs, 2014; 
Chelazzi, Perlato, Santandrea, & Della Libera, 2013; Krebs, Boehler, & Woldorff, 2010). 
However, when a reward-driven response does not align with task goals, such as when a reward-
signaling cue serves as a distractor, or when a previously rewarded response must be inhibited, 
this results in cognitive control failures (Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011; Davidow et al., 
2018; Le Pelley, Pearson, Griffiths, & Beesley, 2015).  
When resolving competing reward-driven and goal-driven responses, biasing toward the 
reward-driven response is characteristic of a range of risk-taking behaviors and psychopathology, 
such as unprotected sex, risky driving, pathological gambling, Binge Eating Disorder, and 
Substance Use Disorders. Many of these risk-taking behaviors and psychopathology are 
characterized not only by worse cognitive control ability, as described above, but also by 
heightened sensitivity to reward  (Kambouropoulos & Staiger, 2001; Matthys, van Goozen, 
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Snoek, & van Engeland, 2004; Petry, 2001; van Hemel-Ruiter, de Jong, Ostafin, & Wiers, 2015). 
This imbalance likely perpetuates difficulties with resolving goal-driven and reward-driven 
conflict. For example, to avoid a binge eating episode, cognitive control must be engaged to 
inhibit approach and consummatory behavior toward sweet and fatty foods that have a history of 
reward. Indeed alterations in frontal control activity in the face of reward, and impaired 
flexibility in reward-based decision-making have been implicated in Binge Eating Disorder 
(Reiter, Heinze, Schlagenhauf, & Deserno, 2017). Similarly, choosing to avoid substance use in 
favor of abstinence, or inhibiting non-suicidal self-injury behavior for a goal of staying safe 
requires inhibiting a reward-associated response in favor of a goal-aligned response.  
Given the interaction between these processes, models of risk-taking behavior and 
substance use have emerged that highlight the importance of understanding reward sensitivity in 
the context of cognitive control rather than examining these processes in isolation. These models 
propose that a relative imbalance in functioning of reward-related neural regions, such as the 
striatum, and cognitive control-related regions, such as prefrontal cortex, leads to an imbalance 
in reward-driven versus goal-driven responses, which in turn facilitates addiction and risk-taking 
behavior (McClure & Bickel, 2014; Somerville & Casey, 2010; Steinberg, 2010; Volkow, Wang, 
Fowler, Tomasi, & Telang, 2011). These models are consistent with findings indicating that the 
predictive value of reward sensitivity and cognitive control are moderated by one another when 
longitudinally assessing substance use and risk-taking (Peeters, Oldehinkel, & Vollebergh, 2017; 
van Hemel-Ruiter et al., 2015). While these models support that interactions between cognitive 
control and reward bias may underlie some maladaptive behaviors, what remains largely absent 
is an understanding of the specific cognitive and neural mechanisms through which these 
processes interact.  
 
4 
The studies comprising the current dissertation address this issue by using a variety of 
tasks and neuroimaging methods to better characterize how a history of reward-association 
interferes with cognitive control when reward-driven and goal-driven responses are at odds with 
one another. Specifically, Study 1 serves to examine what neural signatures are associated with 
successful and unsuccessful attempts at cognitive control over reward and how individual 
variability in neural activity predicts ability to engage cognitive control over reward-associated 
stimuli. This study offers novel insights into the role of fronto-striatal regions in supporting 
motor inhibition over previously rewarded stimuli and provides evidence that the insula plays a 
role in relaying reward-learning biases to disrupt cognitive control. Study 2 aims to further 
examine how the nature of reward learning during training impacts later cognitive control over 
the reward-associated stimulus in the attention domain. By collecting neuroimaging data both 
during the reward-association training phase and during the testing phase, this study examines 
whether neural activity in reward-related regions during training predicts activity in cognitive 
control regions during testing. Finally, Study 3 aims to determine whether reward-driven biasing 
that thwarts cognitive control is better characterized by a Pavlovian learning mechanism or 
Instrumental learning mechanism by using tasks designed to assess whether the reward-
associations learned during training exhibit domain-specific or domain-general effects on 
cognitive control.  
These studies work together to contribute to multiple components of our understanding of 
cognitive control over reward. Firstly, these studies employ carefully designed cognitive tasks to 
isolate reward and cognitive control interactions. Historically, one barrier to understanding 
reward and cognitive control interactions is that relatively few tasks are designed to pit reward-
driven and goal-driven responses against each other. Some studies have attempted to address this 
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by using stimuli that have inherently rewarding properties, such as smiling faces (e.g. Raymond 
& O’Brien, 2009; Somerville, Hare, & Casey, 2010); however one limitation of this approach is 
that participants have varying experiences with the stimuli at the start of the study, which is 
difficult to account for and likely impacts the degree to which participants find the stimuli 
rewarding. Other studies have used a two-part approach in which first reward association is 
explicitly manipulated during a training phase and then cognitive control over reward is 
examined in a separate testing phase during which participants no longer receive reward 
(Anderson et al., 2011; Davidow et al., 2018; Failing & Theeuwes, 2014; Winter & Sheridan, 
2014). This approach has the advantage of both equating reward history across participants and 
allowing for the possibility of examining how reward-learning during training may relate to later 
cognitive control failures. As such, this two-part design was implemented across all studies.   
Secondly, this work helps to better characterize the neural substrates underlying reward-
related disruption of cognitive control. Study 1 aims to address this by separately examining how 
neural signatures predict performance when reward-associated responses are successfully 
inhibited and when participants fail to inhibit the reward-associated response. Study 2 examines 
neural correlates of reactive control over reward by comparing when goal-driven and reward-
driven are in competition with one another (i.e. when a target appears in the location opposite the 
previously rewarded cue), versus when these responses align (i.e. when a target appears in the 
previously rewarded cue).  
Finally, results across these studies aim to characterize how reward-associations formed 
during learning are later sustained, despite the absence of reward receipt, and how reward-biased 
behavior thwarts current goals. Study 1 provides novel insight that insula activity mediates a 
relationship between reward-biasing during the reward-association learning phase and the degree 
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to which reward later disrupts cognitive control at test. Study 2 tests current assumptions that 
reward-signaling activity in ventral striatum regions during the reward-association phase predict 
both neural activity and behavioral performance while engaging cognitive control at test. And 
Study 3 provides new data testing the mechanisms driving reward bias that thwarts goal-driven 
behavior by pitting hypotheses derived from a Pavlovian reward-learning mechanism against 
hypotheses derived from an instrumental reward-learning mechanism.  
These studies have implemented unique designs that pit reward-driven responses against 
goal-driven responses. These designs better allow for the isolation of specific processes, 
including the reward-learning mechanisms and associated neural substrates that lead to goal-
thwarting reward bias. Additionally, these studies serve to help identify which neural substrates 
support the employment of cognitive control in resolving competing goal-driven and reward-
driven responses. Taken together, these studies aim to help elucidate the mechanisms through 
which reward-driven bias disrupts cognitive control, which is imperative for understanding 
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STUDY 1: HISTORY OF CONDITIONED REWARD ASSOCIATION DISRUPTS 
INHIBITORY CONTROL: AN EXAMINATION OF NEURAL CORRELATES  
 
Introduction 
Flexible behavior relies on the ability to control and change learned responses when they 
no longer align with contextual goals. In particular, behaviors learned via reward conditioning 
are difficult to overcome (Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011; Krebs, Boehler, & Woldorff, 
2010; Le Pelley, Pearson, Griffiths, & Beesley, 2015), and the ability to flexibly adapt reward-
conditioned behavior is important for healthy functioning. Inability to overcome conditioned 
reward responses in favor of goal-directed action may be related to risk-taking behaviors, 
substance use, and problematic gambling (de Ruiter et al., 2009; Galvan et al., 2006; Potenza, 
2008; Robbins, Gillan, Smith, de Wit, & Ersche, 2012). For example, if someone has a goal of 
staying sober, selecting the reward-conditioned behavior (consuming alcohol) over the goal-
driven behavior (abstaining) leads to relapse. Thus, better understanding the ability to stop 
responding to stimuli with a history of reward conditioning in order to align with new contextual 
goals is an important step in designing studies evaluating novel treatments for disorders affecting 
mental health. However, the specific neural mechanisms that support one’s ability to engage 
cognitive control in the face of reward-conditioned stimuli are not well understood, in part 
because these processes are often either examined separately from one another or in the context 
of congruent reward-driven and goal-driven responses (e.g. Wang et al., 2019). 
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Cognitive control is essential for selecting actions that align with current goals (Miller, 
2000). A large-scale cingulo-fronto-parietal network, including anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), insular cortex, and posterior 
parietal cortex, underlies the execution of cognitive control (Braver, Paxton, Locke, & Barch, 
2009; Bush & Shin, 2006; Cole & Schneider, 2007; Deng, Wang, Wang, & Zhou, 2018; 
Niendam et al., 2012). A published meta-analysis supports the possibility that these regions are 
recruited both for “cold” non-affective cognitive control and for cognitive control in the presence 
of “hot,” emotional stimuli (Xu, Xu, & Yang, 2016). As such, these regions would also be 
expected to support the ability to flexibly adapt behavior in the context of reward-related 
cognitive control. 
The mechanisms through which reward-driven stimulus-response associations are formed 
has been the subject of research for decades. A prevailing theory is that dopaminergic responses 
drive stimulus-response association through reward-prediction error (Bayer & Glimcher, 2005; 
Glimcher, 2011; Pessiglione, Seymour, Flandin, Dolan, & Frith, 2006). During reward learning, 
dopamine drives neuronal firing in the ventral striatum in response to the reward receipt itself; 
however, over time, neuronal firing in the ventral striatum and other parts of the mesolimbic 
dopamine circuit increases following the presentation of the stimulus predicting reward 
(McClure, Berns, & Montague, 2003; O’Doherty, Dayan, Friston, Critchley, & Dolan, 2003; 
Pessiglione et al., 2006; Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997). While the ventral striatum is 
essential for acquiring initial associations and guiding reward-motivated behavior (Lanciego, 
Luquin, & Obeso, 2012; Wickens, Reynolds, & Hyland, 2003), the orbitofrontal cortex and 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) appear to track reward value as they respond 
preferentially to the encoded reward value of an action or stimulus (Blair et al., 2006; Daw, 
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O’Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006; Elliott, Newman, Longe, & Deakin, 2003; 
Hampton, Bossaerts, & O’Doherty, 2006; Sescousse, Redouté, & Dreher, 2010). 
 Thus far, relatively few studies have directly examined neural activity supporting 
cognitive control over stimuli for which a reward-driven stimulus-response association has been 
established. A related body of research has focused on reversal learning, which is replacing 
previously rewarded response-outcome associations with new response-outcome associations. 
Overcoming the previously rewarded response in favor of a novel response (i.e. reversal 
learning) can thus be conceptualized as consisting of two components: (1) engaging control to 
suppress the previously rewarded response and (2) learning of the novel response-outcome 
association in order to bias selection in favor of the novel reward contingencies. Evidence from 
these studies suggest that frontal regions, including dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, dlPFC, and 
IFG, support error detection in this process (Greening, Finger, & Mitchell, 2011) and 
connectivity between these frontal regions and the subthalamic nucleus supports slowing down 
the execution of prepotent responses (Jahfari et al., 2019) during reversal. Additionally, there is 
evidence suggesting that the vmPFC supports both value representation and inhibition of the 
previously (but not currently) rewarded response in reversal learning (Zhang, Mendelsohn, 
Manson, Schiller, & Levy, 2016). It is plausible that these regions supporting reversal learning 
may serve to suppress the previously rewarded responses; however, this specific sub-process has 
been less well researched. While reversal learning paradigms typically provide rewards for 
changing behavior, attempting to control previously rewarded behaviors in a real-world context 
(e.g. reducing or abstaining from consuming alcohol) does not immediately come paired with a 
novel reward-contingency for changing behavior. It does, however, require inhibiting the 
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previously rewarded behavior. As such, it is important to further characterize the process of 
inhibiting previously rewarded responses in isolation.  
Cognitive control, which involves the volitional control of behavior, includes a variety of 
processes such as attentional control and inhibitory control. Attentional control specifically refers 
to the volitional guidance of attention whereas inhibitory control refers to stopping prepotent 
responses. The body of work that has examined cognitive control over stimuli with a history of 
reward has primarily examined attentional control in which stimuli with a conditioned reward 
history serve as distractors. These findings support that some of the same structures underlying 
reward learning serve to maintain increased salience of stimuli with a history of conditioned 
reward association, ultimately leading to distraction by such stimuli. Specifically, the caudate 
shows greater activity when a reward-associated distractor is present (Anderson, Laurent, & 
Yantis, 2014), and the degree to which a previously rewarded stimulus disrupts attentional 
control is linked to dopaminergic activity in the caudate and putamen, as demonstrated through a 
positron emission topography study (Anderson et al., 2016). In addition to the striatum, the 
insula appears to play a crucial role in maintaining reward-related salience and modulating 
activity in cognitive control networks in response to such salience (Menon & Uddin, 2010). For 
example, in one study using a distractor with conditioned history of reward, the anterior and 
posterior insula were active when a reward-related distractor was present and activity in the 
anterior insula predicted the degree to which performance was slowed in the presence of the 
reward-related distractor (Wang et al., 2015). This study additionally provides evidence 
suggesting that the insula may serve as a relay station through which learned reward conditioning 
later interacts with cognitive control systems: the degree to which connectivity between the 
ventral striatum and insula increased from baseline following the conditioned reward-association 
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training predicted degree of distraction in the subsequent task (Wang et al., 2015). Taken 
together, these data suggest that the prefrontal cortex is important for controlled responding 
following an initial rewarded stimulus-response association, subcortical areas involved in the 
initial acquisition of conditioned reward are re-activated when this stimulus is a salient distractor 
and finally, the insula is an important candidate region through which salience resulting from a 
history of reward interacts with cognitive control networks. 
As described, previous work has focused on the impact of a history of conditioned reward 
associations on attention.  In contrast, the current study investigates the neural correlates of 
response inhibition to a stimulus with a history of conditioned reward association. We address 
these processes because, rather than controlling attention, the ability to control overt behavior 
such as stopping prepotent responses (i.e. inhibitory control), has been most consistently 
associated with risk in the real world (Bohlin, Eninger, Brocki, & Thorell, 2012; Tarter, Kirisci, 
Habeych, Reynolds, & Vanyukov, 2004; Verbruggen, Adams, & Chambers, 2012; Zucker, 
Heitzeg, & Nigg, 2011). 
In previous work we investigated the development of this process, demonstrating that 
neural correlates of these processes shift in adolescence, a developmental period in which risk-
taking peaks (Moffitt, 1993). For example, Somerville and colleagues (2011) used a go/no-go 
task with happy faces serving as the reward-related No-Go cue, and demonstrated an adolescent-
specific increase in fronto-striatal connectivity and striatal activation when inhibiting responses 
to happy faces. In a follow-up study, we first manipulated conditioned reward associations using 
a Monetary Incentive Delay task and then tested inhibitory control over reward using a go/no-go 
task. In the go/no-go task, the No-Go stimuli consisted of the previously rewarded and 
previously unrewarded stimuli from the Monetary Incentive Delay task. This combination is 
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termed the conditioned appetitive response inhibition task (CARIT). In the CARIT, we observed 
age-related increases in connectivity during late adolescence between IFG and vmPFC when 
inhibiting responses to previously rewarded targets (Davidow et al., 2019).  
In sum, existing evidence supports the possibility that age influences the recruitment of 
control processes over stimuli with a history of conditioned reward associations. However, the 
basic neural functioning supporting inhibitory control over previously rewarding stimuli in 
young adults is still not understood. Here we characterize neural processes subserving (1) 
successful inhibitory control over stimuli with a reward history, (2) failures in inhibitory control 
over stimuli with a reward history, and (3) the role of neural recruitment in mediating the impact 
of reward conditioning on inhibitory control behavior. To do so, we firstly examined both 
successful and unsuccessful inhibition over reward-related stimuli as separate processes, 
allowing a more complete understanding of the neural correlates of inhibition over reward. 
Secondly, we examined how individual differences in the ability to inhibit responses to stimuli 
with a reward history relates to neural activity during inhibition. This served to characterize 
which regions are associated with successful inhibition of responses to previously rewarded 
stimuli and which regions are associated with unsuccessful inhibition. Because we expected the 
reward-conditioned motor biases to lead to failures in inhibitory control, we predicted that 
regions involved in reward-associated motor learning (e.g., ventral and dorsal striatum) would be 
more active when previously rewarded stimuli are present, relative to previously unrewarded 
stimuli. Additionally, we hypothesized that individual differences in activity in these regions 
would partially explain individual differences in task performance. Finally, we hypothesized that 
greater recruitment of frontal control regions would be associated with successful inhibition of 
previously rewarded relative to previously unrewarded stimuli and we hypothesized that more 
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 Participants were 42 adults ages 18-25 years old with no self-reported history of 
neurological disorder, head trauma, diagnosis of any psychological or learning disorder, native 
language other than English, or MRI contraindications. Participants were part of a larger sample 
as described by Davidow and colleagues (2019). One participant was excluded from final 
analysis due to poor task performance, defined as go accuracy less than 50% or No-Go accuracy 
less than 25%. This threshold ensured that participants understood and engaged with the task 
without penalizing individuals with lower accuracy due to legitimate challenge. The final 
included sample consisted of 41 individuals (49% Female, 51% Male; M-age = 21.86 years, SD 
= 2.20 years). The demographic composition of the sample reflected the greater Boston area with 
respect to ethnicity (14% Hispanic, 82% Non-Hispanic, 5% unreported) and race (28% Asian, 
2% Bi-racial, 12% Black, 49% White, and 9% unreported). All participants provided informed 
consent to participate in the study and all study procedures were approved by the Partners 
Human Research Committee institutional review board at Massachusetts General 
Hospital/Harvard Medical School. For clarity, some text describing task, image acquisition, and 
preprocessing match as described in the study of the larger sample (Davidow et al., 2019). 
Task Overview 
The CARIT (adapted from Winter & Sheridan, 2014) consists of (a) an initial reward 
conditioning phase implemented using a monetary incentive delay task (MID; Knutson, 
Westdorp, Kaiser, & Hommer, 2000) and (b) an inhibitory control testing phase implemented 
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using a go/no-go paradigm with stimuli from the conditioning phase (Figure 2.1). In the 
conditioning phase, participants press a button as quickly as possible in response to stimuli on 
the screen. Reward-association is conditioned to one of the initially neutral stimuli by conferring 
a monetary reward for responses. For the unrewarded stimulus, participants press as quickly as 
possible but receive no monetary reward for responses. Reward-conditioned approach tendencies 
for the rewarded relative to the unrewarded stimuli are confirmed by measuring differences in 
reaction times. For the testing phase, the stimuli that were previously rewarded (PR) and 
previously unrewarded (PU) in the MID served as No-Go stimuli in the go/no-go task. The 
testing phase was administered approximately 1 hr after the first phase. Inhibitory control is 
measured by successfully withholding responses to No-Go stimuli. The difference in successful 
trials for No-Go trails with PR stimuli and No-Go trials with PU stimuli indicates the specific 
effects of reward-association history on inhibitory control. All behavioral tasks were presented in 
E-Prime Version 2.0 (Psychology Software Tools).  
CARIT: Conditioning Phase 
Participants completed the first study phase seated in a quiet room. Participants acquired 
a conditioned reward association to initially neutral stimuli (i.e., simple geometric shapes) 
through repeated pairing of a rapid button press and a monetary gain. Two shapes, a circle and a 
triangle, underwent conditioning; which shape was rewarded versus unrewarded was 
counterbalanced across participants. The unrewarded shape (either the circle or triangle) was 
never associated with a monetary outcome (no reward); all responses resulted in $0. The 
rewarded shape, in contrast, was associated with a monetary gain (high reward); if the participant 
correctly pressed during a short response window, there was a 70% chance of winning $0.50 and 
a 30% chance of winning $5.00, but responses that were too slow resulted in $0. Another two 
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shapes were conditioned with a relatively small monetary gain (low reward; 70% chance of 
winning $0.10 and a 30% chance of winning $0.20) and risk of monetary loss (loss; 70% chance 
of losing $1.00 and a 30% chance of losing $5.00) but were not carried forward to the second 
phase of the task (the go/no-go) and are not analyzed here. There were 156 total trials with 39 
trials each of the four shapes presented in an intermixed pseudorandom fashion. 
In a trial (Figure 2.1a), participants saw a black line drawing of a shape (500 ms) against 
a white background followed by a white fixation cross against a black background (jittered time 
interval, 2000–2375 ms, M = 2187 ms, SD = 140 ms); this change in background color signaled 
the participant to prepare to make a very rapid button press. Following the jittered fixation, a 
white line drawing of the previously cued shape appeared against the black background and 
participants were instructed to press a button very quickly to obtain the outcome. Immediately 
following, a feedback screen was presented that indicated if the response was sufficiently rapid 
and the resulting monetary outcome (1500 ms). 
The response window adjusted dynamically during the task to control for response 
accuracy. Adjusting the window based on accuracy helped to equate reinforcement exposure (i.e. 
number of rewarded trials) across participants. A staircase algorithm adjusted the response 
window for each stimulus separately to set performance to approximately 66% accuracy by 
lengthening the response window for a stimulus if the accuracy was too low and shortening it if 
the accuracy was too high. The duration of the response window at the start of the task was 
determined by the average reaction time (RT) from a practice round immediately preceding the 
task. 
After completing the conditioning task, we collected self-report ratings of the subjective 
importance, intensity, and valence of each shape on a 5-point Likert scale to verify that the 
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repeated exposure to the different shape–outcome pairings resulted in intended changes to the 
subjective value of the shapes, specifically whether the high-reward shape would have greater 
subjective importance than the no-reward shape. The post-test assessment was not collected in 
one participant. Participants were paid the total amount earned in cash immediately following the 
self-report ratings. 
CARIT: Inhibitory Control Phase 
The second phase of the task, which was administered during fMRI scanning, measured 
the degree to which the reward history acquired in the conditioning phase influenced subsequent 
inhibitory control behavior and associated neural processes. The high-reward and no-reward 
stimuli from the previous conditioning phase were carried forward to the inhibitory control 
phase, which we will refer to as the “previously rewarded” (PR_No-Go) and “previously 
unrewarded” (PU_No-Go) targets. Critically, in the go/no-go task, these targets no longer signal 
reward; there are no incentives and no bonus payments for the go/no-go task.  This was explicitly 
stated to the participants. 
In the go/no-go task (Figure 2.1b), participants were instructed to respond by pressing a 
button as rapidly as possible to a set of stimuli that appeared 73.3% of the time (go targets, 264 
trials total). For the other trials, the stimulus corresponded to the PR_No-Go or PU_No-Go 
stimuli. These were the No-Go targets, each occurring on 13.3% of trials (48 trials each; 96 
total).  The order of presentation for all the targets was pseudorandomized.  
We employed a rapid event-related design where go and No-Go target stimuli were 
presented for 600 msec, followed by a jittered fixation interstimulus interval ranging from 500 to 
4500 ms (M = 1875 ms, SD = 1221 ms). Correct and incorrect responses were recorded during a 
1100 ms response window beginning at the onset of the target. No-Go targets were preceded by 
 
21 
either 2, 3, or 4 ‘go’ targets, about 1/3 of the time, a manipulation intended to impact motor 
prepotency. PR_No-Go and PU_No-Go targets were equally likely to be preceded by 2, 3, or 4 
go targets and equally likely to be followed by all possible interstimulus intervals.  Participants 
viewed the stimuli projected onto a screen in a mirror mounted on the head coil and used an MR-
compatible button box to make behavioral responses. 
Behavioral Analysis 
 The primary outcome of interest is the comparison between the rewarded and unrewarded 
stimuli. For the conditioning phase, a paired t-test was conducted on reaction times to rewarded 
versus no-reward stimuli in order to examine whether participants responded faster to the high-
reward stimulus. Additionally, subjective ratings of importance, intensity, and valence of the 
high-reward and no-reward stimuli were subjected to a paired t-test.  For the inhibitory control 
phase, a similar paired t-test was conducted comparing false alarm rate to the PR_No-Go and 
PU_No-Go stimuli.  
MRI Acquisition 
 Images were acquired at the MGH/HST Athinoula A. Martinos Center for Biomedical 
Imaging on a 3T CONNECTOM scanner (Fan et al., 2016; Setsompop et al., 2013) using a 
custom-made 64-channel phased array head coil (Keil et al., 2013). Functional BOLD images 
were collected in three runs of 124 volumes (total of 372 volumes) of interleaved descending 
T2*-weighted echo-planar (EPI) volumes at oblique transverse orientation with the following 
acquisition parameters: repetition time = 2500 ms, echo time = 30 ms, flip angle = 90°, array = 
72 × 72, 39 slices, effective voxel resolution = 3.0 mm3, field of view = 216 mm. A high-
resolution T1-weighted multiecho magnetization-prepared rapid gradient-echo (MEMPRAGE; 
van der Kouwe, Benner, Salat, & Fischl, 2008) image, accelerated with generalized 
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autocalibrating partially parallel acquisitions (Griswold et al., 2002) was acquired for registration 
purposes with the following acquisition parameters: repetition time = 2530 ms, echo time = 1.61 
ms, flip angle = 7°, array = 256 × 256, 208 slices, voxel resolution = 1.0 mm3, field of view = 
256 mm. 
Preprocessing 
 Brain imaging data processing and statistical analysis were performed in FMRIB's 
Software Library (FSL; Jenkinson, Beckmann, Behrens, Woolrich, & Smith, 2012). The 
MEMPRAGE image was skull-stripped using the Brain Extraction Tool (Smith, 2002), 
segmented into probabilistic tissue maps of gray matter, white matter, and cerebrospinal fluid 
using FMRIB's Automated Segmentation Tool (Zhang, Brady, & Smith, 2001), and registration 
matrices were estimated for transformation into standard template space (Montreal Neurological 
Institute [MNI] template, voxel dimensions 2 mm3). 
Functional images were reconstructed, intensity-normalized, and then preprocessed using 
the fMRI Expert Analysis Tool (FEAT, v.6). Functional images were slice time-corrected using 
Fourier space time-series phase-shifting. Realignment estimates for correcting motion in three 
translational and three rotational directions were computed in MCFLIRT (Jenkinson, Bannister, 
Brady, & Smith, 2002), and functional images were realigned. The MEMPRAGE image was 
skull-stripped using the Brain Extraction Tool. Spatial smoothing was applied using a Gaussian 
kernel of 5 mm FWHM. Images underwent high-pass temporal filtering (Gaussian-weighted 
least squares straight line fitting, with sigma = 50.0 sec) and grand mean intensity normalization. 
The images from each scanning run were coregistered to the participant's anatomical image, and 
registration matrices were estimated for later linear transformation to a standard template (T1 
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MNI template, voxel dimensions 2 mm3) using FLIRT (Jenkinson et al., 2002; Jenkinson & 
Smith, 2001). 
fMRI General Linear Model Estimation 
We used a general linear model (GLM) to estimate effects of task and control for effects 
of non-interest. The GLM design for task events was comprised of equally weighted event onsets 
and durations for (1) No-Go trials where a response was successfully inhibited to the PR_No-Go 
targets, (2) No-Go trials where a response was successfully inhibited to the PU_No-Go targets, 
(3) trials of failed attempts to inhibit a response to the PR_No-Go targets, (4) trials of failed 
attempts to inhibit a response to the PU_No-Go targets, (5) trials of correctly executed responses 
to Go-targets, and (6) trials of missed responses to Go-targets. All task regressors were 
convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function. For contrasts of the overall No-
Go condition, both the regressors for PR_No-Go and PU_No-Go were included. Following 
typical procedures for FSL, statistical analysis of functional images was conducted for each 
participant for each run, and then the runs were combined in a fixed-effect analysis for each 
participant, prior to submission to group mixed effects analyses. The linear registration of 
functional images to MNI-template space was applied in the fixed-effect analysis.  
The nuisance regressors for motion consisted of 24 regressors, and were comprised of 3-
translational and 3-rotational estimates of motion from realignment during preprocessing, their 
derivate, their square, and the square of the derivate. The 3-translational and 3-rotational 
estimates of motions were submitted to ART software (http://gablab.mit.edu/index.php/software) 
implemented through Nipype (Gorgolewski et al., 2011) to identify timepoints where there was 
greater than 0.9 mm relative translations for censoring (Siegel et al., 2014) and spikes in signal 
intensity greater than 3 standard deviations away from the subject mean for the run. Censored 
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timepoints were appended to the 24-column motion regressors for a set of combined nuisance 
regressors to append to the GLM of the task events to control for known effects of non-interest. 
If more than 15% of timepoints within a single run were censored this run was excluded. If a 
participant exhibited a single relative movement of 5 mm or greater this run was excluded. Data 
of one run was excluded for two participants after censoring and no participants lost more than 
one run of data due to excess motion.   
fMRI Group Level Statistical Analysis 
Group level mixed-effect statistical analyses were implemented in FEAT with FLAME1 
(Eklund, Nichols, & Knutsson, 2016; Woolrich, Behrens, Beckmann, Jenkinson, & Smith, 2004). 
The analysis of functional images focused on the main effects of go/no-go task event types. 
Because hierarchical modeling can only be used with a minimum of 3 runs, participants with 
fewer than 3 functional runs (i.e. participants missing any runs of data) after censoring for 
motion were not included in group mixed effects analyses (n = 2). Additionally, 5 participants 
had at least 1 run with no failed attempts to inhibit a response to the PR_No-Go targets. As these 
participants had no events for at least 1 run, there were fewer than 3 runs with events of interest 
for false alarm analyses. As such, these participants were not included in analyses of failed 
attempts. We elected to use hierarchical modeling for analyses, because some runs included a 
small number of events, and hierarchical modeling includes estimates of noise around each run 
in the overall estimate across runs (Smith et al., 2004). Thus, although on average 34% of 
PR_No-Go trials and 29% of PU_No-Go trials per run were false alarms, use of hierarchical 
modeling accounts for variation in number of events across runs and weights more heavily 
estimates from runs with more events. 
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For the general main effects of motor inhibition (No-Go collapsed across PR_No-Go and 
PU_No-Go vs. go), fixed-effect level COPEs for each subject were modeled in a group level 
GLM for Go > No-Go and for No-Go > Go. To test for the influence of conditioned reward 
association history on inhibitory control when responses were successfully withheld, we 
constructed a group level GLM for correctly withheld PR_No-Go > correctly withheld PU_No-
Go (cPR_No-Go > cPU_No-Go). To examine instances where reward history disrupted 
inhibitory control performance we compared false alarms for PR_No-Go and PU_No-Go trials 
(faPR_No-Go > faPU_No-Go).  
To examine the relationship between task-performance and neural activity, two separate 
group-level GLMs were constructed where neural activity was associated with the false alarm 
rate to PR and PU trials (one for cPR_No-Go > cPU_No-Go and one for faPR_No-Go > 
faPU_No-Go). All group-level results were thresholded using a voxel-wise Z-statistic threshold 
Z = 2.3 and a cluster threshold to achieve p ≤ .05 corrected thresholding. Unthresholded 
statistical maps were uploaded to NeuroVault.org database and are available at 
https://neurovault.org/collections/WCSIVGXW/. 
Region of Interest Analyses 
Of primary interest was investigating how neural activity in reward-related regions and 
cognitive control regions relates to individual differences in behavioral task performance during 
both training and testing. In service of this aim, activity was extracted from 4 bilateral regions of 
interest (thalamus, ventral striatum, insula, and anterior cingulate cortex).  The thalamus, ventral 
striatum, and anterior cingulate cortex were defined using coordinate values from a meta-
analysis of neural activity in reward processing (Liu, Hairston, Schrier, & Fan, 2011). The ROIs 
were created by drawing a 6-mm sphere around the voxel coordinate of the reported peak 
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activation during anticipation of reward receipt reported in this meta-analysis. For regions in 
which activity was reported bilaterally in the meta-analysis (i.e. thalamus and ventral striatum), 
one sphere was created for the left and right hemisphere, and then these spheres were combined 
into a single mask so bilateral activation was extracted together. Because the insula is a larger 
structure, we defined this region structurally. For the insula, we used an anatomical mask using 
the Harvard-Oxford Probabilistic Atlas with a 25% threshold and extracted as a singular bilateral 
mask.  Here we used an anatomical mask because, although the meta-analysis of activation 
related to reward receipt only showed differences in anterior insula, activation across both 
anterior and posterior insula has been evidenced in reward-driven attentional bias (Wang et al., 
2015; Wittmann, Lovero, Lane, & Paulus, 2010).  Activation values were extracted from these 
regions using FSL’s featquery. 
For each ROI, regressions were conducted to investigate the association between neural 
activity in correct and incorrect PR_No-Go trials and behavior during both the conditioning and 
inhibitory control phases of the CARIT. Extracted activation values for PR_No-Go trials were 
entered into a regression as a predictor of PR_No-Go false alarm rate with PU_No-Go false 
alarm rate and extracted PU_No-Go trial activation values entered as covariates. Similar 
regression analyses were conducted predicting reaction time to high-reward stimuli in the 
conditioning phase from PR_No-Go trial activation values while controlling for PU_No-Go 
activation values and reaction time to no-reward stimuli. Analyses were conducted using SPSS 
24. Results that survive Bonferroni correction for 4 ROIs (α = .013) are reported, including 




 During conditioned reward-association training, the only manipulated difference between 
the high reward and no-reward stimuli is reward-conditioning. Thus, when carried forward in the 
inhibitory control testing, the primary difference between the PR_No-Go and PU_No-Go stimuli 
is their history of reward conditioning. We hypothesized that participants would be worse at 
inhibiting responses to stimuli with a history of reward conditioning (PR_No-Go) than without. 
One potential mechanism through which history of reward conditioning may impact inhibitory 
control is through neural regions tagging reward-related salience. A way to test whether reward-
biased behavior during conditioning had an indirect effect on disruption of inhibitory control by 
the conditioned reward association through neural activity is by implementing a mediation 
analysis with neural activity for the PR_No-Go>PU_No-Go contrast as the mediator of a 
relationship between behavior during reward-conditioning and reward-biased behavior at test. 
This mediation analysis was only conducted if activity in that ROI was both associated with 
behavior in the conditioning phase and behavior in the inhibitory control phase, as determined by 
the regression analyses described above. With small to moderate sample sizes, as in this study, a 
bootstrap method of testing an indirect effect is recommended (Shrout & Bolger, 2002). Here we 
test the indirect effect of X (speeded response to high-reward relative to no-reward stimuli in the 
conditioning phase) on Y (PR_No-Go false alarm rate > PU_No-Go false alarm rate in the 
inhibitory control phase) through M (neural activity for faPR_No-Go >faPU_No-Go contrast; 
see Figure 2.8 for example). This also does not require that the total effect of X on Y reaches 
significance in this sample in order to test an indirect effect of X on Y, as an indirect effect can 
be meaningful even if the direct effect is masked (Hayes, 2009; MacKinnon & Fairchild, 2009; 
Shrout & Bolger, 2002). For ROIs that were linked with behavior during both the reward 
conditioning and inhibitory control phases, the indirect effect was tested using a bootstrapping 
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approach that provides bias-corrected confidence intervals (MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 
2004). Analyses were conducted using the Hayes (2013) SPSS process macro. Confidence 




  To check the success of the conditioned reward association manipulation during the 
conditioning phase, differences between reaction times for high-reward trials versus no-reward 
trials were compared using a paired t-test. One participant had an extreme value for reward-
biasing on the Monetary Incentive Delay task (i.e. difference in reaction time between rewarded 
and neutral stimuli), such that their reward bias was more than 3 standard deviations greater than 
the mean, and was thus excluded from analyses including behavior on the Monetary Incentive 
Delay task. Participants responded significantly faster to the high-reward stimulus than to the no-
reward stimulus, t(39) = 5.760, p < .001, see Table 2.1. Paired t-tests confirmed that participants 
rated the high-reward stimulus as more intense (t(38) = 15.028, p < .001), more important (t(38) 
= 16.962, p < .001), and of higher positive valence (t(38) = 4.391, p < .001) than the no-reward 
stimulus.  
 The hypothesized direct effects of reward history on behavior in the inhibitory control 
portion of the task was examined using a paired t-test comparing false alarm rate to PR_No-Go 
versus PU_No-Go stimuli. Results demonstrated that reward history impacted inhibitory control, 
as indicated by a higher false alarm rate to PR_No-Go stimuli than to PU_No-Go stimuli, t(40) = 
2.347, p = .024, see Table 2.2.1. A direct relationship between biasing behavior toward reward 
during the conditioning phase of the CARIT and false alarms to previously rewarded stimuli in 
the inhibitory control phase of the CARIT was tested. Pearson correlation coefficients indicated 
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that the difference in reaction time between high-reward and no-reward stimuli in the 
conditioning phase were not significantly associated with the difference in false alarm rate 
between the PR_No-Go and PU_No-Go stimuli in the inhibitory control phase, p = .47.  
Effect of task Manipulation on Neural Activity- Whole Brain  
Before examining reward-specific effects, we tested whether the expected inhibitory 
control regions were being recruited for No-Go trials generally. To check this, neural activation 
collapsing across both No-Go trial types (PR_No-Go and PU_No-Go) relative to go trials was 
examined. Correct (withheld responses) and incorrect (false alarm) No-Go trials were examined 
separately (i.e. cNo-Go>cGo and faNo-Go>cGo; see Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2). Both of these 
analyses were performed because they confer differing advantages: the faNo-Go>cGo contrast is 
equated on motoric response (i.e. pressing) between No-Go and Go trials while the cNo-Go>cGo 
differs in motoric response but is equated on accuracy. Results replicate previous go/no-go 
studies, in which participants engaged regions associated with inhibitory control including the 
right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG). 
 Group maps of correctly withheld PR_No-Go > correctly withheld PU_No-Go (cPR_No-
Go > cPU_NoGo) demonstrate that differences in the history of conditioned reward-association 
for a stimulus yielded different patterns of neural activation, even on trials when this reward 
history did not disrupt behavior (Table 2.2; Figure 2.3). Relative to cPU_No-Go trials, cPR_No-
Go trials elicited greater activity bilaterally in the IFG, insula, striatum, thalamus, caudate, lateral 
occipital cortex, and pericalcarine cortex. We also examined neural responses to PR_No-Go > 
PU_No-Go trials when inhibitory control failed, during false alarm trials (faPR_No-Go > 
faPU_No-Go).  This contrast elicited activation in the insula, lateral occipital cortex, and 
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pericalcarine cortex (Table 2.2; Figure 2.4). When the inverse of this comparison was tested 
(PU_No-Go > PR_No-Go) no significant activation was observed for correct or incorrect trials.  
Association between Neural Activity and Task Performance – Whole Brain 
 To further investigate how differences in activity between PR_No-Go and PU_No-Go 
trials relate to behavior, a whole brain analysis was conducted where both PR_No-Go and 
PU_No-Go false alarm rate were included in a group level GLM as covariates of interest.  The 
covariates of PR_No-Go false alarm rate and PU_No-Go false alarm rate were correlated, r(39) = 
.62, p < .01, but with a low level of multicollinearity (Variance Inflation Factor = 1.64 for 
PR_No-Go and PU_No-Go false alarm rate in regression predicting extracted vmPFC activity) 
indicating that it is acceptable to include both PR_No-Go and PU_No-Go false alarm rate as 
predictors. For the cPR_No-Go > cPU_No-Go contrast, false alarm rate to PR_No-Go relative to 
PU_No-Go stimuli correlated with neural activity in the vmPFC (592 voxel cluster size; local 
maximum x = -4, y = 58, z = 4). To better visualize this relationship, this activity was extracted 
and plotted against task performance (Figure 2.5). Greater vmPFC activity on correctly withheld 
PR_No-Go trials relative to PU_No-Go trials was associated with a lower false alarm rate for PR 
relative to PU stimuli. For the false alarm PR_No-Go > PU_No-Go contrast, false alarm rate to 
PR_No-Go relative to PU_No-Go trials correlated with neural activity in the lateral occipital 
cortex (1228 voxel cluster size; local maximum x = -18, y = -80, z = 38). 
Association between Neural Activity and Task Performance – Regions of Interest 
 In order to test how the frontal and striatal regions of interest related to overall ability to 
inhibit responses to stimuli with a reward-related history, regressions were conducted to 
investigate the association between neural activity for each ROI on correct and incorrect PR_No-
Go > PU_No-Go trials and behavior.  For correct trials, activity in these ROIs did not 
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significantly predict behavior (all p’s > .10). For incorrect trials, more activity in the Thalamus (β 
= .381, p = .012, Figure 2.6) and Insula (β= .440, p = .004, Figure 2.6) to faPR_No-Go > 
faPU_No-Go trials predicted more false alarms on PR_No-Go trials relative to PU_No-Go trials.  
No other regions significantly predicted the PR > PU false alarm rate (all p’s > .05).   
Relationship Monetary Incentive Delay – ROI analysis 
 Regression analyses were performed to analyze the relationship between prior learning 
performance during conditioned reward-association and neural activity during later inhibitory 
control over reward. Reward-biasing on the MID task (e.g. difference in reaction time between 
rewarded and neutral stimuli) predicted neural recruitment in the insula (β = .536, p = .001, 
Figure 2.7) during faPR_No-Go > faPU_No-Go trials. Greater differences in reaction time 
between rewarded and unrewarded stimuli on the MID task predicted greater activity in insula 
when failing to inhibit responses to PR_No-Go stimuli. There were no such associations for 
behavior on the MID task and activity on cPR_No-Go > cPU_No-Go trials (all p’s > .09). 
Mediation 
 While we document that reward association in the Conditioning phase leads to reward-
related failures in cognitive control during the inhibitory control phase, it is as of yet unclear 
which neural regions support this transfer of reward-association during learning to reward-biased 
behavior in testing. In order to investigate this, we conducted a mediation analysis testing 
whether behavior during reward-association has an indirect effect on behavior during the 
inhibitory control phase via neural activity. Insular cortical activity is sensitive to associations 
with reward and also interfaces with cognitive control networks (Wang et al., 2015), suggesting 
the insula may serve as a candidate mediator from reward learning to reward-associated failures 
in cognitive control. Additionally, our results demonstrate that insula activity is related both to 
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reward-biased behavior during the conditioning phase and failures in cognitive control in the 
inhibitory control phase. As such, we formally tested the possibility that reward biasing on the 
MID task impacted false alarm rate on the go/no-go task through neural activity in the insula for 
the contrast of faPR_No-Go > faPU_No-Go by conducting a mediation analysis. Only one 
mediation was tested and reported here through a singular bilateral mask of the insula; however, 
to confirm that a singular mask best represents our data, these results were replicated in separate 
anterior insula and posterior insula ROIs, which is reported in supplementary materials 
(Appendix A). A bootstrapping method (Hayes, 2013) was used to test whether the difference in 
reaction time between high reward and no-reward trials on the Monetary Incentive Delay task 
had an indirect effect on false alarm rates to PR_No-Go controlling for false alarm rates to 
PU_No-Go trials through insula activation for the faPR_No-Go > faPU_No-Go trial contrast. 
Results indicated that Insula activity significantly mediated this relationship (β = 0.440, SE = 
.185, 95% CI .143 - .185; Figure 2.8). 
Discussion 
 This study aimed to characterize neural and behavioral impacts of a history of reward 
conditioning on motor inhibitory control in healthy young adults by investigating group-level 
effects as well as individual variation in the ability to inhibit to previously rewarding stimuli. 
Participants first underwent conditioned reward association training, and then the rewarded and 
unrewarded stimuli from the conditioning phase served as No-Go targets in a go/no-go task to 
test the effect of reward history on inhibitory control. On average, a history of reward 
conditioning disrupted inhibitory control. Trials with previously rewarded No-Go stimuli were 
linked with greater activity in frontal and subcortical regions, including IFG, insula, striatum, 
and thalamus, relative to trials with previously unrewarded No-Go stimuli. For both the 
previously rewarded and previously unrewarded No-Go stimuli, participants had successful 
 
33 
(correctly inhibited) and unsuccessful (false alarm) attempts. Previous work has more often 
focused on neural correlates for successful trials (Anderson, 2017; Anderson et al., 2014; 
Davidow et al., 2019), however this study provided opportunity to dissociate neural signatures 
related to successful control over previous reward versus failures in control over reward. By 
analyzing these trial types separately, we were able to both examine which regions support 
inhibitory control over reward and disrupt inhibitory control over reward.  
Greater activity in the insula and thalamus on false alarms was associated with overall 
greater disruption in inhibitory control over reward related stimuli. In contrast, greater activity in 
the vmPFC on correctly withheld trials predicted better inhibitory control over reward. Activity 
in the insula during the inhibitory control phase (but no other regions) was linked both with 
behavior during reward conditioning and behavior on the go/no-go task, and insula activity 
served as a significant mediator between reward conditioning and the effect of reward history on 
inhibitory control. Overall, these results suggest that history of reward conditioning serves to 
disrupt inhibitory control, and the insula may serve as an important intermediary relay-station 
through which history of reward interacts with current control demands. 
Failures in Inhibitory Control over Reward-Associated Stimuli 
 The experiment was separated into an initial conditioned reward association phase and a 
second inhibitory control phase. During the reward conditioning phase, participants pressed a 
button in response to initially neutral stimuli. Button press to one of the stimuli was associated 
with monetary reward whereas pressing to another stimulus was not associated with any reward. 
Thus, these stimuli did not differ in number of times serving as a target but did differ in 
associated reward-value. Consistent with effective reward conditioning, participants responded 
more quickly to the rewarded than the unrewarded stimulus and reported the rewarded stimulus 
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as more important, more intense, and having more positive valence. Further, when these same 
stimuli were carried forward in a go/no-go task, participants were overall worse at inhibiting 
responses to the stimulus that had been previously associated with reward in the conditioning 
phase than the stimulus that was previously unrewarded in the conditioning phase.  
 We sought to identify which neural regions might play a role in this carry-over effect of 
history of reward-association leading to disruptions in inhibitory control. We demonstrate that 
the degree to which participants increased the speed of their responses to reward-related stimuli 
in the conditioning phase was linked with the degree to which the insula was active when 
participants made a false alarm responses to previously rewarded stimuli in the inhibitory control 
phase. More insula activity while making false alarms to previously rewarded stimuli was also 
related to the false alarm rate to previously rewarded stimuli. Finally, results of a mediation 
analysis revealed a significant indirect effect of reward-related biasing of behavior during the 
conditioning phase leading to greater disruption in inhibitory control over previously rewarded 
stimuli via activity in the insula.  
Previous work has demonstrated that the insula is important for responding to salient 
events and stimuli (Seeley et al., 2007; Uddin, 2015) and is involved in reward processing 
(Knutson et al., 2000; Lee & Shomstein, 2013; Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010). One study extended 
this work to examine insular activity in an attentional control task after acquisition of reward-
association, demonstrating that initial reward learning interfaces with later attentional control 
through the insula, supporting the role of the insula as an intermediary relay station through 
which reward history affects cognitive control (Wang et al., 2015). Finally, theoretical 
frameworks posit that the insula modulates control over actions, particularly in less predictable 
environments, based upon motivationally salient stimuli in the environment (Tops & Boksem, 
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2011). Taken together, theory and empirical evidence suggests that the insula serves as an 
intermediary through which motivational reward history subsequently biases cognitive control 
even after the prospect of reward is no longer available, and our findings provide further 
evidence that reward-conditioned responses interact with cognitive control via the insula.  
In addition to the insula, we found that greater activity in the thalamus for previously 
rewarded relative to previously unrewarded stimuli during false alarms was related to worse 
inhibitory control over previously rewarded stimuli. The thalamus receives input from the 
striatum via direct and indirect pathways and projects to the motor cortex, and in turn serves to 
integrate reward-related motivation and action selection (Bosch-Bouju, Hyland, & Parr-
Brownlie, 2013; Corbit, Muir, & Balleine, 2003; Lanciego et al., 2012; Wickens et al., 2003). 
Previous work has linked thalamic activity with invigorated motor responses and reward 
response (Gaidica, Hurst, Cyr, & Leventhal, 2018; Liu et al., 2011; Rademacher et al., 2010), 
both of which are consistent with our findings demonstrating links between thalamic activity and 
false alarm rate to previously rewarded stimuli. 
Successful Inhibitory Control over Reward-Associated Stimuli 
While participants, on average, demonstrated more failures in inhibitory control to 
previously rewarded than previously unrewarded stimuli, there was variability in this effect both 
across trials and across participants. In an effort to test which regions support better inhibitory 
control over reward, we examined how neural activity on successful trials related to overall 
ability to withhold responses to previously rewarded stimuli. A whole brain investigation of 
relationships between neural activity on correct trials and behavioral performance revealed that 
greater vmPFC activity to previously rewarded relative to previously unrewarded stimuli on 
correct trials predicted better ability to withhold responses to previously rewarded relative to 
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previously unrewarded stimuli. The vmPFC supports behavioral flexibility in the context of 
changing reward contingencies (Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000; Fellows & Farah, 2003), 
and this region is involved in updating relationships between potential actions and reward 
outcomes (Gläscher, Hampton, & O’Doherty, 2009). In the current study, participants initially 
learn an association between pressing to the rewarded stimulus and a reward outcome in the 
conditioning phase, and subsequently are required to update this relationship as the prospect of 
reward is removed and a different response (withholding) is aligned with task goals. This task 
demonstrates that greater vmPFC activity is associated with better ability to inhibit responses to 
previously rewarded stimuli, which may reflect reversing an action-outcome association and is 
consistent with studies of reversal learning which identify this role for the vmPFC (Fellows & 
Farah, 2003; Zhang et al., 2016). 
We also hypothesized that while successfully inhibiting a response to a previously 
rewarded stimuli, frontal control areas would be recruited. On average there was greater activity 
in the IFG for successful inhibition to previously rewarded relative to previously unrewarded 
stimuli. We additionally expected that differences in ACC activity would be observed and would 
relate to task performance. While previous work demonstrates that ACC supports conflict 
resolution and monitoring during inhibition (Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004; Verbruggen & 
Logan, 2008), our results suggest that ACC activity does not differ when supporting inhibition 
over stimuli with or without a history of conditioned reward-association. The IFG supports 
successful inhibition to neutral stimuli in inhibitory control tasks (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 
2014; Swick, Ashley, & Turken, 2008), and shows increases in activity corresponding to 
increases in difficulty in inhibition (Hughes, Johnston, Fulham, Budd, & Michie, 2013). Given 
that participants show more difficulty inhibiting to previously rewarded stimuli, the increase in 
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IFG activity for previously rewarded stimuli may be supporting the resolution of increased 
demands of inhibition when at odds with an action previously associated with reward. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
While this study provided novel insight into how reward history disrupts inhibitory 
control in typically functioning adults, there are limitations to consider and future avenues for 
research. Firstly, because we measured neural function during the go/no-go task, but not during 
initial conditioned reward-association on the Monetary Incentive Delay task, future work is 
required to investigate which regions recruited during reward learning impact later disruption in 
inhibitory control. Secondly, while this project examined how a specific facet of cognitive 
control (inhibition) interacts with reward history, more work is needed to clarify how these 
findings generalize to cognitive control and reward interactions more broadly. Our findings in 
the inhibitory control domain replicate and extend previous findings in the attention domain 
(Wang et al., 2015), suggesting that the insula may serve as a relay station through which reward 
history and cognitive control interact. As such, it is likely that the insula serves this function 
across cognitive control domains, and this warrants further investigation.  
In conclusion, this study characterized neural substrates associated with successful and 
unsuccessful inhibition to previously rewarded stimuli, relative to stimuli with no history of 
reward, in typically functioning young adults. We provide evidence that conditioning a reward-
association with a button-press response for one stimulus leads to worse inhibitory control over 
that stimulus in a subsequent task. This effect is mediated by activity in the insula during false 
alarm trials, which provides support for the insula being an interface between reward learning 
and subsequent effects on cognitive control. While greater insula activity was linked with worse 
performance, greater vmPFC activity during successful inhibition over reward is associated with 
 
38 
better performance for previously rewarded relative to unrewarded stimuli. Taken together, this 
suggests that the vmPFC may contribute to successful motor inhibition in the face of previous 
reward whereas insula may bias behavior toward previously rewarded actions and stimuli, even 
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STUDY 2: COMPETING EFFECTS OF GOAL-DRIVEN AND REWARD-DRIVEN 
ATTENTION IN THE FRONTOPARIETAL ATTENTION NETWORK 
Introduction 
Reward-associated stimuli continue to distract even when the prospect of reward is 
removed, when reward-driven distraction is at odds with current task goals, and when a more 
physically salient stimulus is present (Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011; Bourgeois, Neveu, 
Bayle, & Vuilleumier, 2017; Le Pelley, Pearson, Griffiths, & Beesley, 2015). These findings 
cannot be accounted for by models of attention that posit attention consists of only two modes of 
orienting: through voluntary, goal-directed attention or involuntary, stimulus-driven attention 
(e.g. Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). To account for this dissonance, a third mode of orienting 
attention via selection history has been posited (Awh, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2012; Failing & 
Theeuwes, 2018). It is suggested that all signals biasing attention, including biasing from top-
down control, physical salience, and history effects, converge on the priority map which 
represents the spatial location most likely to be selected (Failing & Theeuwes, 2018; Itti & Koch, 
2001; Theeuwes, 2010; Zelinsky & Bisley, 2015). Reward history appears to exert a strong effect 
on attentional selection and dampens effects of both voluntary and involuntary orienting 
(Bourgeois et al., 2017).  
A current prevailing theory proposes that the dopamine release in the striatum during 
reward learning drives changes in visual cortical and parietal representations of stimuli, which in 
turn leads to biasing attentional selection in favor of those reward-associated stimuli (Anderson, 
2018). While some elements of this theory are well supported, as described in greater detail 
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below, this study aims to address currently untested assumptions of this proposed mechanism. To 
do so, this study consists of two different phases. First, participants complete a “reward training 
phase” during which reward is associated with a stimulus in a visual search task. Then, 
participants complete a “testing phase” during which participants no longer receive money for 
responses to the previously rewarded stimulus and the previously rewarded stimulus serves as a 
non-predictive cue in an attention cueing paradigm. The first of these untested assumptions is 
that striatal activity leads to changes in visual cortical and parietal activity. If this is occurring, it 
would be expected that striatal activity during the reward association phase predicts visual and 
parietal activity in the presence of a reward-associated stimulus, even when attentional selection 
of that stimulus is no longer rewarded (as in the testing phase). However, no studies to date have 
examined neural activity during a reward association phase and during an unrewarded testing 
phase, limiting the ability to test this prediction.  
Second, while this theory provides a suggested neural mechanism through which reward 
history biases activity in visual and parietal regions, it does not address how this bias interacts 
with goal-directed, top-down attention, which also modulates visual and parietal activity 
(Buschman & Miller, 2007; Li, Piëch, & Gilbert, 2004). This interaction is an important element 
of understanding attentional bias to reward, because reactive top-down attention must be 
employed in the presence of a reward-associated distractor. Further, there is some evidence that 
attentional bias to reward-associated distractors is inversely related to measures of executive 
functioning (Anderson et al., 2011). As of yet, it is unclear what neural regions support the 
resolution of competing reward-driven and goal-driven bias. The current study addresses this 
question by contrasting trials in which goal-driven and reward-driven bias align with those in 
which goal-driven and reward-driven bias are at odds. 
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 Existing studies offer support for the role of striatal, visual cortical, and parietal regions 
in biasing attention to reward. Collectively, these regions have been termed the “value-driven 
attentional network,” which is specifically comprised of the caudate tail, early visual cortex, 
lateral occipital complex (LOC), and the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) (Anderson, 2017, for reviews 
see Anderson, 2018; Anderson, Folk, Garrison, & Rogers, 2016). During the reward association 
phase, reward amplifies stimulus representation in the visual cortex (Itthipuripat, Vo, Sprague, & 
Serences, 2019; Serences, 2008; Serences & Saproo, 2010). This reward-related modulation of 
visual cortical activity is also linked with dopaminergic midbrain activity (Hickey & Peelen, 
2015, 2017), and plays a causal role in reward association in a training phase leading to 
distraction during a testing phase (van Koningsbruggen, Ficarella, Battelli, & Hickey, 2016). 
Visual cortical activity feeds forward to parietal cortex, where goal-driven, stimulus-driven, and 
history-driven signals converge on the attentional priority map (Bisley & Mirpour, 2019; 
Zelinsky & Bisley, 2015). The presence of reward-associated distractors is reflected by increases 
in parietal cortex activity (Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2014; Barbaro, Peelen, & Hickey, 
2017), and it has been suggested that reward impacts attentional selection by biasing activity in 
the attentional priority map (Anderson, 2018; Failing & Theeuwes, 2018; Todd & Manaligod, 
2018). Taken together, these studies demonstrate that modulations in visual and parietal activity 
play an important role in the biasing of attention to reward.  
 These changes in visual and parietal activation that are evidenced during the testing 
phase, even after the opportunity for reward is removed, and are likely driven by dopaminergic 
prediction-error signals in midbrain regions. Results of positron emission tomography studies 
suggest that dopaminergic signaling in the caudate is related to both learning and sustaining 
reward-driven biases (Anderson, Kuwabara, et al., 2016; Anderson et al., 2017). Reward-driven 
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attentional bias has also been linked with activity in the striatum in the face of the reward-
associated stimuli (Meffert et al., 2018). And it has been hypothesized that projections from 
midbrain to visual cortex modulate early visual activity, which in turn modulates activity in the 
parietal priority map (Anderson, 2018). Midbrain-driven biasing of visual cortical activity is also 
consistent with findings that visual cortex is sensitive to both timing and probability of reward 
receipt in a prediction-error like manner (Arsenault, Nelissen, Jarraya, & Vanduffel, 2013; 
Shuler & Bear, 2006). These findings suggest reward-related activity in the striatum drives 
sustained changes in visual and parietal representations of a reward-associated stimulus, yet this 
prediction cannot be tested without examining neural activity both during a reward-association 
phase and a separate testing phase during which that stimulus has no reward association.  
The current study aims to directly test this hypothesis by first associating monetary 
reward with attention to a stimulus and subsequently using the previously rewarded stimulus as a 
non-predictive cue during a second testing phase that implements a modified attention cueing 
paradigm during which participants do not receive money associated with that stimulus. 
Consistent with the current theory that dopaminergic signals in ventral striatum modulate 
representation in early visual cortex and subsequently the priority map in the parietal cortex 
(Anderson, 2018), it is hypothesized that activity in the striatum during reward training phase 
will predict both behavioral and neural biasing to reward at test. Specifically, it is expected that 
striatum activity during the reward training phase will predict the degree to which performance is 
better when responding to targets that appear in the same location as a reward-associated cue 
compared with responding to targets in a location opposite the reward-associated cue. 
Additionally, it is hypothesized that striatal activity during the reward training activity will 
predict the difference between activity within the value-driven attention network, including 
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visual cortical and parietal areas, for trials including a previously rewarded cue compared to 
trials with only neutral cues during the testing phase. 
The second aim of this study is to better characterize interactions between goal-directed 
attention and reward-driven attention. There is evidence that reward-related stimuli provide 
facilitation when goal-driven and reward-driven attention align but lead to deficits in 
performance when goal-driven and reward-driven attention are at odds (Failing & Theeuwes, 
2014; Preciado, Munneke, & Theeuwes, 2017). Both reward-driven and goal-driven signals 
converge on the attentional priority map (Failing & Theeuwes, 2018; Todd & Manaligod, 2018), 
suggesting opportunity for competition between these types of attention. Further, both reward-
driven and goal-driven attention modulate visual cortical activity with some evidence that their 
modulations can be additive in nature when directed to the same stimulus (Garcia-Lazaro et al., 
2018). To date, no study has directly compared neural activity when goal-driven and reward-
driven effects align versus when goal-directed and reward-driven effects are at odds. The current 
study aims to examine which regions support goal-driven attention overcoming reward-driven 
attention by using a modified attention cueing paradigm during a testing phase, in which a 
stimulus that was previously reward-associated during a reward training phase serves as a non-
predictive cue. A two-cue presentation were implemented, in which the previously reward-
associated cue is presented alongside a neutral cue. For this trial type, the target will appear in 
the location of the neutral cue on 50% of trials (invalid trials; competition between goal-driven 
and reward-driven signals) and in the location of the previously rewarded cue on 50% of trials 
(valid trials; alignment between goal-driven and reward-driven signals). By directly contrasting 
activity for correct invalid versus correct valid trials, this study is able to determine which 
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regions support successful deployment of goal-driven over reward-driven attention while 
controlling for visual input from reward-associated stimuli.  
While this process is largely unexplored at this time, some candidate regions that may 
subserve successful resolution of competing reward-driven and goal-driven signals on the 
priority map include the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), insula, and middle frontal gyrus 
(MFG), as these regions support reactive filtering of distractors (Marini, Demeter, Roberts, 
Chelazzi, & Woldorff, 2016). The ACC plays an important function for reactive control (De 
Pisapia & Braver, 2006; Grandjean et al., 2012; MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000), 
and it is expected that this region will be preferentially active for trials on which goal- and 
reward-driven bias are at odds compared to trials on which they align. While the role of the 
insula in attentional bias to reward is still somewhat unclear, activity in insula has also been 
shown to respond preferentially to previously rewarded over previously unrewarded stimuli 
(Anderson et al., 2014; Wang et al., 2015). Insula activity also shows a direct relationship to 
reward-modulated early visual activity (Lee & Shomstein, 2013). There is also some evidence 
that the insula acts as a relay station, through which reward history interacts with the fronto-
parietal control network (Wang et al., 2015). As such, it is expected that insula activity will be 
present for all testing phase trials in which stimuli associated with reward are present, and that 
this activation may be stronger when the target appears opposite the reward-associated cue 
(when goal- and reward-driven bias are at odds) compared to when the target appears in the 
reward-associated cue (when goal- and reward-driven bias align).  
In summary, it is hypothesized that striatal activity during reward learning predicts 
sustained changes in parietal and visual cortical activity, a hypothesis that has previously not 
been directly tested because no study to date has examined neural activity both during reward 
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training and during testing. By collecting neuroimaging data during a reward training phase and 
a separate testing phase, this study will directly test whether striatal activity during the reward 
training phase can predict activity in parietal and visual cortex in the testing phase. Additionally, 
while goal-driven and reward-driven bias converge on the attentional priority map, it is as of yet 
unclear how these biases are resolved when in competition with one another. By implementing a 
task design in which goal-driven and reward-driven bias are aligned on some trials and at-odds 
on others, this study will test which neural regions differ between converging and competing 
bias. It is expected that trials for which goal-driven and reward-driven bias are in competition 
will show greater activity in prefrontal regions, ACC, and insula.   
Materials and Methods 
Overall Design 
 All participants were recruited out of part of a larger study titled “Frontolimbic circuitry, 
behavioral flexibility, and adolescent alcohol history.” The subset of participants from this larger 
study who had not already completed reward-association tasks with the present stimuli were 
eligible for participation in the current study. Participants completed two study visits. At study 
visit 1, participants completed questionnaires and tasks outside of the scanner. At this session, 
participants completed an initial reward-association training (360 trials). At study visit 2, 
participants underwent fMRI scanning while completing tasks as well as completing tasks 
outside the scanner. While undergoing fMRI scanning, participants completed a brief re-training 
of the reward-association task (120 trials) with the same rewarded stimulus as in study visit 1. 
This was followed by a modified cueing paradigm using the previously rewarded (PR) and 
previously unrewarded (PU) stimuli in the reward association task, also completed during fMRI 




 Participants were N = 27 adults age 22 – 40. Of participants who completed demographic 
information through an online questionnaire, 2 participants left demographic information blank. 
Hard copies in Howell lab space with information regarding age and gender for these participants 
could not be accessed at this time due to restriction in movement from COVID-19, but will be 
included after movement to lab space is no longer restricted. Of the participants who responded, 
they were an average of 26.4 years old (SD = 4.8 years), 21 female and 4 male. Participants were 
recruited from print advertisements, flyers, and email listservs. Individuals were excluded from 
participation if they reported a history of neurological or psychiatric diagnoses, were currently 
taking psychoactive medications (e.g. antidepressants, narcotic pain relievers), or were using 
illicit drugs. Individuals who were color-blind were excluded as determined by both self-report 
on a phone screen and the Ishihara color blindness test (Ishihara, 1973). Participants were 
excluded for any fMRI contra-indications, including left-handedness, pregnancy, claustrophobia, 
or metal in the body that cannot be removed.  
The broader study recruited participants based on history of alcohol use. Specifically, half 
of the participants in the larger study have a history of binge drinking in adolescence (i.e. four or 
more binge drinking episodes prior to age 18) while the other half is a control group without any 
history of binge drinking prior to age 18. Of these two groups, half of each did not engage in 
recent binge drinking (defined as 0 or 1 binge episodes in the past year) and half will have 
engaged in recent binge drinking (defined as 2 or more binge episodes in the past year). Given 
that data form the 2015 Youth Risk Behavior Survey indicates that by the time students are in the 
12th grade, 24.6% of respondents report having a binge drinking episode in the past month (Kann 
et al., 2018), we anticipate that inclusion of a subset of participants with a history of binge 
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drinking in adolescence is representative of typically recruited samples. In our final sample 
included in the current study, 18 participants did not have a history of binge drinking in 
adolescence, and of those participants 4 of them reported recent binge drinking. Additionally,  9 
participants reported having a history of binge drinking in adolescence, all of whom reported 
recent binge drinking. While testing the impact of history of adolescent binge drinking is not a 
primary aim of this study, analyses were conducted that confirmed no difference in task 
performance or striatal activity between groups, and so all participants were included in the 
analyses.  
All participants provided informed consent to participate in the study. Participants were 
compensated for their time. Specifically, participants earned monetary bonuses for performance 
within the reward-association task, described in more detail below, and received a $15 bonus for 
achieving at least 75% accuracy on the modified cueing task. If participants did not achieve at 
least $15/hour from task bonuses, they were paid at an hourly rate of $15/hour for their 
participation. All procedures were approved by the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
Institutional Review Board.  
Training 
Reward was associated with a given colored circle using a training paradigm adapted 
from Anderson and colleagues (2011). Training trials consisted of a fixation screen, followed by 
a search array, and then a feedback screen on a gray background (Figure 3.1). The sequence 
began with a fixation screen (jittered time interval, 500 – 4500 ms, M = 1350 ms, SD = 1062 
ms). Jitter time approximated an exponential distribution with 50% of trials at the shortest time 
interval (500 ms). The search array consisted of six circles placed at equal intervals at an 
imaginary circle with a 5˚ radius around the fixation cross. Each circle was a different color and 
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contained a white line. One of the circles was either blue or yellow on every trial, with the blue 
or yellow circle being the target circle. A blue and yellow circle never appeared on the same 
trial. Participants were instructed to indicate with a button response whether the white line inside 
the target circle is vertical or horizontal by pressing the appropriate button with their index 
finger. Participants had 800 ms to respond. After the search display, a fixation screen was 
displayed (jittered time interval, 500 – 1500 ms, M = 812 ms, SD = 410 ms) before a feedback 
screen displayed for 1000 ms showed the amount of money earned (if any) and the current total. 
Jitter time approximated an exponential distribution with 50% of trials at the shortest time 
interval (500 ms). If participants gave the incorrect response, the feedback display was blank 
aside from the current total. If no response was given within the time-frame, the feedback screen 
displayed “Slow” along with the current total money.   
The color of the rewarded target (blue or yellow) was counterbalanced across 
participants. For the rewarded target, 80% of trials were worth 30 cents and 20% were worth no 
money. For the unrewarded target, all trials were worth no money. Our paradigm implements a 
probabilistic reward rather than a reward with 100% prediction certainty, because previous work 
indicates that dopaminergic neurons are less sensitive to 100% predictive rewards which limits 
reward learning (Hollerman & Schultz, 1998; Mirenowicz & Schultz, 1994). For session 1, 
participants completed 360 trials of this task across 3 blocks. In session 1, the stimuli are 
presented on a laptop and participants provided button responses on a keyboard. For session 2, 
participants completed a brief practice session outside the scanner on a laptop. Participants then 
completed 2 runs of the reward training task while undergoing scanning (120 trials total). 
Participants viewed the task projected onto a screen in a mirror mounted on the head coil and 
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used a MR compatible button box to make behavioral responses using their left and right index 
fingers. All tasks were programmed using OpenSesame (Mathôt, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012).  
Testing 
 The testing phase of these tasks implemented a modified attention cuing paradigm 
(Figure 3.2). Testing trials consist of a fixation, a double-cue display, and a target display. The 
fixation is displayed at the start of a trial (jittered time interval, 500 – 4500 ms, M = 1323 ms, SD 
= 1061 ms). Jitter time approximated an exponential distribution with 50% of trials at the 
shortest time interval (500 ms). The cue display was presented for 200 ms and consisted of two 
differently colored circles (peach, maroon, yellow, or blue; 3.4˚ diameter) with figure-eight 
placeholders inside the circles (2.3˚ x 1.1˚). The blue and yellow colors previously served as 
target in the reward training (either previously rewarded or previously unrewarded). The peach 
and maroon circles were displayed in training but never served as targets, so they serve as neutral 
cues. After 200 ms, an offset of two line segments in each of the figure-eight premasks revealed 
the target display. The target display consisted of the same circles as the cueing display, but with 
a letter revealed inside each circle (“S”, “P”, “H”, “E”; 2.3˚ x 1.1˚). A premask with an offset 
was used rather than target onset to minimize exogenous orienting by an onset (Jonides, 1981). 
One of the two letters were a target letter (“S” or “P”) and the other were a distractor letter (“H” 
or “E”). Participants were instructed to indicate with a button response which target letter was 
present by pressing the appropriate button with their left or right index finger. The target display 
remained on the screen for 800 ms. For this phase, participants were explicitly informed that the 
circles are unrelated to the location of the target letter, emphasizing the color of the circles was 
task-irrelevant. Participants completed a short practice block prior to scanning. Testing consisted 
of 480 trials across 3 runs while undergoing scanning. Trials were coded as PR,  PU, or neutral 
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according to the cue types present (Figure 3.3). While the cues were non-predictive, for PR trials 
and PU trials, when the target appeared in the location of the previously trained stimulus, the trial 
was coded as valid. When the target appeared in the location opposite a PR or PU cue, the trial 
was coded as invalid.  
Image Acquisition 
 Scanning was performed on a 3T Siemens Prisma Scanner, using a 32-channel head coil. 
T1-weighted multiecho MPRAGE volumes (anatomical scans) were acquired for coregistration 
with fMRI images (TR = 2400 ms, TE = 2.24 ms, flip angle = 8°, field of view = 256 x 256 mm, 
in-plane voxel size = 0.8 mm3). A navigator echo before scan acquisition was used to reduce 
artifacts caused by motion. This compares slices to the echo online and permits up to 20% of 
slices to be reacquired. Blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) signal during functional runs was 
acquired using a gradient-echo T2*-weighted EPI sequence. Seventy-two slices with a 2 x 2 x 2 
mm3 voxel size were acquired in the sagittal plane (TR = 800 ms, TE = 37 ms, flip angle = 52°, 
bandwidth = 2290 Hz/Px, echo spacing = 0.58 ms, field of view = 208 x 208 mm). For the first 
run of the reward-association task and the first and third runs of the cueing task, data was 
acquired with an anterior to posterior phase encoding direction, while a posterior to anterior 
phase encoding direction was implemented for data from the second run of the reward 
association task and the second run of the cueing task. By acquiring data with opposite phase 
encoding directions between runs, this allows for the implementation of fieldmap correction 
which serves to estimate and correct susceptibility induced distortions.  Before each scan, 8 





Results included in this manuscript come from preprocessing performed using fMRIPrep 1.3.2 
(Esteban et al., 2019, 2018), which is based on Nipype 1.1.9 (Gorgolewski et al., 2011, 2018). 
Anatomical data preprocessing 
Each subject’s T1-weighted (T1w) image was corrected for intensity non-uniformity (INU) 
with N4BiasFieldCorrection (Tustison et al., 2010), distributed with ANTs 2.2.0 (Avants, 
Epstein, Grossman, & Gee, 2008). The T1w-reference was then skull-stripped with 
a Nipype implementation of the antsBrainExtraction.sh workflow (from ANTs), using 
OASIS30ANTs as target template. A T1w-reference map was computed after registration of 2 
T1w images (after INU-correction) using mri_robust_template (FreeSurfer 6.0.1, Dale, Fischl, & 
Sereno, 1999). Brain surfaces were reconstructed using recon-all (FreeSurfer 6.0.1, Dale et al., 
1999), and the brain mask estimated previously was refined with a custom variation of the 
method to reconcile ANTs-derived and FreeSurfer-derived segmentations of the cortical gray-
matter of Mindboggle (Klein et al., 2017). Spatial normalization to the ICBM 152 Nonlinear 
Asymmetrical template version 2009c (Fonov, Evans, McKinstry, Almli, & Collins, 2009) was 
performed through nonlinear registration with antsRegistration (ANTs 2.2.0), using brain-
extracted versions of both T1w volume and template. Brain tissue segmentation of cerebrospinal 
fluid (CSF), white-matter (WM) and gray-matter (GM) was performed on the brain-extracted 
T1w using fast (FSL 5.0.9, Zhang, Brady, & Smith, 2001). 
Functional data preprocessing 
For each of the 5 BOLD runs found per subject (2 runs of reward learning task; 3 runs of cueing 
task), the following preprocessing was performed. First, a reference volume and its skull-stripped 
version were generated using a custom methodology of fMRIPrep. A deformation field to correct 
for susceptibility distortions was estimated based on extracting the first 3 volumes of task data 
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collected in the AP phase encoding direction and the first 3 volumes of task data collected in the 
PA phase encoding direction, using 3dQwarp (Cox & Hyde, 1997) (AFNI 20160207). Based on 
the estimated susceptibility distortion, an unwarped BOLD reference was calculated for a more 
accurate co-registration with the anatomical reference. The BOLD reference was then co-
registered to the T1w reference using bbregister (FreeSurfer) which implements boundary-based 
registration (Greve & Fischl, 2009). Co-registration was configured with nine degrees of 
freedom to account for distortions remaining in the BOLD reference. Head-motion parameters 
with respect to the BOLD reference (transformation matrices, and six corresponding rotation and 
translation parameters) are estimated before any spatiotemporal filtering using mcflirt (FSL 
5.0.9, Jenkinson, Bannister, Brady, & Smith, 2002). BOLD runs were slice-time corrected 
using 3dTshift from AFNI 20160207 (Cox & Hyde, 1997). The BOLD time-series, were 
resampled to surfaces on the following spaces: fsaverage5. The BOLD time-series (including 
slice-timing correction when applied) were resampled onto their original, native space by 
applying a single, composite transform to correct for head-motion and susceptibility distortions. 
These resampled BOLD time-series will be referred to as preprocessed BOLD in original space, 
or just preprocessed BOLD. The BOLD time-series were resampled to MNI152NLin2009cAsym 
standard space, generating a preprocessed BOLD run in MNI152NLin2009cAsym space. First, a 
reference volume and its skull-stripped version were generated using a custom methodology 
of fMRIPrep. Several confounding time-series were calculated based on the preprocessed BOLD: 
framewise displacement (FD), DVARS and three region-wise global signals. FD and DVARS 
are calculated for each functional run, both using their implementations in Nipype (following the 
definitions by Power et al., 2014). Additionally, a set of physiological regressors were extracted 
to allow for component-based noise correction (CompCor, Behzadi et al. 2007). Principal 
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components are estimated after high-pass filtering the preprocessed BOLD time-series (using a 
discrete cosine filter with 128s cut-off) for the anatomical CompCor variant (aCompCor). A 
subcortical mask is obtained by heavily eroding the brain mask, which ensures it does not 
include cortical GM regions. For aCompCor, six components are calculated within the 
intersection of the aforementioned mask and the union of CSF and WM masks calculated in T1w 
space, after their projection to the native space of each functional run (using the inverse BOLD-
to-T1w transformation). The head-motion estimates calculated in the correction step were also 
placed within the corresponding confounds file. All resamplings can be performed with a single 
interpolation step by composing all the pertinent transformations (i.e. head-motion transform 
matrices, susceptibility distortion correction when available, and co-registrations to anatomical 
and template spaces). Gridded (volumetric) resamplings were performed 
using antsApplyTransforms (ANTs), configured with Lanczos interpolation to minimize the 
smoothing effects of other kernels (Lanczos, 1964). Non-gridded (surface) resamplings were 
performed using mri_vol2surf (FreeSurfer). 
Many internal operations of fMRIPrep use Nilearn 0.5.0 (Abraham et al., 2014), mostly within 
the functional processing workflow. For more details of the pipeline, see the section 
corresponding to workflows in fMRIPrep’s documentation 
(https://fmriprep.readthedocs.io/en/latest/workflows.html). 
Finally, the data were spatially smoothed with a 4-mm FWHM kernel. Data were 
inspected for artifacts using framewise displacement data produced by fMRIPrep. Single-point 
outlier regressors were included in person-level models to account for any motion exceeding 0.9 
mm. In addition, six rigid body motion regressors and their 1st derivative were included in 
person-level models. There were no individual runs where more than 20% of the time points in 
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the run were excluded due to motion, thus, no entire runs were excluded due to motion. Within 
the cueing task, 3 participants had one run of data that could not be included in analysis due to 
other technical difficulties. These participants were included in data analysis using 2 runs of 
cueing data. 
fMRI General Linear Model Estimation 
 Two general linear models (GLMs) were used to estimate effects of task and control for 
effects of non-interest: one for the training phase and one for the testing phase. For training, the 
covariates of interest included in the model were the onset of the Rewarded target stimulus with 
correct responses and the onset of the Unrewarded target stimulus with correct responses. The 
model also included covariates modeling all incorrect trials and the onset of the feedback screen. 
Motion and outlier regressors were included as covariates of non-interest as described above.  
 For testing, covariates modeled trial type and target location for accurate trials, resulting 
in the following covariates: (1) all incorrect trials, (2) correct neutral trials, (3) correct PR valid 
target left, (4) correct PR valid target right, (5) correct PR invalid target left, (6) correct PR 
invalid target right, (7) correct PU valid target left, (8) correct PU valid target right, (9) correct 
PU invalid target left, and (10) correct PU invalid target right. Motion and outlier regressors 
were included as covariates of non-interest as described above. 
fMRI Group level statistical analysis 
 Group-level mixed-effect statistical analyses were implemented in FEAT with FLAME1 
(Eklund, Nichols, & Knutsson, 2016; Woolrich, Behrens, Beckmann, Jenkinson, & Smith, 2004). 
For training, analysis of functional images will focus on isolating the value-driven attention 
network during reward learning by contrasting correct Rewarded trials and correct Unrewarded 
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trials. All results were thresholded using a voxel-wise Z-statistic threshold Z=2.3 and a cluster 
threshold p =.05.  This cluster level correction in combination with FLAME effectively 
decreases the rate of false-positive findings, because it accounts for the probability of a cluster 
occurring by chance (Eklund et al., 2016; Woolrich et al., 2004).  
Behavioral Analysis 
Attentional bias effects were measured using inverse efficiency. Inverse efficiency 
accounts for a combination of RT and accuracy to account for speed-accuracy tradeoffs 
(RT/accuracy). In calculating RT, any RTs below 100 ms were excluded from further analyses, 
as these responses are likely too fast to reflect accurate target discrimination. Only correct 
responses were used to calculate reaction time. For the training phase, a paired t-test compared 
performance on the rewarded and unrewarded targets to determine whether participants show 
facilitated performance for the rewarded target. For the testing phase, a repeated measures 
ANOVA comparing performance for invalid PR trials, neutral trials, and valid PR trials was 
implemented to assess whether an attentional bias to reward is evident and whether both 
facilitated capture for the valid trials and impaired disengagement for the invalid trials was 
observed. While the PR trial types are of primary interest, a follow-up repeated measures 
ANOVA was conducted for the valid and invalid PU trials to determine whether the attentional 
bias is specific to reward or due to general experience. Similar analyses replicated on RT and 
accuracy independently are reported in Appendix A.  
Training Phase and Testing Phase Relationships 
 This study aims to test whether striatal activity during reward-learning predicts activity in 
the value-driven attention network at test. To do so, activity within the ventral striatum during 
the training phase for correct Rewarded > correct Unrewarded were extracted using FSL’s 
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featquery function. The ROI sphere was created by drawing 4 mm sphere around the peak 
activation within the ventral striatum. Then, a group-level GLM for the testing phase was 
constructed in which neural activity were associated with extracted beta weight value of striatal 
activity in training. The group-level results were thresholded using a voxel-wise Z-statistic 
threshold Z = 2.3 and a cluster threshold p = .05.  
 Additionally, this study will examine whether striatal activity during the training phase 
predicts attentional bias to reward during the testing phase. This was investigated by with a 
simple bivariate correlation between striatal activity during the training phase (described above) 
and attentional bias on PR trials (described above). 
Results 
Behavioral Results. 
Reward Training. To assess a reward-effect in training, a paired t-test with reward status 
(rewarded, unrewarded) as a within-subjects factor was implemented on inverse efficiency for 
both training sessions. Session 1 results indicated that participants performed better on trials with 
the rewarded color than trials with the unrewarded color in the initial training, t(26) = 7.80, p < 
.001.  In session 2, the pattern of results was the same, such that participants performed better on 
trials with the rewarded color than trials with the unrewarded color, t(26) = 6.12, p < .001.  
To explore whether the reward-effect changed between the training sessions, a 2x2 
repeated-measures ANOVA with reward status (rewarded, unrewarded) and session as within-
subjects factors was implemented on inverse efficiency. For inverse efficiency, there was both a 
main effect of reward type, F(1, 26) = 56.44, p < .001, and a reward by session interaction, F(1, 
26) = 5.70, p  = .025. This indicated that participants performed better for the rewarded color 
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relative to the unrewarded color, and this effect of reward on performance was larger in Session 
2 than in Session 1 (Table 3.1). 
Attention Cueing Paradigm. It was anticipated that, consistent with value-driven 
attentional bias, participants would demonstrate increasingly worse performance across valid PR, 
neutral baseline, and invalid PR trials. To test this linear-orienting effect, a repeated-measures 
ANOVA was conducted for performance on PR trials with the within-subjects factors of trial 
type (invalid, baseline, valid). There was a significant effect of trial type on inverse efficiency, 
F(1.29, 33.48) = 8.58, p = .003, η2 = .248, which was linear in nature as hypothesized, F(1, 26) = 
9.88, p = .004, η2 = .275, Figure 3.4. Paired t-tests on inverse efficiency revealed a significant 
effect of both facilitated capture to the PR cue, t(26) = 2.41, p = .023, and impaired 
disengagement from the PR cue, t(26) = 2.73, p = .011. 
To examine whether the orienting effect is value-specific, we tested whether an orienting 
effect was exhibited for PU cues, which contained the color that was the unrewarded target color 
in the training phase. A similar repeated-measures ANOVA with the within-subjects factor of 
trial type (invalid, baseline, valid) was implemented for PU trials. There was no effect of trial 
type on inverse efficiency (MValid = 556, SDValid = 88, MInvalid = 553, SDValid = 75, p = .819). 
Because there was no evidence of attentional bias to PU cues, components of attentional bias to 
PU cues were not probed.  
Neural Activity. 
Effect of Reward on Neural Activity During Reward Training. 
To test reward-specific effects during the reward training task, group maps of visual 
search targets with the rewarded stimulus > visual search targets with an unrewarded stimulus 
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were examined. This contrast examines the effect of reward manipulation on neural activity 
when the reward-associated stimulus serves as a target in a visual search display while 
controlling for neural activity driven by target history alone. Group maps of rewarded visual 
search targets > unrewarded visual search targets demonstrate a robust effect of reward 
association on neural activity. Relative to unrewarded visual search targets, rewarded visual 
search targets elicited activity in bilateral visual cortical regions, bilateral parietal cortex, and 
prefrontal regions (Table 3.2; Figure 3.5). 
Effect of Reward History on Neural Activity in Attention Network and Visual Regions in 
Unrewarded Cueing Task 
 For each trial type (PR, PU, and Neutral) in the cuing task, whole-brain group maps 
examining the onset of that trial type relative to an implicit baseline. Robust activation was 
evidenced in visual areas, including bilateral occipital fusiform gyri and bilateral lateral occipital 
cortex (LOC), the dorsal attention network, particularly parietal regions and supplementary 
motor area (SMA), and bilateral putamen for all trial types (Figure 3.6).  
 Of primary interest was identifying whether trials including a previously rewarded 
stimulus elicited greater activity in attentional control regions and visual cortex relative both to 
trials with only neutral stimuli and to trials with a previously unrewarded stimulus (i.e. a 
stimulus equated on target history but with no history of reward association). This was first 
assessed by examining whole-brain group maps comparing PR trials > Neutral trials and PR 
trials > PU trials. For PR > Neutral, history of reward was associated with greater activity in 
attentional control regions, including the right superior parietal lobule (SPL) and SMA. 
Additionally, for PR > Neutral, history of reward was associated with greater activity in visual 
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cortex, including bilateral occipital fusiform gyri and LOC (Table 3.3; Figure 3.7). At the whole 
brain level, PR > PU was associated with one significant cluster (84 voxel cluster size; local 
maximum x = 54, y = -22, z = 36) in the postcentral gyrus. Unlike PR > Neutral, the PR > PU 
contrast did not yield active clusters in parietal, SMA, or visual cortex. The PU > Neutral 
contrast was examined to identify if there was overlap in regions active for history without 
reward and history with reward relative to Neutral. For the PU > Neutral contrast, activity was 
associated with unrewarded history in frontal cortex, including SMA, but not parietal regions or 
visual cortex (Table 3.3).  
To follow-up on a priori hypotheses that reward history would be associated with 
increased activity in attentional control regions and in visual cortex, region of interest (ROI) 
analyses were conducted in attentional control regions (bilateral parietal cortex and SMA) and in 
visual cortex. Activity in parietal, visual, and SMA regions for the contrast of Neutral > implicit 
baseline were used to define the location of ROI’s. These ROI’s were queried separately for PR 
> implicit baseline and PU > implicit baseline.  For the attentional control regions, SMA and 
bilateral parietal regions were created by creating a binary mask from the 3 clusters in Neutral > 
implicit baseline that corresponded to these regions (see Figure 3.6). To isolate regions within 
visual cortex, local maxima for the Neutral > implicit baseline with a minimum of 16mm 
separation were identified. The top 4 local maxima in each hemisphere with the highest Z-value 
(yielding 8 local maxima out of the highest 9 local maxima) were used to define visual ROI’s 
(Table 3.4). Multiple ROI’s were extracted in each hemisphere to allow for investigation of the 
possibility that the effect of reward on visual cortex might differ across visual regions. Spherical 
ROI’s were created by drawing a 4-mm sphere around the voxel coordinate of the reported local 
maxima in visual cortex, corresponding to bilateral LOC, bilateral Occipital Fusiform Gyrus, 
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bilateral Occipital Pole, an additional more lateralized Occipital pole in the left hemisphere, and 
Temporal Occipital Fusiform in the right hemisphere. After the ROI’s were defined, activation 
values were extracted from these regions for the contrasts PR > implicit baseline and PU > 
implicit baseline using FSL’s featquery. 
Separate analyses were conducted to examine the effects of reward history on attentional 
control ROI’s and visual ROI’s. For attentional control ROI’s, a 2 x 3 repeated measures 
ANOVA with within-subjects factors of reward history (PR trials vs. PU trials) and ROI (left 
parietal, right parietal, SMA) was conducted on the activation values. Results revealed a main 
effect of reward history, F(1, 26) = 51.304, p < .001, η2 = .664, such that PR trials showed more 
activation than PU trials. There were no overall differences in activation between ROI’s (p = 
.451) nor was there a qualifying interactions between the effect of reward history and region (p = 
.755), indicating that the effect of reward history on activation was similar across the attentional 
control regions examined.  
To examine effect of reward history on visual ROI’s, a 2 x 8 repeated measures ANOVA 
was conducted with the within-subjects factors of reward history (PR trials, PU trials) and 
region.  Results revealed a main effect of reward history on visual activity, F(1, 26) = 5.04, p = 
.034, η2 = .162, such that overall PR trials elicited more visual activity than PU trials.  There was 
also an overall effect of region, F(1, 26) = 3.30, p = .002, η2 = .162, indicating differences in 
activity across regions. The interaction between reward history and region was trending toward 
significance, F(2.78, 72.25) = 2.37, p = .082, η2 = .084. Given this interaction did not reach 
significance, our results indicate that more activity was associated with PR trials and PU trials in 
the visual regions extracted. 
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Effect of Reward History on Relative Deactivation in Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex. 
While not an explicit aim of the study, exploratory analyses were conducted to examine 
whether any regions reflected relative deactivation specifically to stimuli with a reward history 
relative both to neutral stimuli and stimuli with a target history but no reward association. To 
examine this, whole-brain group maps were constructed for the contrasts PU > PR and Neutral > 
PR, and subsequently a conjunction overlay was implemented to confirm overlapping activity. 
For PU > PR, results revealed one active cluster in the vmPFC (477 voxel cluster size; local 
maximum x = -6, y = 46, z = 20). Similarly for Neutral > PR, there was an active cluster in the 
vmPFC (375 voxel cluster size; local maximum x = -2, y = 58, z = 2), as well as active clusters 
in the middle frontal gyrus (275 voxel cluster size; local maximum x = 26, y = 22, z = 50), right 
LOC (132 voxel cluster size; local maximum x = 54, y = -72, z = 32), and angular gyrus (90 
voxel cluster size; local maximum x = 56, y = -54, z = 48). A conjunction overlay was performed 
in which only activation that reached significance for both PU > PR and Neutral > PR was 
retained. Results of the conjunction overlay revealed one overlapping cluster in the vmPFC (105 
voxel cluster size; ; local maximum x = -2, y = 58, z = 2; Figure 3.8) There were no active 
clusters for the comparison of Neutral > PU, indicating the activity in vmPFC is more likely 
characterized as relative deactivations to stimuli with a history of reward. 
Invalid Trial Effects on Neural Activity: When Cognitive Control and Reward History Are at 
Odds 
 Another primary aim of this study was to examine neural regions that support 
overcoming reward history when biases driven by reward history are at odds with current goals. 
To do so, this study investigated neural activity associated specifically with trials in which the 
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PR cue was in the opposite location of the target. As described above, despite the cues being 
non-predictive, participants tend to behaviorally perform better when the target appears in the 
same location as the PR cue (“valid” trials) compared to when the target appears in the location 
opposite the PR cue (“invalid” trials). There is no behavioral difference between PU cue valid 
trials and PU cue invalid trials, suggesting the behavioral validity effects are driven by reward 
history.  
 It was anticipated that PR Invalid trials would overall show more activity in frontal 
control regions, including ACC and insula, relative to PR Valid trials, Neutral trials and PU 
Invalid trials. For the PR Invalid > PR Valid contrast, no clusters reached significance. However, 
for the contrasts PR Invalid > PU Invalid and PR Invalid > Neutral, the PR Invalid trials were 
associated with greater activity in lateral visual cortex and parietal regions (Table 3.5) but not 
ACC or insula.  
 To examine the converse, which describes relative greater activation when goal-driven 
and reward-driven attention align, the contrasts of PR Valid > PR Invalid, PR Valid > Neutral, 
and PR Valid > PU Valid were examined. For PR Valid trials > PR Invalid trials, there was more 
activity in the occipital pole (166 voxel cluster size; local maximum x = 16, y = -92, z = 34) and 
the posterior cingulate gyrus (156 voxel cluster size; local maximum x = 10, y = -36, z = 34). . 
No clusters exceeded the whole-brain threshold for PR Valid > PU Valid. However, for PR Valid 
> Neutral, robust activity was evidenced in visual cortex, intraparietal sulcus, SMA, precuneus 
cortex, and precentral gyrus (Table 3.5).    
Striatal Activity During Reward Learning Predicts Behavior and Neural Activity at Test 
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 One unique asset of participants undergoing fMRI scanning during both the reward 
training phase and the unrewarded test phase is the ability to isolate how neural activity during 
the reward training phase predicts behavior and neural activity at test when there is no longer the 
prospect of reward. It was hypothesized the greater striatal activity during the reward training 
phase would be associated with more attentional bias to reward at test and more activity in the 
value-driven attention network (including visual and parietal areas) at test. The ventral striatum 
is sensitive to reward receipt and reward prediction, and is thought to drive changes in the value-
driven attention network. To test this hypothesis, a 4-mm spherical ROI was created around the 
local maximum of activity for the active cluster in the ventral striatum for the Rewarded > 
Unrewarded contrast during the reward training task (x = 8, y =18, z =4). Activation values from 
this ventral striatum ROI were extracted for each participant using FSL’s featquery. 
 Pearson correlations were conducted to assess the relationship between striatal activity 
during reward training and attentional bias to reward at test. Results indicated that more striatal  
activity for trials with a Rewarded stimulus > trials with an Unrewarded stimulus was associated 
with overall more attentional bias to reward (PR Invalid relative to PR Valid performance) as 
measured by inverse efficiency, r(26) = .416, p = .031. When examining whether this 
relationship differed for predicting significant reward-driven facilitated capture (i.e. PR Valid 
relative to Neutral) versus reward-driven impaired disengagement (i.e. PR Invalid relative to 
Neutral), results indicated that more striatal  activity was specifically associated with greater 
facilitated capture as measured by inverse efficiency, r(26) = .633, p < .001. There was no 
relationship between striatal activity during training and impaired disengagement from PR cues, 
p = .83. 
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 To further investigate how striatal activity during the reward training phase relates to 
neural activity during the unrewarded test phase, a whole brain analysis was conducted in which 
the extracted striatal activation value for each participant was included in a group level GLM as a 
covariate of interest. For the PR > Neutral contrast, striatal activity during reward training 
predicted relatively more activity in visual and parietal areas for the PR trials compared to 
Neutral trials at test (Table 3.6). No clusters reached significance for PR > PU comparison 
predicted by striatal activity. Additionally, it was tested whether striatal activity during training 
predicted any relative deactivations to PR cues. Striatal activity did not significantly predict any 
activation for Neutral > PR. However, for PU > PR, more striatal activity in training was 
associated with relatively less activity in the vmPFC for PR relative to PU trials. 
To examine whether regions predicted differed by a function of validity, comparisons 
with PR Valid and PR Invalid were examined separately. For PR Valid > Neutral, more striatal 
activity during training was associated with relatively more activation in visual areas, angular 
gyrus, and motor cortex (Table 3.6). No clusters reached threshold for PR Valid > PU Valid 
comparison predicted by striatal activity. For PR Invalid > Neutral, more activity in striatal 
during training predicted relatively greater activation in ACC and supramarginal gyrus for PR 
Invalid trials relative to Neutral. Similarly, for PR Invalid > PU Invalid, striatal activity predicted 
more ACC activity for PR Invalid > PU Invalid trials.  
Discussion  
The current study examined how a history of reward-association leads to attentional bias 
to a previously rewarded stimulus. To do so, this study collected fMRI data during a reward-
association training phase and subsequently used stimuli from the training phase as non-
predictive cues in an unrewarded cueing phase during which participants also underwent fMRI 
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scanning. Results of this study demonstrate that reward history biases attention behaviorally and 
is associated with greater activity in visual cortical regions and attentional control regions. 
Further, this study is the first of its kind to test the relationship between striatal activity while 
reward is conferred and neural activity during an unrewarded test phase. Results demonstrate that 
striatal activity during learning predicts both visual cortical activity at test and the degree to 
which participants bias attention to the previously rewarded stimulus. As such, this is the first of 
its kind to establish a direct relationship between reward-associated neural activity during 
learning and later visual cortical representation and attentional bias sustained in an unrewarded 
context. Further, this study provided opportunity to evaluate potential differences between neural 
activity when reward-history driven attentional bias and goal-driven attentional control align as 
compared to when they differ, and indicated largely overlapping activity in the value-driven 
attention network. 
Evidence of the Value-Driven Attention Network During Reward Learning 
 Evidence of successful learning was demonstrated by better performance for reward-
associated targets relative to unrewarded targets during the reward learning phase. Neural 
activity during the reward learning phase was consistent with previous work highlighting a 
value-driven attention network including the LOC, parietal cortex, caudate, and early visual 
cortex (Anderson, 2017, for reviews see Anderson, 2018; Anderson, Folk, et al., 2016). In 
addition to typical regions established within the value-driven attention network, rewarded 
targets are also associated with greater activity in the anterior insula, a region that is typically 
associated with reward learning (Liu, Hairston, Schrier, & Fan, 2011) and has some support for a 
role in value-driven attentional selection (Wang et al., 2015). Further, we find increased activity 
for rewarded targets in prefrontal regions, including ACC, IFG, and ventrolateral prefrontal 
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cortex, that support cognitive control (Braver, Paxton, Locke, & Barch, 2009; Cole & Schneider, 
2007; Deng, Wang, Wang, & Zhou, 2018; Niendam et al., 2012), which is less typically found in 
previous value-driven attention paradigms. One primary difference between the current and some 
previous studies of value-driven attention during reward learning is that participants are provided 
explicit knowledge of which stimulus is conferred higher reward prior to starting the task. As 
such, participants may additionally be employing top-down strategies relying on explicit 
information about the availability of reward (Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005; Feifei, Yi, Guixiang, 
Jun, & Bo, 2018). This extends previous work to demonstrate that similar striatal, visual, and 
parietal activation is associated with reward learning in value-driven attention when participants 
are made explicitly aware of the reward-association.  
Reward History Effects on Visual Cortex and Attentional Control Regions  
 After reward-association was conferred to one stimulus in the reward learning phase, 
stimuli that previously served as targets (both rewarded and unrewarded) were subsequently 
carried forward as non-predictive cues in a cueing task. Despite the non-predictive nature of the 
cues, of which participants were explicitly informed, participants still exhibited attentional bias 
to the previously rewarded cue, as measured by relative facilitation when the target appeared in 
the location of the previously rewarded cue and relative impaired performance when the target 
appeared in the location opposite the previously rewarded cue. Replicating previous findings 
(Failing & Theeuwes, 2014), this effect was indeed reward specific, as no attentional bias was 
exhibited to the previously unrewarded cues. Activation within the fronto-parietal attention 
network (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002), particularly in bilateral parietal cortex and supplementary 
motor area, and visual cortex was exhibited across all trial types. It was hypothesized that 
previously rewarded cues would be associated with greater relative activity in visual cortex and 
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attentional control regions relative to neutral cues and previously unrewarded cues, which was 
supported using whole-brain analysis for previously rewarded relative to neutral cues and a priori 
region of interest analysis for the previously rewarded relative to previously unrewarded stimuli. 
The reward effect was similar within attentional control regions, indicating no difference in 
reward effect between supplementary motor area and parietal cortex. This supports previous 
models suggesting that reward history effects converge on parietal cortex (Anderson, 2018; 
Failing & Theeuwes, 2018), and extends them to provide support for reward history effects in 
supplementary motor area, which is another region of the fronto-parietal attention network 
implicated in both voluntary and involuntary attention (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Hopfinger, 
Buonocore, & Mangun, 2000; Meyer, Du, Parks, & Hopfinger, 2018). Additionally, reward 
effects were exhibited similarly across visual regions investigated, including visual cortical 
regions involved in both early visual and later visual processing. Overall, activity associated with 
reward history in visual cortex and attentional control regions was robust and implicates reward-
driven amplification of visual and attentional processing.  
 In addition to examining how reward history impacts processing related to visual 
attention on average, this study was well equipped to test how variation during the reward-
association phase might drive individual differences in the degree to which reward history 
impacts behavior and neural activity. The prevailing current theory of how reward-association 
leads to biased attentional selection is that dopaminergic signals from the striatum during reward 
learning drive changes in visual cortical and parietal representations of stimuli, which in turn 
leads to biased attentional selection (Anderson, 2018). To date, because studies have examined 
neural activity during the reward learning phase separately from activity during an unrewarded 
test phase, this theory is largely untested. This study addressed this gap by extracting the relative 
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increase in striatal activity for rewarded stimuli relative to unrewarded stimuli during reward 
learning and examining the relationship to neural activity in a subsequently unrewarded cueing 
task. 
As described above, on average trials in which the target was in the rewarded color were 
associated with greater activity in the ventral striatum, specifically the caudate, relative to trials 
in which the target was in the unrewarded color, as hypothesized. Here we further demonstrate 
that this striatal activity correlates with the degree to which participants demonstrated attentional 
bias to the previously rewarded stimulus during the subsequent unrewarded cueing phase. This is 
consistent with previous work linking dopaminergic activity in the striatum with behavioral 
indices of attentional bias to reward-associated stimuli (Anderson, Kuwabara, et al., 2016; 
Anderson et al., 2017; Meffert et al., 2018). However, previous work had not yet examined the 
neural mechanisms driving this relationship. It was further hypothesized that striatal activity 
during the reward learning phase would predict greater activity in the value-driven attention 
network, including activity in early visual cortex, the lateral occipital complex, and parietal 
cortex, during the unrewarded cueing phase. This hypothesis is supported by our results, which 
addresses a critical gap within the current neurobiological model of value-driven attention 
(Anderson, 2018). Within the current model, it is hypothesized that during reward learning 
striatal response to reward receipt, and subsequently to the reward-predicting stimulus, results in 
amplification of visual cortical response to the reward-associated stimulus which feeds forward 
to increased activity in the parietal cortex. There is support that during reward learning striatal 
activity amplifies visual cortical and parietal activity (Anderson, 2017; Barbaro et al., 2017; 
Hickey & Peelen, 2015, 2017). However, it was as of yet untested whether sustained attentional 
bias after the removal of reward receipt was driven by continued reward response in the ventral 
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striatum even after the prospect of reward was removed or whether it was driven by sustained 
changes in priority given to the reward-associated stimulus in visual and parietal cortex. This 
study is the first to provide direct evidence that striatal activity during learning drives increased 
visual and parietal response to stimuli with a history of reward, even after the prospect of reward 
is no longer available. This suggests a level of plasticity in visual and parietal cortex that is 
sensitive to reward learning and persists in unrewarded contexts. 
Reward History Associated with Deactivation in vmPFC  
 In addition to examining reward history driven increases in activity of the value-driven 
attention network, exploratory analyses were conducted to detect whether any regions of the 
brain exhibited reward-history associated relative deactivation as compared with neutral stimuli 
and stimuli with equal selection history but not reward history (i.e. previously unrewarded 
stimuli). Results indicated that relative to both neutral stimuli and previously unrewarded stimuli, 
trials with a previously reward associated stimulus were associated with a relative deactivation in 
vmPFC. Further, analysis of striatal activity revealed an inverse relationship between striatal 
activity for rewarded relative to unrewarded stimuli during reward learning and vmPFC 
activation to those stimuli during the cueing phase. Said another way, more striatal activity to the 
rewarded targets relative to unrewarded targets was associated with larger decreases in vmPFC 
activity for the previously rewarded relative to previously unrewarded stimuli in the cueing 
phase. Previous work has implicated the role of the vmPFC in supporting behavioral flexibility 
in the context of changing reward contingencies (Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000; Fellows & 
Farah, 2003; Gläscher, Hampton, & O’Doherty, 2009). One mechanism through which this may 
be supported is through the role of the vmPFC in value representation, wherein more vmPFC 
activity tracks the value of rewards (Lim, O’Doherty, & Rangel, 2011; McClure, Laibson, 
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Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004). This general conceptualization of vmPFC tracking higher value 
appears at-odds with our current findings: the stimulus with the greater reward history is 
associated with less activity in vmPFC compared to stimuli with no value-association, and in fact 
those who showed the most reward-associated activity in the striatum subsequently showed the 
least vmPFC activity to that stimulus. However, this relatively larger decrease in vmPFC activity 
that is inversely related to striatal activation during learning likely reflects a compensatory 
“updating” of value in this novel unrewarded context. Specifically, while the absolute value in 
this unrewarded cueing task is equal across stimuli, the relative change in value negative for the 
previously rewarded stimulus as compared to the previously unrewarded or neutral stimuli. This 
interpretation is consistent with evidence that decreases in vmPFC activity are evident after a 
rewarded stimulus is no longer rewarded (Zhang, Mendelsohn, Manson, Schiller, & Levy, 2016). 
Additionally, while increases in vmPFC activity are evident with increases in reward value, the 
degree to which vmPFC activity decreases following an unrewarded outcome in a reward-
association task is larger for stimuli that are associated with reward than stimuli without a reward 
history (Knutson, Fong, Bennett, Adams, & Hommer, 2003). While the current study has some 
limitations regarding the ability to interpret the role of the vmPFC due to the exploratory nature 
of this analysis, these results are strikingly consistent across analyses within this study and 
suggest the importance of further research examining the role of the vmPFC in overcoming 
value-driven biases.   
Interactions Between Goal-Driven and Reward-Driven Attention Effects 
 Another primary aim of the current study was to clarify the neural mechanism through 
which reward history and goal-directed, top-down attention interact. As previously discussed and 
demonstrated in our current results, reward history biases attention and modulates visual cortical 
 
79 
and parietal activity, all of which is also true of goal-directed attention (Buschman & Miller, 
2007; Li et al., 2004). It has also been suggested that both reward-driven and goal-driven signals 
converge on the attentional priority map (Failing & Theeuwes, 2018; Todd & Manaligod, 2018); 
however, it is as of yet unclear how competition between reward-driven and goal-driven 
attention is resolved. To investigate this process, the current study examined trials in which 
reward-driven and goal-driven attention effects aligned (PR valid trials) and in which these 
attention effects biased in opposite locations (PR invalid trials). It was expected that more 
activity in frontal control regions, specifically the insula and ACC, would be associated with PR 
invalid trials relative to trials that did not require top-down suppression of reward-driven bias (i.e 
PU invalid trials, PR valid trials, and neutral trials). No clusters reached significance in a whole-
brain analysis of PR invalid relative to PR valid trials, suggesting largely overlapping activation. 
Given the behavioral differences between these trials, this was somewhat surprising; however 
one possibility is that goal-driven and reward-driven attention effects are interacting within the 
same attention network. Indeed, for comparisons of voluntary and involuntary attention, whole 
brain analyses are not often sensitive to differences within the frontoparietal network, despite 
evidence for diverging top-down and bottom-up influences on attentional selection within the 
frontoparietal network (Bowling, Friston, & Hopfinger, 2020; Buschman & Miller, 2007; 
Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Meyer et al., 2018). Given the current evidence from this study that 
previously rewarded cues elicit activity within the frontoparietal attention network, it may be that 
similar analytical approaches employed to disentangle top-down versus bottom-up influences in 
the frontoparietal network for voluntary and involuntary attention could provide further insight 
regarding differences in directional  effects within the frontoparietal network across reward-
driven and goal-driven attention. 
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Further evidence for interactions between goal-driven and reward-driven attention stem 
from our analysis of how striatal activity during reward learning predicts separable components 
of attentional bias during the unrewarded cueing task. A unique element of the current design is 
the ability to also separate facilitated capture to the previously rewarded stimulus and impaired 
disengagement from the previously rewarded stimulus, given that trials varied on whether the 
target and the previously rewarded cue were in the same location (valid trials) or opposite 
location (invalid trials). By analyzing these components separately, it was revealed that the  
relationship between striatal activity and attentional bias to the previously rewarded stimulus was 
driven specifically by a strong relationship between striatal activity during learning and the 
degree to which performance was facilitated on valid trials (i.e. facilitated capture) without a 
relationship between striatal activity and impaired disengagement. While this study is the first to 
test this relationship, there is some precedent for the specificity of this effect. For example, 
emotional significance of a distractor can drive initial orienting to that stimulus (Öhman, Flykt, 
& Esteves, 2001). These initial shifts tend to be relatively automatic in nature and are not 
overcome by top-down control (Le Pelley et al., 2015; Pearson, Donkin, Tran, Most, & Le 
Pelley, 2015). Further, individual differences in self-reported reward drive has been linked both 
with the degree to which reward-association facilitates responses to target features (Hickey, 
Chelazzi, & Theeuwes, 2010) and with the amplitude of an event-related potential indexing 
attentional capture to a reward-associated stimulus (Qi, Zeng, Ding, & Li, 2013).  
Given the behaviorally differentiated relationships between striatal activity with 
facilitated capture and impaired disengagement, the relationships between striatal activity in 
learning and neural activity during the unrewarded cueing task were also examined separately for 
valid and invalid trials. For valid trials, more ventral striatum activity in learning was largely 
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associated with similar regions for the previously rewarded cue broadly, specifically early visual 
cortex, occipital fusiform gyrus, and the angular gyrus, a region in the parietal cortex that is 
involved in spatial attention (Chambers, Payne, Stokes, & Mattingley, 2004; Studer, Cen, & 
Walsh, 2014). As such, our findings indicate that on valid trials, in which attentional shifts to the 
previously rewarded cue confer relative advantage in responding to the target, a history of 
greater reward-related activity in the ventral striatum is associated with a relative increase in 
visual cortical representation of the previously rewarded cue. On the other hand, for invalid 
trials, in which attentional shifts to the previously rewarded cue would slow target responses, 
previous striatal activation shows no relationship to increases in visual cortical activity, which 
aligns with our finding that striatal activation did not predict relative impairment in disengaging 
from the previously rewarded cue. Instead, previous striatal activity is associated with increased 
ACC activity for invalid trials. Disengaging from distractor that have already captured attention 
requires reactive attentional control in the form of distractor suppression (Geng, 2014), and the 
ACC is a region that supports reactive filtering of distractors (Marini et al., 2016). Other 
literature has also suggested that prefrontal control is crucial to effective disengagement from 
emotionally salient threat stimuli (see Cisler & Koster, 2010). Taken together, these results 
suggest that striatal activity during learning specifically drives initial attentional shifts to 
previously rewarded stimuli and the associated increase in visual cortical activity. The speed at 
which participants are able to subsequently shift away from the stimulus is not related to striatal 
activity; however, the degree to which participants recruit ACC on invalid trials, which require 
suppression of attention to a previously rewarded cue for successful target selection, is predicted 
by striatal activity. It was hypothesized that the ACC may serve a role in reactive filtering of 
reward-related distractors when goal-driven and reward-driven attention are at odds. While 
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whole-brain analysis did not reveal on average differences between valid and invalid trials, the 
separable relationships to striatal activity provide further support that the ACC may indeed 
support goal-driven attention overcoming reward-driven biases. There are limitations of the 
current study to specifically disambiguate the role of the ACC on invalid trials; however given 
the promising initial findings in this study, future work should investigate the role of ACC in 
supporting reactive attentional control in the face of previously rewarded distractors. This study 
provides exciting new evidence that differentiates the relative impact of reward-associated neural 
activity during learning on later facilitated initial orienting and impaired suppression of stimuli 
with a reward history through selectively biasing top-down selection and bottom-up visual 
attention neural mechanisms in different trial types.  
Conclusion 
 This study served to fill important gaps in our knowledge regarding the mechanisms 
through which reward history leads to distraction. The study is the first of its kind to demonstrate 
a direct relationship between striatal activity to a stimulus during reward learning and increased 
visual cortical and parietal activity in a subsequent task without the prospect for reward receipt. 
More specifically, striatal activity predicted facilitated initial orienting to a stimulus with a 
history of reward, but appeared unrelated to impaired disengagement. Additionally, our results 
provide support that goal-driven effects on attention and reward-driven effects on attention 
appear to largely share overlapping neural substrates within the frontoparietal attention network; 
however, this study provides preliminary support that reward history of a stimulus is associated 
with relative deactivation in the vmPFC when encountered in a task without reward relative to 
stimuli that have no history of reward association. Taken together this suggests that reward 
history does bias attention through learning-induced changes in visual and parietal activity. 
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Furthermore, overcoming this bias may require both instantaneous top-down suppression to filter 
a distractor associated with reward history along with value updating over time to re-establish the 
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STUDY 3: LEARNING MECHANISMS IN REWARD-BIASED BEHAVIOR: 
DISSOCIATING THE IMPACT OF PAVLOVIAN APPROACH AND INSTRUMENTAL 
LEARNING 
Introduction 
In recent years, there has been growing research interest in examining interactions 
between cognitive control and reward-biased behavior. It has long been established that 
increased sensitivity to rewarding properties is predictive of a wide range of risk-taking 
behaviors and psychopathology, including pathological gambling, externalizing disorders, and 
substance use disorders (Kambouropoulos & Staiger, 2001; Matthys, van Goozen, Snoek, & van 
Engeland, 2004; Petry, 2001; van Hemel-Ruiter, de Jong, Ostafin, & Wiers, 2015). Separately, 
worse cognitive control ability has also been shown to predict worse outcomes in these same 
domains (Holmes, Hollinshead, Roffman, Smoller, & Buckner, 2016; Lueger & Gill, 1990; 
Verbruggen, Adams, & Chambers, 2012). The concept of cognitive control generally describes 
voluntarily guided control over behavior to align with current goals and is considered resource-
limited in nature. Cognitive control acts to provide top-down support for task-relevant cognitive 
processing, such as magnifying representations of goal-relevant features (Cohen, Dunbar, & 
McClelland, 1990; Desimone & Duncan, 1995), and has been highlighted as essential in the 
flexible adaptation of behavior to match contextual goals (Rougier, Noelle, Braver, Cohen, & 
O’Reilly, 2005). 
 However, it is rare that this flexible adaptation of behavior occurs in a completely neutral 
context; rather, most cues have an affective history gained from previous interactions and 
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cognitive control must be engaged to override the affectively driven response if it is at odds with 
current goals. For example, if someone has a goal of weight loss, they must engage in cognitive 
control to inhibit approach and consummatory behavior toward sweet and fatty foods that have a 
history of reward. And indeed alterations in frontal control activity in the face of reward and 
impaired flexibility in reward-based decision-making have been implicated in Binge Eating 
Disorder (Reiter, Heinze, Schlagenhauf, & Deserno, 2017). Similarly, inhibiting reward-
associated behavior in favor of another goal is an important element across disorders, such as 
choosing to withhold substance use in favor of abstinence or inhibiting non-suicidal self-injury 
behavior for a goal of staying safe. Recent models of adolescent risk-taking behavior and of 
substance use have acknowledged the potential interaction of reward-related and cognitive 
control systems by adopting a dual-systems framework that describes the impact of a relative 
imbalance between development of striatal reward-related neural substrates and frontal control-
related neural substrates (McClure & Bickel, 2014; Somerville & Casey, 2010; Steinberg, 2010). 
Yet, the specific mechanisms through which reward-related biasing may disrupt cognitive 
control have not been well established. 
 One study conducted by Davidow and colleagues (2019) has provided a useful 
framework for beginning to assess reward and cognitive control interactions. This study 
demonstrated that one way in which history of reward may disrupt cognitive control is through 
disruption of inhibitory control over previously rewarded stimuli. In their study, participants first 
completed a reward-association training phase, in which they provided a button press response to 
stimuli on the screen and received monetary rewards for fast enough responses to some stimuli 
(rewarded) but received no money for the same responses to other stimuli (unrewarded). These 
previously rewarded and previously unrewarded stimuli were subsequently used as no-go stimuli 
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in a go/no-go task, during which participants did not earn any further money.  This allowed for 
measurement of inhibitory control in the face of previously rewarded stimuli while controlling 
for motor prepotency through the use of a matched unrewarded stimulus. Additionally, this 
controlled for individual differences in experience with the rewarding stimulus by using a 
previously neutral stimulus (i.e. geometrical shapes) and then experimentally associating that 
stimulus with reward. Results indicated that participants were overall worse at inhibiting 
responses to the previously rewarded stimulus as compared to the previously unrewarded 
stimulus (Davidow, Sheridan, Van Dijk, Santillana, Snyder, Bustamente, et al., 2019), consistent 
with reward-related disruption in cognitive control processes.  
 Other studies have used similar separation of reward-association training and cognitive 
control testing phases within the attention domain. Typically in these studies, reward association 
is trained using an attention task, rather than the motor task described above, and demonstrate 
that participants bias their attention toward stimuli that have been associated with reward, even 
when these stimuli no longer signal reward and serve as distractors to their task goals. Examples 
of the types of tasks used during reward association include using a search display or cueing 
paradigm (Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011; Failing & Theeuwes, 2014). During reward-
association training, responses to one of the target stimuli would be associated with a monetary 
reward while responses to another target would be associated with either less money or no 
money at all. This approach equates attentional selection history while manipulating reward-
association history. When the stimuli that had previously been rewarded during reward-
association training appear either as distractors or as non-predictive cues in a subsequent non-
rewarded test phase, participants continue to bias their attention to the previously reward-
associated stimulus, even though this is at odds with task goals and thwarts optimal task 
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performance (Anderson, Kronemer, Rilee, Sacktor, & Marvel, 2016; Anderson et al., 2011; 
Failing & Theeuwes, 2014; Roper, Vecera, & Vaidya, 2014). Findings from these studies mirror 
the findings from Davidow and colleagues (2018) in that they demonstrate reward disrupting 
later cognitive control; however, the methods implemented limit our ability to determine the 
mechanism through which behavior is biased by reward history, as described below.  
 While both of these approaches serve to demonstrate that a history of reward associated 
with a stimulus later thwarts cognitive control, it does not serve to identify the mechanisms 
through which reward learning interacts with cognitive control. Specifically, because these 
studies use methods in which approach behavior is rewarded and that same approach behavior is 
later tested (e.g. rewarding motoric approach and testing ability to inhibit motoric approach), 
these studies cannot differentiate whether Pavlovian conditioning or instrumental learning is 
driving the goal-thwarting reward bias. Pavlovian conditioning, also termed classical 
conditioning, occurs when a stimulus is associated with a rewarding outcome (Pavlov, 1928). 
While Pavlovian conditioning is the learning mechanism for stimulus-outcome associations, one 
consequence of Pavlovian conditioning is that the reward-associated stimulus automatically 
elicits approach behaviors, and these behaviors are termed Pavlovian approach bias (Day, 
Wheeler, Roitman, & Carelli, 2006; Konorski, 1967). For example, pigeons tend to peck at a red 
light signaling food, even when that behavior is not rewarded or when pecking means they will 
be denied food (Brown & Jenkins, 1968; Williams & Williams, 1969). Pavlovian approach bias 
has also been demonstrated in humans: participants have difficulty inhibiting saccades to stimuli 
associated with reward receipt, even when saccades to that stimulus always results in the 
omission of a reward (Le Pelley, Pearson, Griffiths, & Beesley, 2015; Pearson, Donkin, Tran, 
Most, & Le Pelley, 2015) and show increased motor excitability in the context of rewarding 
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stimuli, such as food and money (Gupta & Aron, 2011). Another reward-learning mechanism is 
instrumental learning, which describes stimulus-response learning when a specific behavior is 
associated with reward receipt (Skinner, 1938). For example, participants can be trained to either 
direct attention to specific features or suppress attention to specific features, depending on 
whether attentional selection or suppression is rewarded (Hickey & Peelen, 2015; Libera, 
Perlato, & Chelazzi, 2011). Further, it has been shown that these types of learning may be 
interacting, wherein instrumental learning occurs more quickly when approach behaviors are 
paired with reward than when inhibiting a response is paired with reward (Guitart-Masip et al., 
2012).  
While the paradigms described above both demonstrate that reward-driven responses 
disrupt cognitive control, they are not equipped to differentiate whether this reward-driven 
disruption is primarily instrumental or Pavlovian in nature, because instrumental learning 
behaviors and Pavlovian approach behaviors would bias behavior in the same way in those 
paradigms. For example, in the Anderson (2011) paradigm, attentional capture to the reward-
related stimulus could be due to the fact that the behavior of attentional selection was rewarded 
previously (instrumental) or because the reward-associated properties with that stimulus elicited 
approach (Pavlovian). Similarly, findings that participants are worse at inhibiting responses to 
previously rewarded stimuli (Davidow, Sheridan, Van Dijk, Santillana, Snyder, Bustamente, et 
al., 2019) could be driven either by automatic motor approach to the reward-associated stimulus 
(Pavlovian) or by a history of speeded motor approach behavior being rewarded (instrumental). 
Dissociating which of these mechanisms drives reward-driven disruption of goal-directed 
behavior has important implications for interventions.  
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Several interventions target reward-associated responses, and implicit or explicit 
assumptions about the underlying mechanisms of these reward-driven responses shape the 
interventions themselves. Within substance abuse literature, the attestation that reward-
association with substance-related stimuli leads to automatic approach (Farris & Ostafin, 2008; 
Wiers, Kühn, et al., 2013) has given rise to cognitive bias modification treatments aimed at 
implicit processes, such as attentional bias modification and counterconditioning (Cristea, Kok, 
& Cuijpers, 2016; Wiers, Gladwin, Hofmann, Salemink, & Ridderinkhof, 2013). On the other 
hand, non-suicidal self-injury behaviors and oppositional behaviors in children are thought to be 
perpetuated in part through instrumental learning in which reinforcement makes the behavior 
more likely to occur again (del Valle, Kelley, & Seoanes, 2001; Nock, 2009; Nock & Prinstein, 
2004). As such, contingency management strategies that provide or omit rewards contingent 
upon behaviors are commonly implemented in these arenas (Brestan & Eyberg, 1998; Linehan, 
1993; Serketich & Dumas, 1996; Washburn et al., 2012). However, some research has also 
implicated that self-injury history is linked with more positive evaluation of self-injury 
associated stimuli (Franklin, Lee, Puzia, & Prinstein, 2014), which has spurred treatments 
implementing counterconditioning for self-injury associated stimuli (Franklin et al., 2016). In 
these cases, treatment are working to target reward-driven behavior (e.g. substance use, self-
injury) that is at odds with long-term goals (e.g. abstaining from alcohol, safety); however, 
whether a treatment is more effective by targeting a stimulus-reward association versus a 
behavior-reward association is dependent upon whether the reward-driven behavior is 
perpetuated through a Pavlovian mechanism or instrumental mechanism. While these processes 
will eventually need to be dissociated in the clinical populations receiving treatment, an 
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important first step is to dissociate whether Pavlovian approach or instrumental learning 
perpetuates reward-driven behavior that thwarts goal-driven behavior in healthy individuals. 
Thus far, relatively few studies have aimed to dissociate the relative impact of these 
learning mechanisms, and there are existing limitations to consider.  Bucker and Theeuwes 
(2017) demonstrated that task-irrelevant, response-independent reward association with a 
stimulus was sufficient to cause reward-driven attentional bias. For the initial training phase, 
participants provided responses to changes in the fixation cross and received automatically 
administered high or low rewards that were task irrelevant following presentation of a colored 
stimulus. In the no-reward test phase, participants responded to the orientation of a line inside a 
square among a display of circles (shape singleton). On some trials, all stimuli were gray with no 
distractors. On other trials, one of the circles was in the previously high-reward or previously 
low-reward color. Participants performed worst when the high-reward distractor was present, 
compared to both the low-reward and no distractor conditions (Bucker & Theeuwes, 2017). 
These results show that pairing attentional selection with a reward (instrumental learning) is not 
a necessary component to exhibiting reward-driven attentional bias. However, the experiment 
was designed such that attention should be automatically biased to the distractor, because it is the 
only non-gray shape on the screen (Itti & Koch, 2000). So while the authors demonstrate 
Pavlovian-driven modulation of attention, it is unclear whether that effect would be strong 
enough to induce attentional bias when the rewarded stimulus is of similar physical salience as 
the other stimuli, which is more typical of visual scenes in the real world. This will be tested in 
the current study by using neutral and previously unrewarded stimuli that do not differ from the 
previously rewarded stimulus in physical salience.  
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The optimal way of disentangling whether Pavlovian approach or instrumental learning 
drives reward-related disruption in cognitive control would be to instead create a situation in 
which dissociable predictions could be made about Pavlovian-driven versus instrumental-driven 
effects. One recent study has approximated this approach by associating reward with an 
antisaccade away from the reward-signaling stimulus (Kim & Anderson, 2019b). During 
training, participants were instructed to move their eyes to the location opposite a blue or red 
cue. For the rewarded color, participants received rewards for their antisaccades whereas no 
money was conferred for antisaccades away from the unrewarded stimulus. During testing, 
participants no longer received money and were instructed to make a prosaccade to a circle, 
which was either blue, red, or green, while a blue, red, or green square distractor was placed in 
the opposite location. Results demonstrated that participants were faster and more accurate when 
the previously rewarded color served as the target compared to when the previously rewarded 
color served as a distractor. This would be consistent with an approach mechanisms, however, 
there are several caveats to consider. Firstly, significant effects were found when the cue display 
included the previously rewarded and previously unrewarded colors but not when the previously 
rewarded color cue was paired with a color cue with no selection history (Kim & Anderson, 
2019b see supplementary materials). However, when the previously unrewarded color cue was 
displayed with a color cue with no selection history, participants were slower to respond when 
the previously unrewarded color served as the target than as the distractor (Kim & Anderson, 
2019b see supplementary materials). As such, the effects of bias away from the previously 
unrewarded cue oddly appear to be stronger than bias toward the previously rewarded cue, and 
so evidence for approach may be artificially inflated when the previously rewarded cue is paired 
with the previously unrewarded cue. In the current study, because attentional bias is determined 
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by comparing trials in which a previously rewarded stimulus is in the same location of the target 
with trials in which the previously rewarded stimulus is in the opposite location of the target, 
results indicating attentional bias must be driven by the previously rewarded cue itself. Secondly, 
while the oculomotor behavior that is rewarded in training is shifts away from the reward-
associated stimulus, previous work demonstrates that participants covertly attend to cues that 
serve to initiate antisaccades (Klapetek, Jonikaitis, & Deubel, 2016). Therefore, participants’ 
covert attentional selection of the reward-associated stimulus may also be rewarded, which 
would indicate either an instrumental or Pavlovian mechanism might explain later attentional 
bias to the rewarded stimulus.  
While existing studies have indicated that either Pavlovian approach behavior or 
instrumental learning behavior can be elicited independently of the other, whether reward-driven 
disruption in cognitive control is primarily driven by Pavlovian approach or instrumental 
learning remains an open question. The current study aimed to disentangle which of these 
mechanisms subserves reward-driven disruption in cognitive control by capitalizing on specific 
predictions made by each theory. Explicitly, Pavlovian approach behavior stems from Pavlovian 
conditioning, which is driven by the stimulus-reward association rather than an action-reward 
association. This means that the approach behavior driven by Pavlovian learning is not relegated 
to a specific domain, but instead approach toward a reward-associated stimulus ought to be 
exhibited across both visual attention and motoric approach (i.e. domain general). On the other 
hand, instrumental learning occurs when a specific behavior is rewarded, which predicts that if 
approach is trained in the visual attention domain, it would be expected that approach is later 
exhibited in the visual attention domain but not in the motor domain, and vice versa. Across two 
experiments, it was tested whether reward-association training has domain-specific or domain-
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general effects, as this differentiates behavior driven by Pavlovian stimulus-reward association or 
instrumental action-reward association.  
The first experiment implemented a reward-association training phase that both 
associates reward with a stimulus (Pavlovian learning) and rewards attention to that stimulus 
(Instrumental learning) using a paradigm similar to that of Anderson (2011). Participants then 
completed two tasks at test, during which no reward will be conferred. A cueing paradigm with 
non-predictive cues, including stimuli that were previously rewarded and previously unrewarded 
in training, tested attentional control in the face of the previously rewarded stimulus. A go/no-go 
task with the previously rewarded and previously unrewarded stimuli serving as the no-go 
stimuli tested motor inhibitory control over the previously rewarded stimulus. The second 
experiment implemented a reward-association training phase that associates reward with a 
stimulus (Pavlovian learning) and rewards motoric approach to that stimulus (Instrumental 
learning), using a paradigm similar to that of Davidow and colleagues (2018). The same testing 
tasks used in experiment 1 will be used in experiment 2. The stimuli used in the training and 
testing tasks were also be matched between experiments. 
If Pavlovian approach bias is driving reward-related disruption in cognitive control, it 
would be expected that participants demonstrate (a) worse inhibitory control over the previously 
rewarded stimulus as measured by more false alarms to the previously rewarded than the 
previously unrewarded stimulus, and (b) attentional bias to the previously rewarded stimulus as 
demonstrated by faster reaction times when a target appears on the side of the previously 
rewarded cue versus the opposite side of the previously rewarded cue. These findings would be 
consistent with an approach bias toward reward-associated stimuli, regardless of whether that 
specific approach behavior (i.e. attentional capture and motoric approach) was trained.   
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On the other hand, if instrumental learning is driving reward-related disruption in 
cognitive control, predictions would differ between experiment 1 and experiment 2, because the 
specific behavior rewarded differs between these experiments. For experiment 1, in which 
attention to the stimulus is rewarded during training, it would be expected that attentional bias, 
but not motoric approach, would be exhibited during testing. In the cueing paradigm, this would 
be expected to be evident as faster reaction times when the target appeared in the non-predictive 
previously rewarded cue compared to when it does not. Previous work has demonstrated that 
stimuli with higher attentional priority facilitate inhibitory control (Chevalier, Chatham, & 
Munakata, 2014). Capitalizing on this effect, it would be hypothesized that if instrumental 
learning drives findings in experiment 1, participants will show greater inhibitory control over 
the previously rewarded stimulus, as measured by fewer false alarms to the previously rewarded 
compared to the previously unrewarded stimulus. For experiment 2, because motor approach is 
rewarded in training, an instrumental learning mechanism predicts that participants will 
demonstrate worse inhibitory control over the previously rewarded stimulus, as measured by 
false alarms, but no effect on attentional bias, as demonstrated by no difference between reaction 
times when the target appears in the previously rewarded cue versus the opposite location. 
Because a null effect is predicted, a power analysis has been conducted to ensure adequate power 
to detect an effect if one exists. 
While it is expected that findings will demonstrate that either Pavlovain approach or 
instrumental learning dominates reward-driven disruption in cognitive control, a third possibility 
to consider is that effects of both of these learning types is exhibited at test, which yields a third 
set of hypotheses. If both mechanisms are contributing equally to the pattern of findings, it 
would be expected that in experiment 1, attentional bias would be exhibited to the previously 
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rewarded stimulus and there would be no effect on inhibitory control. Attentional bias would be 
expected because in experiment 1, both instrumental learning and Pavlovian approach predict 
attentional bias. If both Pavlovian approach and instrumental learning are impacting behavior, no 
effect on inhibitory control would be expected, because in experiment 1, a Pavlovian approach 
mechanism would facilitate approach, leading to increased false alarm rate, whereas an 
instrumental learning mechanism would facilitate inhibition, leading to decreased false alarm 
rate. In experiment 2, it would be expected that both Pavlovian approach and instrumental 
learning bias towards worse inhibitory control (i.e. more false alarms) over previously rewarded 
stimuli and that Pavlovian approach would lead to attentional bias to previously rewarded stimuli 
while there would be no instrumental learning effect on attention. As such, in experiment 2, both 
significantly worse inhibitory control over previously rewarded stimuli and significant 
attentional bias toward previously rewarded stimuli would be predicted.  
In sum, previous work has highlighted that a history of reward can indeed bias later 
behavior. This occurs even when the prospect of reward is no longer available and when the 
reward-driven behavior is at odds with accomplishing current contextual goals. To date, no study 
has yet determined whether goal-thwarting reward-driven behavior is dominated by a Pavlovian 
approach mechanism or instrumental learning mechanism, and which of these plays a larger role 
has repercussions for the focus of future interventions. The current study aimed to discern which 
of these mechanisms better explains reward-driven behavior that thwarts contextual goals by 
determining whether reward-associations during a training phase has domain-general or domain-





 The present study consists of two experiments designed to dissociate whether Pavlovian 
approach or instrumental learning mechanisms dominate reward-related disruptions in cognitive 
control. The study visits were completed in one 2 hour session at Howell Hall on UNC Chapel 
Hill’s Campus. All procedures were approved by the UNC Chapel Hill Institutional Review 
Board. Experiment 1 first manipulated reward-association in an attention task and subsequently 
tested motor inhibitory control and attentional control over the previously rewarding stimulus. A 
separate group of participants was recruited to complete experiment 2 first manipulated reward-
association in a motor response task and subsequently tested motor inhibitory control and 
attentional control over the previously rewarding stimulus. As such, experiments 1 and 2 only 
differ on the type of task in which the reward-association training occurred: attention task in 
experiment 1 and motor task in experiment 2. The unrewarded test phases were identical across 
experiments 1 and 2, including an unrewarded cueing task and unrewarded go/no-go task.   
Experiment 1 
 The first experiment was designed to test the effects of reward associations made during 
an attention training paradigm on subsequent inhibitory control and attentional control tasks. 
Specifically, participants first completed reward association training in which they searched for 
specific colored circles in a search array (Figure 4.1). All circles in the display were differently 
colored and a blue or yellow circle served as the target circles. One of either the blue or yellow 
circles was associated with money (rewarded) whereas the other was never associated with 
money (unrewarded), and this was counterbalanced across participants. After participants 
completed training, they completed one of two cognitive control tasks - either a go/no-go task or 
a cueing paradigm task (counterbalanced across participants). For the go/no-go task, the stimuli 
that served as targets in the training, both the previously rewarded (PR) and previously 
unrewarded (PU), served as the no-go stimuli. For the attention cueing paradigm, the PR and PU 
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stimuli served as non-predictive cues. Participants completed a brief re-training of reward 
association, by completing one additional block of the reward-association training paradigm, 
prior to completing the second cognitive control task (either go/no-go or cueing). In addition to 
completing the tasks, participants completed self-report questionnaires which are described and 
explored for relationships with performance in Appendix A. 
Participants and Recruitment Procedures. 
 Participants were recruited from the community using listservs, flyers, word of mouth, 
and posting on the recruitment website for Psychology 101 experiment participation credit. 
Participants had self-reported 20-20 or corrected to 20-20 vision with no colorblindness, 
confirmed using the Ishihara Color vision test (Ishihara, 1973). Exclusion criteria included a 
history of psychosis, brain damage, intellectual disability, pervasive developmental disorder, or a 
current diagnosis of clinical depression. Eligibility was confirmed via self-report prior to 
scheduling the study visit. Participants were compensated with the money earned during the 
tasks (minimum of $10/hr). For participants who were recruited using the Psychology 101 
recruitment website, they also received course credit. Forty-eight adults (ages 18 – 30) 
participated in Experiment 1; however, due to restrictions on study activity due to the outbreak of 
COVID-19, only 41 of the proposed 48 participants in experiment 2 completed their study visit 
at the time of this defense. Given that participants were matched between experiments by 
yolking accuracy, the 7 subjects who did not have a matched participant in experiment 2 were 
excluded from the current analyses. The final sample included 41 participants (31 female, 10 
male), with an average age of 21.0 years old (SD = 3.5 years),. With regard to ethnicity, 5% of 
participants were Hispanic or Latino and  95% were not Hispanic of Latino. With regard to race, 
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78% of the sample identified as White or Caucasian, 10% identified as Asian, 2% identified as 
Black or African American, and 10% identified as multiracial or biracial. 
Reward Association Training. 
Reward was associated with a given colored circle using a training paradigm adapted 
from Anderson and colleagues (2011). Training trials consisted of a fixation screen, followed by 
a search array, and then a feedback screen on a gray background (Figure 4.1). The sequence 
begins with a fixation screen presented for a random interval between 1000 – 1250 ms on each 
trial. The search array consisted of six circles placed at equal intervals at an imaginary circle 
with a 5˚ radius around the fixation cross. Each circle was a different color and contained a white 
line. One of the circles was either blue or yellow on every trial, with the blue or yellow circle 
being the target circle. A blue and yellow circle never appeared on the same trial. Participants 
were instructed to indicate with a keyboard response whether the white line inside the target 
circle was vertical or horizontal by pressing the appropriate key with their index finger. By 
implementing a discrimination task, rather than a detection task, for a specific circle among an 
array, this ensures that the behavior being rewarded is attentional selection rather than a motor 
response. Participants had 800 ms to respond to each display. After the search display, a 
feedback display (1000 ms) showed the amount of money earned (if any) and the current total. If 
no response was given within the time-frame, a 500ms 1,000 Hz feedback tone informed 
participants that the trial timed out, and the feedback screen displayed “Slow” along with the 
current total money.   
The color of the rewarded target (blue or yellow) was counterbalanced across 
participants. For the rewarded target, 80% of trials were worth 14 cents and 20% will be worth 
no money. Our paradigm implements a probabilistic reward rather than a reward with 100% 
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prediction certainty, because previous work indicates that dopaminergic neurons are less 
sensitive to 100% predictive rewards which limits reward learning (Hollerman & Schultz, 1998; 
Mirenowicz & Schultz, 1994). For the unrewarded target, all trials were worth no money. 
Training consisted of 360 trials across 3 blocks, and was preceded by a practice block of 50 
trials. For the brief re-training of reward association after the first cognitive control task, 
participants completed an additional 120 trials in 1 block. All tasks were programmed using 
OpenSesame (Mathôt, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012) and stimuli were presented on a 22 inch color 
monitor with a refresh rate of 60 frames per second. All tasks were completed in a sound-
attenuated booth. Participants were seated in a chair such that their eyes were approximately 75 
cm from the screen, as measured by a trained research assistant. 
Attention Cueing Paradigm. 
One of the testing paradigms (Figure 4.2) was a cueing paradigm modified from Failing 
and Theeuwes (2014). Testing trials consisted of a fixation, a double-cue display, and a target 
display. The fixation was displayed for a randomly determined period of 400-600 ms. The cue 
display was presented for 200 ms and consisted of two differently colored circles (red, green, 
yellow, or blue; 3.4˚ diameter) with figure-eight placeholders inside the circles (2.3˚ x 1.1˚). The 
blue and yellow colors previously served as target in the reward training (either PR or PU). The 
red and green circles were displayed in training but never served as targets, so they served as 
neutral cues. After 200 ms, an offset of two line segments in each of the figure-eight premasks 
revealed the target display. The target display consisted of the same circles as the cueing display, 
but with a letter revealed inside each circle (“S”, “P”, “H”, “E”; 2.3˚ x 1.1˚). A premask with an 
offset is used rather than target onset to minimize exogenous orienting by an onset (Jonides, 
1981). One of the two letters was a target letter (“S” or “P”) and the other was a distractor letter 
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(“H” or “E”). Participants were instructed to indicate with a keyboard response which target 
letter was present by pressing the appropriate key with their index finger. The target display 
remained on the screen for 800 ms or until a response was given. For this phase, participants 
were explicitly informed that they would not receive money for their performance and that the 
circles were unrelated to the location of the target letter, emphasizing the color of the circles was 
task-irrelevant. Participants completed a 48 trial practice block prior to both training and testing. 
Testing consisted of 480 trials across 5 blocks. Trials were coded as PR,  PU, or neutral 
according to the cue types present (Figure 4.3). Attentional bias to reward was coded as the 
difference between when the target appeared in the location of the PR circle (PR valid trial) 
compared to when the target appeared in the opposite location of the PR circle (PR invalid trial). 
Go/No-Go Paradigm. 
 In the other testing paradigm, a go/no-go paradigm was used, in which every trial began 
with a fixation screen presented for either 500, 1000, or 1500 ms, which was followed by a 
centrally presented circle for 500 ms (see Figure 4.4). On 75% of trials, the color of the circle 
(white, cyan, green, pink, or orange) indicated that the participant should press the spacebar (Go 
trials). On the other 25% of trials, the color of the circle (yellow or blue) indicated that the 
participant should withhold a response (no-go trials). The color of the no-go trials corresponded 
to the PU and PR circles used in the reward association tasks. After a short practice block (50 
trials), participants completed 600 trials of the task across 5 blocks. Reward related bias in motor 
inhibitory control was measured as the difference between false alarms to PR  relative to PU 
stimuli. 
Experiment 2 
The second experiment was designed to test the effects of reward associations made 
during a motor training paradigm on the same inhibitory control and attentional control tasks 
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used in Experiment 1. Specifically, participants first completed reward association training that 
focused on simple motor responses, in which they pressed a button as quickly as possible to 
circles on the screen. One of the circles was associated with money (rewarded) whereas another 
was never associated with money (unrewarded). After participants completed training, they 
completed one of the two cognitive control tasks described in Experiment 1 - either the go/no-go 
task or the cueing paradigm task (counterbalanced across participants). For the go/no-go task, the 
PR and PU stimuli served as the no-go stimuli. For the cueing paradigm, the PR and PU stimuli 
served as non-predictive cues. Participants completed a brief re-training of reward association, 
by completing one additional block of the reward-association paradigm, prior to completing the 
second cognitive control task (either go/no-go or cueing). The go/no-go and cueing paradigms 
were the identical tasks as described in Experiment 1 above. 
Participants and Recruitment Procedures. 
 Forty-one participants completed the study. At this time, 41 of the 48 proposed sample is 
completed because recruitment was halted in response to the COVID-19 outbreak. Participants 
were on average 21.7 years old (SD = 3.5 years), with 28 female and 16 male. With regard to 
ethnicity, 10% of participants were Hispanic or Latino and 90% were not Hispanic of Latino. 
With regard to race, 59% of the sample identified as White or Caucasian, 24% identified as 
Asian, 10% identified as Black or African American, 2% identified as Middle Eastern, and 2% 
identified as multiracial or biracial. Participants were recruited from the community using 
listservs, flyers, word of mouth, and posting on the recruitment website for Psychology 101 
experiment participation credit. Participants had self-reported 20-20 or corrected to 20-20 vision 
with no colorblindness, confirmed using the Ishihara Color vision test(Ishihara, 1973). Exclusion 
criteria included history of psychosis, brain damage, intellectual disability, pervasive 
 
110 
developmental disorder, or a current diagnosis of clinical depression. Eligibility was confirmed 
via self-report prior to scheduling the study visit. Participants were compensated with the money 
earned during the tasks (minimum $10/hr). Participants recruited through the psychology student 
pool additionally received course credit.  
Reward Association Training. 
Reward was associated with either a blue or yellow circle using an adapted version of the 
Monetary Incentive Delay task (Knutson, Westdorp, Kaiser, & Hommer, 2000). Training trials 
consisted of an initial cue display indicating the upcoming trial type, followed by a white fixation 
cross, a blue or yellow circle target, and a feedback screen on a gray background (Figure 4.5). 
The cue display (500 ms) consisted of six differently-colored circles placed at equal intervals 
around a centrally presented blue or yellow circle. For half of participants, the blue circle served 
as the rewarded circle and the yellow circle served as the unrewarded circle. The reverse was 
true for the other half of participants. The color of the centrally presented circle in the cue 
display indicated the upcoming trial type (i.e. reward-related or unrewarded). Following the cue 
display, a white fixation cross was presented for a random interval between 1000-1250 ms. The 
transition to a fixation cross indicated to the participant to prepare for a very rapid button press. 
After the fixation screen, a centrally presented yellow or blue circle appeared, which served as 
the target screen indicating the participant should respond as quickly as possible. The color of the 
target matched the color of the centrally presented circle in the preceding cue display. 
Immediately following, a feedback display (1000 ms) indicated if the response was sufficiently 
rapid as well as showed the amount of money earned (if any) and the current total. For the 
rewarded circle, 80% of trials were worth 14 cents and 20% of trials were worth no money. For 
the unrewarded circle, all trials were worth no money.  
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For the reward-association training in experiment 2, the response window was adjusted 
dynamically during the task to control for response accuracy. A staircase algorithm adjusted the 
response window for each stimulus separately to a predetermined accuracy by lengthening the 
correct response window for a stimulus if the accuracy was too low and shortening it if the 
accuracy was too high. The predetermined accuracy was yoked to the accuracies of participants 
obtained in experiment 1, such that a given participants’ accuracy in experiment 2 was randomly 
selected without replacement from the set of accuracies obtained by participants in experiment 1. 
Additionally, the order in which participants received the 14 cent reward or no money following 
correct responses to the reward-associated circle is yolked to the order of reward-associated trials 
of the same “matched” participant from experiment 1. By equating for accuracy across the two 
experiments, this equates for exposure to reward. Specifically, across the two experiments, 
participants will have close to the same number of “correct” responses in training, which helps to 
equate both the amount of money earned in training as well as the number of correct rewarded 
trials between the experiments. In doing so, this ensures that differences in patterns of results 
between the experiments is not driven by differences in amount of reward associated with the 
stimulus or differences in number of rewarded trials. Behavioral data from one participant during 
the initial blocks of the reward association training could not be included due to technical 
difficulties. 
Analysis. 
Reward Training Paradigm Experiment 1: Visual Search 
 Of primary interest for analysis was the difference between performance on trials with 
rewarded stimuli and unrewarded stimuli. Any RT’s below 100 ms was excluded from further 
analysis, as these responses were likely too fast to reflect accurate target discrimination. Only 
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correct responses were used to calculate RT. For the reward-association training paradigm, a 
paired t-test comparing RT for the rewarded and unrewarded targets was implemented to assess 
whether reward-bias is evident during training. Results of all analyses that are reported in RT for 
the primary document are reported separately for accuracy and inverse efficiency in Appendix B. 
Reward Training Paradigm Experiment 2: Monetary Incentive Delay Task 
For the reward-association training, bias effects was measured using reaction time (RT). 
Any RT’s below 50 ms were excluded from further analysis, as these responses were likely too 
fast to reflect accurate target discrimination. A shorter cutoff is implemented for this reward 
association training because the training in experiment 1 is a discrimination task, whereas the 
training in experiment 2 is a detection task. Only correct responses were used to calculate RT. 
For the reward-association training paradigm, a paired t-test comparing RT’s to the rewarded and 
unrewarded targets was implemented to assess whether reward-bias is evident during training. 
Cueing Paradigm Experiments 1 and 2 
Of primary interest was whether history of reward association impacted attentional bias 
and whether this effect differed between Experiments 1 and 2, as measured by speeded responses 
to PR valid trials relative to PR invalid trials. Any RT’s below 100 ms was excluded from further 
analysis, as these responses were likely too fast to reflect accurate target discrimination. Only 
correct responses were used to calculate RT. All analyses are reported using accuracy and 
inverse efficiency separately in Appendix B. For the attention cueing paradigm, attentional bias 
to reward would be tested by examining a difference between RT’s for trials in which the target 
appears at the location of the PR cue and trials in which the target appears at the location 
opposite the PR cue (i.e. valid vs. invalid; see Figure 4.3 for trial types). Faster RT’s, reflecting 
better performance, when the target appears inside the PR cue, despite its non-predictive status, 
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would indicate attentional bias to reward. A similar follow-up paired t-test was conducted for the 
PU trial type in order to assess whether the attentional bias is reward-specific or due to training 
alone. For the go/no-go paradigm, a paired t-test was implemented to compare false alarm rate to 
the PR stimulus and false alarm rate to the PU stimulus.  
Results. 
Experiment 1 Results. 
Reward Training Visual Search Task. On average, participants earned $17.98 (SD = 
$1.41) in the initial 3 blocks of training and $6.58 (SD = $0.37) in the re-training block. To 
assess a reward-effect in training, a paired t-test with reward status (rewarded, unrewarded) as a 
within-subjects factor was implemented on RT. Results indicated that for the initial training, 
participants were faster [t(40) = 10.99, p < .001] when trials included the rewarded color (M = 
542 ms, SD = 40 ms) versus trials with the unrewarded color (M = 603 ms, SD = 40 ms). 
Participants remained faster [t(40) = 14.35, p < .001] for the rewarded trials (M = 526 ms, SD = 
39 ms) relative to unrewarded trials (M = 597 ms, SD = 48 ms) in the re-training block that 
occurred prior to the last task.  
Attention Cueing Paradigm. If value-driven attentional bias was exhibited in this 
experiment, it would be expected that participants would be increasingly faster when the target 
appeared in the same location as the previously rewarded cue (PR valid) relative to when the cue 
appeared at the opposite location (PR invalid). To test this, a paired t-test was conducted for 
performance on PR trials with the within-subjects factors of trial type (valid or invalid). Results 
indicated there was an effect of trial type on RT, t(40) = 4.05, p < .001, such that participants 
were faster for the PR valid trials (M = 521 ms, SD = 34 ms) relative to the PR invalid trials (M 
= 531, SD = 39; Figure 4.6).  
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To examine whether the attentional bias effect is value-specific, we tested whether 
attentional bias was exhibited for PU cues, which contained the color that was the unrewarded 
target color in the training phase. A similar paired t-test using the within-subjects factor of trial 
type (valid and invalid) was implemented for PU trials. Results indicated there was a trend 
toward participants exhibiting faster RT for PU valid (M = 523, SD = 38) relative to PU invalid 
(M = 528, SD = 39), t(40) = 1.80, p = .079.  
Go/No-Go Task. Whether history of reward impacted inhibitory control was investigated 
by a paired t-test examining whether false alarm rate differed between PR no-go stimuli and PU 
no-go stimuli in the go/no-go task. Results indicated no difference in the ability to inhibit 
responses to PR no-go stimuli (accuracy M = .65, SD = .16) than PU no-go stimuli (Accuracy M 
= .67, SD = .12),  p = .49. Participants demonstrated good performance on go trials (Accuracy M 
= .97, SD = .04; RT M = 413 ms, SD = 35 ms).  
Experiment 2 Results. 
Reward Training Monetary Incentive Delay Task.  On average, participants earned 
$16.38 (SD = $1.75) in the initial 3 blocks of training and $5.54 (SD = $0.58) in the re-training 
block. To assess a reward-effect in training, a paired t-test with reward status (rewarded, 
unrewarded) as a within-subjects factor was implemented on RT in the Monetary Incentive 
Delay task. Results indicated that for the initial training, participants were faster [t(39) = 7.11, p 
< .001] to trials in which the target was a rewarded stimulus (M = 234 ms, SD = 40 ms) than to 
trials in which the target was an unrewarded stimulus (M = 260 ms, SD = 53 ms). Participants 
remained faster [t(40) = 8.56, p < .001] to the rewarded trials (M = 223 ms, SD = 39 ms) relative 
to unrewarded trials (M = 249 ms, SD = 43 ms)  in the re-training block that occurred prior to the 
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last task. Because accuracy was constrained within the task, there were no differences in 
accuracy in the initial training phase (p = .32) or later training phase (p = .70).  
Attention Cueing Paradigm. As in experiment 1, value-driven attentional bias was 
tested by implementing paired t-tests on RT’s for valid relative to invalid PR trials. Results 
indicated participants were significantly faster for PR valid trials (M = 510 ms, SD = 34 ms) 
compared with PR invalid trials (M = 515 ms, SD = 35 ms), t(40) = 2.09, p = .043 (Figure 4.7). 
As in experiment 1, we tested whether the bias effect is value-specific, by testing whether 
attentional bias was exhibited for PU cues. A similar paired t-test using the within-subjects factor 
of trial type (valid and invalid) implemented on performance for PU trials indicated no effect of 
validity on RT (p = .270; MInvalid = 513 ms, SDInvalid = 31 ms; MValid = 511, SDValid  = 35 ms). 
Go/No-Go Task. Whether history of reward impacted inhibitory control was investigated 
by an paired t-test examining whether false alarm rate differed between PR no-go stimuli and PU 
no-go stimuli in the go/no-go task. Results indicated no difference in the ability to inhibit 
responses to PR no-go stimuli (accuracy M = .64, SD = .18) than PU no-go stimuli (accuracy M 
= .63, SD = .18),  p = .93. Participants demonstrated good performance on go trials (Accuracy M 
= .98, SD = .02; RT M = 393 ms, SD = 32 ms).  
Cross-Experiment Analysis.  
In both experiment 1 and experiment 2, there is evidence for the impact of reward 
association on attentional bias but not on inhibitory control. As a follow-up analysis, an 
interaction between study and reward biasing on the Attention Cueing task and go/no-go task 
was tested. For the Attention Cueing task, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on RT 
with a within-subjects factor of validity (PR Invalid, PR valid) and a between subjects factor of 
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study (experiment 1, experiment 2). Results indicate that there was a main effect of validity F(1, 
80) = 19.19, p < .001, η2 = .193. There was no interaction between the validity effect and study 
(p = .133), suggesting that the impact of reward on attention did not differ between experiment 1 
and experiment 2. For the go/no-go task, a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on 
accuracy with a within-subject factor of stimulus type (PR, PU) and a between subjects factor of 
study. Results revealed neither an overall effect of stimulus type (p = .745) nor an interaction 
between studies (p = .420), suggesting there was no effect of reward history in either study on 
the Go-No Go task. This is despite the overall high performance on go-trials in the task and 
participants exhibiting a similar false-alarm rate to the no-go stimuli as has been demonstrated in 
other no-go tasks with stimuli that have high perceptual overlap and a 25% no-go trial rate 
(Luijten, Littel, & Franken, 2011; Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, & Cohen, 2004). 
Discussion 
 The aim of the current study was to disambiguate whether goal-thwarting behaviors 
driven by reward history were more consistent with behaviors learned via instrumental learning 
or Pavlovian conditioning. To do so, this study employed a multi-experiment approach in which 
the first group of participants was assigned to confer reward-association with a stimulus within a 
visual search task, in which both attentional selection of the rewarded stimulus (instrumental 
learning) and the stimulus itself (Pavlovian conditioning) were associated with reward. In 
experiment 2, the same stimuli were implemented, however reward-association was conferred 
within a simple reaction time task in which motoric approach to the stimulus (instrumental 
learning) was rewarded along with conferring the stimulus-reward association. After undergoing 
these differing reward-association trainings, participants across both experiments completed 
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tasks assessing the relative impact of reward history on cognitive control in both the attention 
domain with a cueing task and the motor domain with a go/no-go task.  
It was hypothesized that if the effect of reward history on disrupting cognitive control 
was driven by Pavlovian conditioning, evidence of reward-driven disruption would be 
demonstrated similarly across both experiment 1 and experiment 2 with previously rewarded 
cues leading to attentional bias in the cueing paradigm and motoric approach in the go/no-go 
task. If the effect of reward history on cognitive control was more consistent with instrumental 
learning, it was hypothesized that the disruptions in cognitive control would be specific to the 
domain in which the reward-association was conferred, leading to attentional bias without 
motoric approach to the reward-associated cue in experiment 1 and motoric approach without 
attentional bias to the reward-associated cue in experiment 2. Results from these experiments 
indicate that across both experiment 1 and experiment 2, stimuli with a history of reward bias 
attention. Additionally, neither in experiment 1 nor in experiment 2 is there evidence that the 
stimuli with a history of reward association disrupt motor inhibitory control. A between-study 
analysis of the effects of reward history on attention and inhibition suggest that the effects do not 
differ regardless of whether the reward-association training was conducted within a task 
rewarding attentional selection or a motor response.  
These results provide partial support for Pavlovian conditioning driving reward-biased 
behavior that is at odds with current task goals. Evidence that attentional bias to stimuli with a 
reward history is exhibited uniformly across experiments, regardless of whether attentional 
selection was rewarded or not, provides support that this attentional bias is consistent with a 
Pavlovian approach behavior rather than one shaped through instrumental learning. This finding 
is consistent with some claims within the attentional bias to reward literature that suggest that it 
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is not the history of selection but the history of stimulus-reward association itself (Bucker & 
Theeuwes, 2017; Kim & Anderson, 2019a, 2019c). Indeed, while the prospect of reward is still 
readily available, stimuli that signal the potential to receive reward automatically capture 
attention even if they have not previously served as a target (Bucker, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 
2015; Le Pelley et al., 2015). Further, there is one study that has modified a monetary incentive 
delay task to be implemented in the auditory domain and demonstrated that the reward-
associated auditory stimuli received attentional priority as indexed by modulated event-related 
potentials (Krugliakova et al., 2019). As with the current study, the previous study employed a 
two-phase approach in which it was demonstrated that after completing a monetary incentive 
delay task, auditory cues that had previously signified upcoming reward received increased 
attentional priority in an unrewarded Oddball task (Krugliakova et al., 2019). Taken together 
with this previous work and our results, these findings would suggest that after the prospect of 
reward is no longer available, sustained attentional bias to a stimulus with a history of reward is 
driven by a Pavlovian learning mechanism. Further, we do not see an interaction between the 
type of reward-association training paradigm implemented and attentional bias. This provides 
some support that this effect is not amplified or decreased when Pavlovian conditioning is 
combined with instrumental learning; however, given that we had aimed to include a larger 
sample size, it is possible that an even larger sample size than the current study might be 
necessary to have enough power to detect small differences in attentional bias between 
experiments; however, given that the current sample size is a relatively large sample for 
investigating attentional bias, we will interpret these results.  
In addition to uniformly exhibiting attentional bias to stimuli with reward history across 
experiments, we also examined the differential effects of type of reward-association task on the 
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degree to which reward history disrupts inhibitory control. Previous work in our lab using a 
similar two-phase approach in which reward-association is first conferred in a simple reaction 
time task (as in experiment 2), and subsequently inhibitory control over the previously rewarded 
stimuli was tested in an unrewarded go/no-go task found that adults are worse at inhibiting 
responses to the stimulus with a history of reward-association (Davidow, Sheridan, Van Dijk, 
Santillana, Snyder, Vidal Bustamante, et al., 2019).  It was hypothesized that if instrumental 
learning was the primary mechanism driving reward-associated disruption in inhibitory control, 
then we would expect to see worse inhibitory control over previously rewarded stimuli in 
experiment 2, for which participants were rewarded for motor response, and better inhibitory 
control in experiment 1, during which attentional selection was rewarded. On the other hand, it 
was anticipated that if Pavlovian conditioning was the primary mechanism, worse inhibitory 
control over the previously rewarded stimuli would be exhibited across both experiment 1 and 
experiment 2. Our findings indicate no impact of reward-association history on inhibitory control 
in the go/no-go task across both experiments 1 and 2, suggesting both no overall effect and no 
moderation by the task in which reward-association was conferred. Given the previous result 
finding an effect of reward history on inhibitory control after reward-association was conferred 
in a simple reaction time task (Davidow, Sheridan, Van Dijk, Santillana, Snyder, Vidal 
Bustamante, et al., 2019), the result that stimuli through which reward history was conditioned 
the modified monetary incentive delay task did not impact motor inhibitory control is somewhat 
surprising. There are some differences between the reward training used previously and our 
current paradigm that may have contributed to our conflicting findings, which are discussed in 
more detail below. 
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One of the primary differences in the monetary incentive delay task employed here is the 
difficulty. A main goal of the current study was to maximize similarities between the reward-
association paradigms for experiment 1 and experiment 2 in order to isolate our variable of 
interest, which was the type of reward learning participants engaged. To do so, we equated visual 
properties of the stimuli, the number of trials for each stimuli, and the set success rate of 
responses in experiment 2 was determined by the accuracies of participants in experiment 1. As 
such, the mean set success rate for the monetary incentive delay task in experiment 2 was 83%. 
In previous work that has found an effect of reward history on inhibitory control, the monetary 
incentive delay task set success rate was 66% (Davidow, Sheridan, Van Dijk, Santillana, Snyder, 
Vidal Bustamante, et al., 2019). A recent meta-analysis of neural activity in the monetary 
incentive delay task described that the majority of set success rates for the monetary incentive 
delay task falls within 65% - 67% (Oldham et al., 2018). Previous work indicates that the 
mechanism through which reward leads to speeded reaction times in reaction time tasks by 
enhancing preparation of preprogrammed movement (Mir et al., 2011). Further, there is evidence 
for interactions between the effect of reward on preparatory processes and task difficulty, such 
that this effect is larger in more difficult tasks (Krebs, Boehler, Roberts, Song, & Woldorff, 
2012; Schevernels, Krebs, Santens, Woldorff, & Boehler, 2014). Thus by decreasing task 
difficulty across participants, we may have accidentally decreased the degree to which they 
practiced or ‘learned’ these motor preparatory responses.  In a sense, this might mean 
participants didn’t engage in instrumental learning at all, or engaged in a much lesser degree than 
in previous studies. While we see an effect of reward on reaction times in the reward association 
task of experiment 2, descriptively the overall average reaction times were slower (M = 247, SD 
= 46) in the current study than in the adult sample of the previous study (M = 224, SD = 20), 
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which may reflect less reliance on preprogrammed motor responses in the current study. 
Consistent with this idea, an exploratory analysis within the current data revealed a relationship 
between the set success rate and average reaction time in the reward-association phase (r = .56, p 
< .001); however, there was no relationship between the set hit rate and the degree to which 
participants were faster to the rewarded relative to unrewarded stimuli (r = .08, p = .63). Of note, 
is that if this does explain the difference between the previous and current studies, the 
mechanism described here would be an instrumental mechanism, wherein reward associated with 
enhanced preprogrammed motor response drives later disruption in inhibitory control. In turn, 
this could implicate that the mechanisms through which reward history lead to disruption may in 
fact differ between attentional control and motor inhibitory control, wherein the ladder may rely 
more on history of instrumental learning. Future studies should clarify this effect by examining 
the interaction between task difficulty during reward learning and the effect of reward history on 
motor response. 
Another possibility is that the expected impact of reward-association on motoric 
approach, as described with Pavlovian approach behaviors, may not be shown as consistently in 
humans or may require more sensitivity to detect. Much of the literature establishing motoric 
approach to reward-associated stimuli has been established in animals (Breland & Breland, 1961; 
Dayan, Niv, Seymour, & D. Daw, 2006). There is also evidence that reward impacts motor 
activity in humans, such as increased motor excitability in the context of rewarding stimuli 
(Gupta & Aron, 2011). Further, some studies have demonstrated more false alarms on no-go 
stimuli in go/no-go paradigms and lengthened stop-signal reaction times in the context of 
reward-signaling stimuli (Asci, Braem, Park, Boehler, & Krebs, 2019; Padmala & Pessoa, 2010); 
however, this finding is not universal and others have found that inhibitory control over an 
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immediately rewarding stimulus can be successfully employed (O’Connor, Rossiter, Yücel, 
Lubman, & Hester, 2012). These mixed findings may be in part due to increased difficulty more 
readily eliciting behavioral effects in attention tasks than in go/no-go tasks. For example, some 
work has found increases in difficulty leading to worse performance on a Flanker task but did not 
show an effect on go/no-go task (Lindqvist & Thorell, 2008). Other work has demonstrated that 
changes in prepotency on a go/no-go task can impact event-related potentials associated with 
inhibitory control without an effect on false alarm rate (Wessel, 2018). As such it is possible that 
reward history effect on motor inhibitory control may be more difficult to elicit, and future 
studies employing these techniques in conjunction with neuroimaging may be more sensitive to 
detecting effects of reward history on associated inhibitory control processes.  
In conclusion, the current study demonstrates that attentional bias to stimuli with a 
reward history is relatively equal whether the stimulus-reward association was learned while 
attentional selection of the stimulus was rewarded or while motoric approach to the stimulus was 
rewarded. This extends beyond previous work suggesting that Pavlovian conditioning is 
sufficient to elicit attentional bias to physically salient stimuli (Bucker & Theeuwes, 2017) in 
key aspects. Firstly, it demonstrates that attentional bias conferred through stimulus-reward 
association is exhibited even without amplification of attentional selection through exogenous 
orienting (i.e. increased physical salience). Given this finding, it is more plausible that history of 
stimulus-reward association would attentional bias even in more complex scenes. Secondly, we 
find no difference in the attentional bias effect between experiment 1 and experiment 2. This 
suggests that we do not see an additive effect of instrumental learning with Pavlovian 
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Models of psychopathology and risk-taking behaviors have highlighted the importance of 
understanding interactions between reward-driven and goal-driven responses, rather than 
studying these processes in isolation (McClure & Bickel, 2014; Somerville & Casey, 2010; 
Steinberg, 2010; Volkow, Wang, Fowler, Tomasi, & Telang, 2011). Goal-driven behavior is 
supported by cognitive control, which can bias behavioral responses and cognitive processing in 
service of current goals (Baddeley, Sala, Robbins, & Baddeley, 1996; Desimone & Duncan, 
1995; Dosenbach et al., 2006; Rougier, Noelle, Braver, Cohen, & O’Reilly, 2005). However, 
cognitive control is rarely employed over completely neutral stimuli, but with stimuli that have 
some motivational history. As such, it is crucial that the current understanding of cognitive 
control be expanded to understand how it is employed in the context of stimuli with a 
motivational history.  
 The present studies aim to address this important gap by examining successful and 
unsuccessful implementation of cognitive control in the presence of stimuli with a history of 
reward-association. These studies are designed to work in concert with one another to address (1) 
the mechanisms through which reward-association leads to later disruptions in cognitive control, 
including the reward learning mechanisms and associated neural correlates, and (2) which neural 
structures provide support in overcoming biases driven by a history of reward association when 
those reward-driven biases thwart successful goal-driven behavior. To do so, all of the present 
studies employed a two-phase approach, in which participants first complete a training phase, 
during which reward is associated with one stimulus, and subsequently complete a testing phase, 
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during which reward is no longer conferred. In the testing phase, participants employ cognitive 
control, including attentional control and inhibitory control, while faced with the stimulus that 
had previously been associated with reward during the training phase.  
This two-phase approach has multiple advantages that help shape the conclusions that can 
be drawn from results across studies. Firstly, across all studies, the the stimuli used in the 
training phase were neutral stimuli, such as shapes or colors, that did not have inherently 
rewarding properties. As such, any differences observed in the testing phase between reward-
associated stimuli and unrewarded stimuli, both on average and between individuals, can only be 
attributed to the history of reward association. By experimentally manipulating the reward 
association within the study, these studies provide opportunity to examine what aspects of the 
reward learning process lead to sustained cognitive biases driven by reward history. Secondly, it 
provides opportunity for isolating reward history effects on cognitive control. Designs that either 
implement currently rewarding stimuli (e.g. happy faces) or that offer a reward-association with 
a different stimulus (e.g. reversal learning paradigms) introduce biasing driven by the current 
prospect of obtaining reward. Because all of the current studies include an unrewarded test 
phase, each is equipped to specifically isolate aspects of disruption in cognitive control driven by 
reward history. Next, the main findings from all three studies will be integrated and summarized 
as relate to these aims. 
Summary of Integrated Findings: Cognitive Control Over Previously Rewarded Stimuli is 
Impacted by Reward Learning 
 Across each of these studies, it is demonstrated that on average when a stimulus has a 
history of a reward-association, encountering that stimulus biases cognitive processing in such a 
manner that disrupts cognitive control. This is evidenced by disruption in inhibitory control 
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(Study 1) and disruption in attentional control (Study 2 and Study 3) in the presence of the 
previously rewarded stimulus. By examining how behavior and neural activity during the 
reward-association training phase relates to behavior and neural activity in the unrewarded test 
phase, these studies also allow for opportunity to better characterize the mechanisms through 
which reward history later disrupts cognitive control. 
 Consistent with successful reward learning during the reward-association training phases 
participants demonstrated better performance for rewarded relative to unrewarded stimuli during 
the reward-association phase. This was evidenced both by speeded responses to the rewarded 
stimulus in a simple reaction time task (Study 1 and Study 3) and by faster attentional selection 
at the location of the rewarded stimulus in a visual search array (Study 2 and Study 3). One 
primary aim of Study 1 was to examine how behavior during the reward-association phase, 
which was used as a proxy for variation in reward learning, might later impact the degree to 
which cognitive control over the stimulus with a reward history was disrupted via altered neural 
activity. The results highlighted the importance of the insula serving as a relay station through 
which reward history later disrupted cognitive control: greater reward-driven biasing of behavior 
during the learning phase was associated with greater insula activity during inhibitory failures to 
previously rewarded stimuli, which in turn was associated with an overall worse cognitive 
control, specifically inhibitory control, over previously rewarded stimuli. This extends previous 
work that suggests the insula supports reward processing (Knutson, Westdorp, Kaiser, & 
Hommer, 2000; Lee & Shomstein, 2013; Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010) and interfaces with 
cognitive control networks (Tops & Boksem, 2011; Wang et al., 2015) to suggest that the insula 
may play a role in sustaining behavior driven by reward history.  
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 A primary aim of Study 2 was to examine how neural activity during the reward-
association phase predicted behavior and neural activity during the unrewarded test phase. To do 
so, activity in the ventral striatum, a region associated with reward prediction (Hollerman & 
Schultz, 1998), was extracted during the reward-association phase. Results revealed that more 
striatal activity during the reward-association phase predicted worse cognitive control, 
specifically attentional control, in the face of the previously rewarded stimulus. Striatal activity 
was also associated with overall increases in visual cortical and parietal activity to the previously 
rewarded stimulus, consistent with increased attentional priority of the previously rewarded 
stimulus. The relationship of striatal activity with later attentional bias and increased visual and 
parietal activity was more specifically driven by trials in which reward-driven and goal-driven 
attention converged in space. On the other hand, while overall participants showed impaired 
disengagement from the location of a previously rewarded stimulus when the target appeared in 
the opposite location, the degree to which participants were slowed to disengage from that 
location was not predicted by striatal activity. Instead, more striatal activity during learning 
predicted more activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), a region associated with reactive 
cognitive control (De Pisapia & Braver, 2006; Grandjean et al., 2012; MacDonald, Cohen, 
Stenger, & Carter, 2000). This provides further support for models suggesting that reward 
sensitivity and cognitive control should be considered in concert with one another, as these 
results suggest that reward-associated neural activity during learning predicts the degree to which 
cognitive control structures are recruited to successfully engage in goal-directed behavior when 
goal-driven and reward-driven biases are at-odds with one another.  
     While Study 1 and Study 2 provided important information regarding neural 
mechanisms through which variation in reward biasing during learning leads to disruption in 
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cognitive control, they do not specifically address the reward learning mechanism that leads to 
this disruption, which was a primary aim of Study 3. Study 3 served to address this goal by 
examining whether disruption in cognitive control was more consistent with instrumental 
learning or Pavlovian learning. Results provided some support that Pavlovian learning drives 
disruption in cognitive control. Following a stimulus-reward association, participants 
demonstrated attentional bias to the previously rewarded stimulus in an unrewarded cueing task. 
This bias was exhibited similarly whether reward was associated with a speeded button-press to 
the rewarded stimulus or with attentional selection of the rewarded stimulus in the reward-
association phase, suggesting that our results are likely not driven by instrumental learning. 
However, in Study 3, unlike Study 1, there was no effect of stimulus-reward association on 
inhibitory control. Given the differential effects of the stimulus-reward association on attentional 
control and inhibitory control in Study 3 across 2 experiments, this suggests that potentially the 
susceptibility to disruption by reward is not equivalent across domains of cognitive control. 
Indeed, there is some evidence that attentional control, as measured in a flanker task, can be 
more easily disrupted through increased difficulty than false alarm rate on a go/no-go task 
(Lindqvist & Thorell, 2008; Wessel, 2018). Furthermore, we see evidence in Study 1 and Study 
2 that neural activity associated with cognitive control over reward appears to partially differ 
depending on the cognitive control domain. Specifically, in Study 1, which tests inhibitory 
control over previously rewarded stimuli, there is more activity in inferior frontal gyrus, a region 
associated with motor inhibitory control (Aron, 2007; Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2014), when 
stopping a response to a previously rewarded stimulus. While in Study 2, which tests attentional 
control in the face of previously rewarded stimuli, there is more activity in regions of the fronto-
parietal attentional control network (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002) when encountering previously 
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rewarded stimuli. This suggests that while history of stimulus-reward association does indeed 
disrupt cognitive control, there may be some specificity in how control is employed depending 
upon the specific cognitive control process being disrupted by reward history. 
Summary of Integrated Findings: Neural Mechanisms Supporting Successful Cognitive Control 
over Stimuli with a Reward History 
 While across each of the studies cognitive control was on average disrupted by stimuli 
with a history of reward association, there is variation in success and failure in overcoming that 
reward-associated bias that helps to better elucidate how cognitive control might be successfully 
employed. In both Study 1 and Study 2, individual differences in the degree to which cognitive 
control was disrupted by reward history was examined in an effort to better understand which 
neural correlates are associated with greater success in controlling responses to stimuli with a 
reward history. In Study 1, a whole brain analysis examining the relationship between inhibitory 
control over previously rewarded stimuli and neural activity during correctly withheld trials with 
a previously rewarded no-go stimulus revealed that greater vmPFC activity to previously 
rewarded relative to previously unrewarded stimuli was associated with overall better ability to 
inhibit responses to previously rewarded stimuli. Study 2, which gave opportunity to examine 
relationships between the reward learning phase and unrewarded test phase, provided greater 
context for understanding this relationship. In Study 2, stimuli with a reward history were 
associated with relative deactivation in vmPFC compared with other stimuli. Because Study 2 
provided opportunity to test contrasts between previously rewarded stimuli and multiple types of 
unrewarded stimuli (including one with target history and without), our results suggest that this 
result is driven by the history of reward itself and not by a property of the neutral or previously 
unrewarded stimuli. Supporting the interpretation that vmPFC deactivation is linked with reward 
 
136 
history, another analysis revealed that the relative deactivation of vmPFC is largest in individuals 
who also showed the highest striatal activity to the rewarded stimulus during the reward 
association phase. This suggests that while vmPFC tracks value representation (Lim, O’Doherty, 
& Rangel, 2011; McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004), relatively more updating of 
the value representation is required when the difference between previous reward history and 
current reward prospect is larger (Knutson, Fong, Bennett, Adams, & Hommer, 2003; Zhang, 
Mendelsohn, Manson, Schiller, & Levy, 2016). As such, findings from Study 1 may be 
reconceptualized such that relatively less deactivation in vmPFC for the previously rewarded 
stimulus is associated with less disruption in cognitive control by the previously rewarded 
stimulus, which may be in part due to the closer convergence in valuation for the previously 
rewarded and previously unrewarded stimuli.  
 Additionally, Study 2 was designed to investigate neural correlates of cognitive control 
over reward by separating instances in which attentional bias driven by goal-oriented attention 
and reward history converged on the same location or were in opposite locations. Behaviorally, 
participants exhibited both facilitated performance when the reward-driven and goal-driven 
biases converged as well as impaired performance when the reward-driven and goal-driven 
biases were at odds. Whole brain analysis of the data did not reveal overall differences between 
the trial types, which suggests that the reward-driven and goal-driven biases may be interacting 
within the frontoparietal attention network that is active for the average of trials with a 
previously rewarded cue present. Further, the results provide some evidence that the ACC may 
support reactive suppression of reward-driven biases: while striatal activity was not a significant 
predictor of variation in the degree to which reward history disrupted goal-driven attention for 
invalid trials, there was a positive relationship between reward-associated activity in the ventral 
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striatum during learning and more ACC activity on trials in which reward-driven biases need to 
be suppressed in order to attain task goals (i.e. PR invalid trials). This also provides further 
support for the idea that reward-associated processes and cognitive control ought to be 
considered in concert with one another. It also suggests that relationships between prefrontal 
regions and behavior may be clouded in part by this interaction: if greater reward learning is 
associated with the need for greater recruitment of prefrontal regions in order to attain successful 
control and if it is hypothesized that greater recruitment of prefrontal regions supports better 
control, future studies may only be able to reveal the ladder relationship when controlling for 
variation in reward learning. 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
 As highlighted above, these studies contribute to our understanding of interactions 
between cognitive control and reward history in a myriad of ways. These studies demonstrate 
that by associating reward with a stimulus, this in turn biases cognitive processing and behavior 
even after the prospect of reward is removed. They suggest that the degree to which this reward-
biasing occurs in an unrewarded context is driven in part by the degree to which a participant 
demonstrated reward sensitivity during the learning itself, but this relationship does not fully 
explain the degree of success in engaging in goal-driven behavior. Additionally, these studies 
provide initial support for two potential mechanisms through which goal-driven behavior might 
overcome biases of reward history: both the employment of reactive cognitive control through 
typical prefrontal control regions and through updating current value status of the stimulus with a 
reward history given the novel unrewarded context.  
 While the primary aim of the current studies was to investigate these processes in 
typical populations, this provides an important step in characterizing effects of reward history on 
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goal-driven processing. These studies reaffirm the necessity of examining reward processes and 
goal-driven processes together, and future studies should extend these techniques to better 
understand variation in success as relates to psychopathology. In particular, based on this work, 
it would suggest that there are multiple pathways through which reward history can lead to 
failures in cognitive control including (1) increased reward sensitivity during learning leading to 
greater impact on visual and attention processing after reward learning, (2) failures in reactive 
cognitive control to effectively suppress the reward-driven response, and (3) a failure to update a 
novel reward-outcome situation when a previously rewarded stimulus is encountered in an 
unrewarded context. It will be important for future work to examine which of these processes 
more specifically may be driving cognitive control failures in the context of stimuli with reward 
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A. CARIT: Conditioning Phase 
 
B. CARIT: Inhibitory Control Phase 
 
Figure 2.1. CARIT. (A) Neutral cues are conditioned as targets for a buttonpress response. They 
are equated on number of times serving as a target but differ in reward history. One cue is 
reinforced with reward (high reward), and another cue is never rewarded (no reward). A 
feedback screen shows participants if the response was fast enough, the amount earned on the 
trial, and the cumulative amount earned in the block. (B) Conditioned cues become No-Go 
targets in the following inhibitory control task to measure the differential impact from 
conditioning history on inhibitory control processes. There are no rewards in the go/no-go task. 







Figure 2.2. Whole Brain No-Go Results. A. False Alarm No-Go trials (collapsed across 
Previously Rewarded and Previously Unrewarded) > correctly pressed go trials, p < .05, FWE 
corrected. B. Correctly withheld No-Go trials (collapsed across Previously Rewarded and 
Previously Unrewarded) > correctly pressed go trials, p < .05, FWE corrected. Unthresholded 






Figure 2.3. Whole brain activation for correctly withheld Previously Rewarded trials > 
correctly withheld Previously Unrewarded trials, p < .05, FWE corrected. Unthresholded 






Figure 2.4. Whole brain activation for false alarms to Previously Rewarded > false alarms 
to Previously Unrewarded, p < .05, FWE corrected. Unthresholded statistical maps were 





A.  B.  
Figure 2.5.  vmPFC Activation. A. Results of whole brain correlation with behavior at x = -2, p 
< .05, FWE corrected. Results show that greater vmPFC activity to Previously Rewarded No-Go 
stimuli relative to Previously Unrewarded No-Go stimuli on correctly withheld trials predicted 
fewer false alarms to Previously Rewarded stimuli relative to Previously Unrewarded stimuli. 
Unthresholded statistical maps were uploaded to NeuroVault.org database and are available at 
https://neurovault.org/collections/WCSIVGXW/. B. Scatterplot of activation extracted from the 








Figure 2.6. False alarm neural activity correlated with behavior. A. Plot of bilateral thalamic 
activity on false alarm trials for the contrast Previously Rewarded > Previously Unrewarded 
predicting Previously Rewarded false alarm rate, while controlling for Previously Unrewarded 
false alarm rate. B. Plot of bilateral Insula activity on false alarm trials for the contrast Previously 
Rewarded > Previously Unrewarded predicting Previously Rewarded false alarm rate, while 




Figure 2.7. Plot of reward biasing on the MID, as measured by RT difference between 
high reward and no reward stimuli, predicting neural activity in the insula on false alarms to 







Figure 2.8. Mediation analysis. Demonstrating an indirect effect of reward biasing in Monetary 
Incentive Delay (MID) task on false alarm rate to Previously Rewarded No-Go stimuli, relative 
to Previously Unrewarded No-Go stimuli in the inhibitory control phase through insula activity 
on false alarms to Previously Rewarded No-Go stimuli relative to Previously Unrewarded No-Go 







Figure 3.1. Reward-training paradigm. Adopted from Anderson (2011). Participants were 
instructed to respond to the orientation of a line inside the target circle. For the rewarded target 
circle, 80% of trials were worth 30 cents and 20% were worth no money. For the unrewarded 





Figure 3.2. Testing paradigm. Adopted from Failing and Theeuwes (2014). A double cue was 
displayed for 200 ms with figure-eight premasks, then an offset would reveal target letters for 
800 ms. Participants identified whether the letter “S” or the letter “P” was present. Letters “E” 






Figure 3.3. Cue types. (A) Description of the 3 non-predictive cue-types if blue were the 
previously rewarded color in training, yellow were the previously unrewarded color, and colors 
red and green never served as targets during the reward training. (B) Example of “valid” and 






Figure 3.4. Orienting effects to PR cues. A significant linear orienting effect was found for PR 
trials in the cueing task, characterized both by facilitated capture on PR valid trials and impaired 






Figure 3.5. Whole brain activation for Rewarded stimulus trials > Unrewarded stimulus 
trials, p < .05, FWE corrected. Of primary interest was examining relationships between striatal 
activity (indicated with blue arrow) during reward learning and later performance and neural 





Figure 3.6. Whole brain activation for all trial types compared to an implicit baseline, p < 




Figure 3.7. Whole brain activation for PR trials > Neutral trials, p < .05, FWE corrected, 





Figure 3.8. Conjunction overlay demonstrating relative deactivation in vmPFC for PR 
trials. Deactivation is relative both to Neutral trials and to PU trials (saggital slice displayed at x 






Figure 4.1. Reward association paradigm for experiment 1: visual search task. Participants 
respond with a button press indicating whether the orientation of the line in the target circle (the 
blue or yellow circle) is vertical or horizontal. Participants were explicitly informed which circle 
is associated with reward. For the rewarded circle, 80% of trials are worth 14 cents and 20% of 






Figure 4.2. Cueing paradigm. Adopted from Failing and Theeuwes (2014). A double cue was 
displayed for 200 ms with figure-eight premasks, then an offset would reveal target letters for 
800 ms. Participants identified whether the letter “S” or the letter “P” was present. Letters “E” 






Figure 4.3. Cue Types (A) Description of the 3 non-predictive cue-types if blue were the 
previously rewarded color in training, yellow were the previously unrewarded color, and colors 
red and green never served as targets during the reward training. (B) Example of “valid” and 





Figure 4.4. Go/No-Go paradigm. Every trial will begin with a fixation screen presented for 
either 500, 1000, or 1500 ms, which was followed by a centrally presented circle for 500 ms. On 
75% of trials, the color of the circle (white, cyan, green, pink, or orange) indicated that the 
participant should press the spacebar (Go trials). On the other 25% of trials, the color of the 
circle (yellow or blue) indicated that the participant should withhold a response (no-go trials). 





Figure 4.5. Reward association task in experiment 2: modified Monetary Incentive Delay 
paradigm. Participants will be instructed that the central cue (blue or yellow) indicates whether 
it is possible to receive reward for the upcoming trial. When the cue returns to the screen after 
fixation, participants will respond by pressing the spacebar as quickly as possible. The response 
time window will be dynamically adjusted based upon accuracy, which is yolked to performance 
of a participant in experiment 1. For the rewarded circle, the percentage of trials worth 14 cents 
and worth no money are yolked to percentage of trials worth money of a participant in 




Figure 4.6. Attentional bias to PR cues on the cueing task in experiment 1 as measured 
by RT. A significant validity effect was found for PR trials on all performance metrics. Error 


















Figure 4.7. Attentional bias to PR cues on the cueing task in experiment 2 as measured 
by RT. A significant validity effect was found for PR trials on all performance metrics. Error 


















Table 2.1. Behavioral effects of reward. Mean(SD) 
 Rewarded Unrewarded Reward Effect 
MID Training 
(reaction time) 
218 ms (20 ms) 231 ms (20 ms) 13 ms (14 ms) 
Go-NoGo Testing 
(false alarm rate as 
proportion) 





Table 2.2. Whole brain results. Negative values for X coordinates indicates left hemisphere, 
while positive X coordinate values correspond to right hemisphere. 
   Local Maxima 
Coordinates 
  
Contrast Cluster Size 
(Voxels) 
x y z Z-
score 
Region 
cNo-Go>cGo 1 547 12 -68 48 4.12 Precuneus cortex 
 2 1124 -30 22 -8 6.24 Inferior Frontal Gyrus 
 3 1665 -32 48 14 5.00 Frontal Pole 
 4 3246 -52 -46 10 4.59 Supramarginal Gyrus 
 5 5195 56 -50 22 6.52 Angular Gyrus 
 6 9365 30 20 6 5.79 Insular Cortex 
faNo-Go>cGo 1 689 4 -24 0 3.86 Right Thalamus 
 2 879 22 44 26 5.63 Frontal Pole 
 3 990 -60 -52 34 4.84 Supramarginal Gyrus 
 4 2177 58 -48 34 5.16 Angular Gyrus 
 5 2185 -30 20 -8 7.55 Insular Cortex 
 6 2427 42 16 -2 7.90 Insular Cortex 




1 490 -34 14 -2 3.52 Anterior Insular 
Cortex 
 2 636 28 28 -4 3.71 Inferior Frontal Gyrus 
 3 9069 26 -94 0 5.50 Occipital Pole 
   26 -10 8 3.38 Putamen 
   16 -38 -4 3.18 Hippocampus  
   32 -24 22 3.15 Posterior Insula 
   18 10 14 3.14 Caudate 
faPR_No-Go > 
faPU_No-Go 
1 430 -48 -14 22 3.5 Central Opercular 
Cortex 
 2 535 -24 -96 -4 4.22 Occipital Pole 
   14 -38 -4 3.61 Hippocampus  
   -6 -78 46 3.32 Superior parietal 
lobule 
   -48 -14 22 3.41 Posterior Insula 
 3 3749 0 -82 30 4.88 Cuneal Cortex 





Table 3.1. Effect of reward on performance during the reward association sessions. 
Means of inverse efficiency are presented with standard deviation in parentheses. 
 Inverse Efficiency 
Mean (SD) 
 Rewarded Unrewarded 
Session 1 652 (70) 788 (118) 





Table 3.2. Whole brain results during reward learning task. Contrast for rewarded targets > 
unrewarded targets. Negative values for X coordinates indicate left hemisphere, while positive X 
coordinate values correspond to right hemisphere. 
  Local Maxima 
Coordinates 
  
Cluster Size (Voxels) x y z Z-score Region 
1 2553 34 -88 -12 5.78 Lateral Occipital Cortex 
2 1841 -16 -100 -10 5.52 Occipital Pole 
3 1269 36 -60 50 4.64 Lateral Occipital Cortex/Superior 
Parietal Lobule 
4 598 48 10 32 4.74 MFG/IFG 
5 587 2 32 52 4.75 Superior Frontal Gryus/ACC 
6 306 -32 -66 48 4.32 Lateral Occipital Cortex 
7 295 36 18 -12 3.79 Anterior Insula 
8 177 -34 16 -4 3.57 Anterior Insula 
9 176 -30 -66 -26 3.97 Cerebellum 
10 161 44 58 0 4.38 Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex 
11 123 -26 -72 -46 3.31 Cerebellum 
12 116 8 18 4 4.14 Right Caudate 
13 106 3 -44 -54 3.00 Superior Parietal Lobule 
14 102 2 -94 10 4.11 Occipital Pole 





Table 3.3. Whole brain results for group maps. Negative values for X coordinates indicates left 
hemisphere, while positive X coordinate values correspond to right hemisphere. 
   Local Maxima 
Coordinates 
  
Contrast Cluster Size (Voxels) x y z Z-score Region 
PR > Neutral 1 2284 22 -16 76 4.66 Precentral Gyrus 
 2 1455 -24 -72 -16 4.49 Left Occipital Fusiform 
Gyrus 
   -44 -76 -10 3.89 Left LOC 
 3 959 44 -60 -18 4.00 Right Occipital Fusiform 
Gyrus 
   38 -78 2 3.69 Right LOC 
 4 258 8 -12 58 4.08 SMA 
 5 140 -60 -2 14 3.54 Precentral Gyrus 
 6 135 32 -58 50 4.08 Right SPL 
        
PU > Neutral 1 718 44 -14 54 4.92 Precentral gyrus 
 2 146 -54 28 -6 3.63 Frontal Orbital Cortex 
 3 136 6 -14 60 3.64 SMA 





Table 3.4. Visual regions of interest. ROI’s defined by local maxima within Neutral > implicit 
baseline contrast. ROI’s created with 4mm radius spheres around peak. Z-score corresponds to Z-score 
within Neutral > implicit baseline contrast. 
Local Maxima Coordinates   
x y z Z-score Region 
-46 -88 -6 6.25 Left LOC 
30 -78 -18 6.20 Right Occipital Fusiform Gyrus 
-36 -76 -20 6.00 Left Occipital Fusiform Gyrus 
16 -90 -10 5.72 Right Occipital Pole 
38 -62 -22 5.37 Right Anterior Fusiform 
-10 -94 0 5.24 Left Occipital Pole 
-34 -96 14 5.21 Left Middle Occipital Gyrus 





Table 3.5. Whole brain results for group maps. Negative values for X coordinates indicate 
left hemisphere, while positive X coordinate values correspond to right hemisphere. 
   Local Maxima 
Coordinates 
  
Contrast Cluster Size 
(Voxels) 
x y z Z-
score 
Region 
PR Invalid > PU 
Invalid 
1 146 
54 -22 36 
3.86 Supramarginal gyrus 
 2 137 36 -60 48 3.56 LOC 
 3 109 -32 -66 -20 3.84 Occipital Fusiform gyrus 
 4 102 36 -46 46 3.59 SPL 
PR Invalid > 
Neutral 
1 1837 42 -16 54 4.61 Precentral gyrus 
 2 806 -48 -58 -10 4.08 Left LOC 
 3 472 44 -62 -14 3.7 Right LOC 
 4 219 -6 6 56 3.68 SMA 
 5 179 32 -56 58 3.67 Right SPL 
 6 151 -28 -74 30 3.59 Left LOC 
PR Valid > 
Neutral 
1 669 
32 -24 46 3.82 
Precentral gyrus 
 2 372 
46 -52 -24 4.05 
Temporal Occipital 
Fusiform gyrus 
   40 -72 -18 3.72 LOC 
 3 357 16 -76 30 4.4 Precuneus cortex 
   28 -82 36 3.32 Intraparietal Sulcus 
 4 316 -12 -80 28 4.02 Precuneus cortex 
   -2 -90 26 3.47 Occipital Pole 
 5 313 56 -10 14 4.85 Central Opercular cortex 
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 6 235 
-62 -18 8 4.07 
Superior Temporal 
Gyrus 
 7 163 -30 -82 26 3.47 LOC 
 8 163 -36 -54 -16 4.26 Occipital Fusiform gyrus 
 9 147 -14 -82 -4 3.8  
 10 90 -54 -74 8 3.43 LOC 





Table 3.6. Whole brain results for group maps for cueing as predicted by striatal activity 
during reward training phase. Negative values for X coordinates indicates left hemisphere, while 
positive X coordinate values correspond to right hemisphere. 
   Local Maxima 
Coordinates 
  
Contrast Cluster Size 
(Voxels) 
x y z Z-score Region 
PR > Neutral 1 1997 -38 -42 38 4.65 Supramarginal Gyrus 
   -24 -78 52 4.43 Left LOC 
   10 -68 58 4.33 Right LOC 
 2 413 -8 -92 -18 3.96 Occipital Pole 
 
3 239 -48 -14 12 4.04 
Central Opercular 
Cortex 
 4 238 -12 -98 30 4.76 Occipital Pole 
 5 237 -48 -82 20 4.01 Left LOC 
 6 169 -58 -70 -8 3.98 Left LOC 
PR Valid > 
Neutral 
1 3126 -12 -98 30 4.53 Occipital pole 
   10 -68 58 4.36 LOC 
 2 263 -54 -8 24 3.92 Postcentral Gyrus 
 3 188 4 -82 -24 3.67 Cerebellum 
 
  26 -90 -18 3.4 
Occipital fusiform 
gyrus 
 4 141 68 -10 20 3.82 Postcentral Gyrus 
 5 137 58 -48 16 4.01 Angular Gyrus 
PR Invalid > 
Neutral 
1 161 4 -50 70 3.96 Precuneus Cortex 
 2 89 2 8 48 3.59 ACC 
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PR Invalid > PU 
Invalid 
1 183 2 12 42 3.94 ACC 





APPENDIX A: STUDY 1 SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS FOR ANTERIOR AND 
POSTERIOR INSULA ANALYSIS 
 Supplementary analyses were performed to confirm that the original analysis, which 
extracted activation across both anterior and posterior insula, was the best representation of the 
data. To test this, we additionally created ROI’s which separated anterior insula and posterior 
insula. These ROI’s were hand drawn using the mask tool in FSLView (Supplementary Figure 
1). In order to test whether results showed the same pattern across the entire insula, posterior 
insula, and anterior insula, the activations extracted from the anterior insula and posterior insula 
were subjected to the same analyses performed on the whole insula reported in the paper. As 
described in more detail below, results from the anterior insula and posterior insula ROI’s were 
similar to each other and similar to extraction of activation across the insula. This suggests that 
the ROI implemented in the main body of the paper, which includes both anterior and posterior 
aspects of insular cortex, provides the best representation of this data.  
Association between Neural Activity and Task Performance  
 Regressions were conducted to investigate the association between neural activity for 
each ROI on incorrect PR_no-go > PU_no-go trials and behavior. More activity in the anterior 
insula (β = .371, p = .023) and posterior insula (β = .466, p = .003) to faPR_no-go > faPU_no-go 
trials predicted more false alarms on PR_no-go trials relative to PU_no-go trials.   
Relationship Monetary Incentive Delay 
 Reward-biasing on the Monetary Incentive Delay task (e.g. difference in reaction time 
between rewarded and neutral stimuli) predicted neural recruitment in the anterior insula (β = 
.558, p < .001) and in the posterior insula (β = .371, p = .026)  during faPR_no-go > faPU_no-go 
trials. Greater differences in reaction time between rewarded and unrewarded stimuli on the 
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Monetary Incentive Delay task predicted greater activity in anterior and posterior insula when 
failing to inhibit responses to PR_no-go stimuli. 
Mediation 
A bootstrapping method (Hayes, 2013) was used to test whether the difference in reaction 
time between high reward and no-reward trials on the Monetary Incentive Delay task had an 
indirect effect on false alarm rates to PR_no-go controlling for false alarm rates to PU_no-go 
trials through posterior insula and anterior insula activation for the faPR_no-go > faPU_no-go 
trial contrast. Posterior insula activation and anterior insula activation were tested as mediators in 
two separate mediation analyses. Results indicated that posterior insula activity significantly 
mediated this relationship (β = .0029, SE = .0017, 95% CI .0004 - .0068). Anterior insula activity 
yielded a similar effect size for the indirect pathway, however, the lower limit of the 95% 
confidence interval was 0, indicating this effect did not reach significance (β = .0033, SE = 




Supplementary Figure A.1. Anterior Insula and Posterior Insula regions of interest. 




APPENDIX B: STUDY 2 BEHAVIORAL RESULTS FOR REACTION TIME AND 
ACCURACY SEPARATELY 
 Because effects were evident on both accuracy and inverse efficiency, it was determined 
that inverse efficiency, which can account for speed/accuracy tradeoffs, would be the better 
representative value for performance. Here results from the reward training and cueing task are 
reported for reaction time and accuracy separately.  
Reward Training. To assess a reward-effect in training, a paired t-test with reward status 
(rewarded, unrewarded) as a within-subjects factor was implemented on RT and accuracy for 
both training sessions. Session 1 results indicated that participants were faster on trials with the 
rewarded color than the unrewarded color in the initial training, t(26) = 10.54, p < .001, and 
participants were more accurate to the rewarded relative to unrewarded color t(26) = 6.23, p < 
.001. In session 2, the pattern of results was the same, such that participants showed faster RT 
[t(26) = 10.54, p < .001], higher accuracy [t(26) = 6.38, p < .001] for the rewarded relative to 
unrewarded color.   
To explore whether the reward-effect changed between the training sessions, a 2x2 
repeated-measures ANOVA with reward status (rewarded, unrewarded) and session as within-
subjects factors was implemented on RT, accuracy, and inverse efficiency. With regards to 
reaction time, there was a main effect of reward type, F(1, 26) = 146.06, p < .001, such that 
participants were faster to the rewarded than the unrewarded color (Table A1). There was also a 
main effect of session, F(1, 26) = 9.02, p = .006, wherein participants’ RTs were slower in 
Session 2 than in Session 1. These main effects were not qualified by a reward by session 
interaction, p = .20. For accuracy, results revealed a main effect of reward type F(1, 26) = 61.53, 
p < .001, which was qualified by a reward by session interaction F(1, 26) = 5.11, p = .03, (Table 
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B.1). This revealed that participants were more accurate for the rewarded relative to unrewarded 
colors across both sessions, but the effect of reward on accuracy was larger for Session 2 than 
Session 1. There was no change in overall accuracy between sessions, p = .15.  
Attention Cueing Paradigm. It was anticipated that, consistent with value-driven 
attentional bias, participants would be increasingly worse across valid PR, neutral baseline, and 
invalid PR trials. To test this linear-orienting effect, a repeated-measures ANOVA was 
conducted for performance on PR trials with the within-subjects factors of trial type (invalid, 
baseline, valid) for both RT and accuracy. Results indicated there was an effect of trial type on 
RT, F(2, 52) = 12.22, p < .001, η2 = .320. Within-subjects contrasts confirmed that the effect of 
trial type on RT was linear, such that performance followed the expected pattern across trial 
types, F(1, 26) = 16.23, p < .001, η2 = .384, Figure B.1. Separate paired t-tests examined the 
specific effects of capture (PR valid relative to neutral baseline) and disengagement (PR invalid 
relative to neutral) on RT. Results indicated a trending effect of capture, t(26) = 1.84, p = .078, 
and a significant effect of disengagement, t(26) = 3.72, p = .001, on RT. Similar effects of 
reward on accuracy were revealed by a significant effect of trial type, F(1.55, 40.40) = 4.49, p = 
.024, η2 = .147. Within-subjects contrasts confirmed that the effect of trial type on accuracy was 
linear, such that performance followed the expected pattern across trial types, F(1, 26) = 6.13, p 
= .020, η2 = .191, Figure A1. Separate paired t-tests examined the specific effects of capture (PR 
valid relative to neutral baseline) and disengagement (PR invalid relative to neutral) on RT. 
Results indicated a significant effect of capture, t(26) = 2.28, p = .031, but no effect of 
disengagement (p = .197) on accuracy. 
To examine whether the orienting effect is value-specific, we tested whether an orienting 
effect was exhibited for PU cues, which contained the color that was the unrewarded target color 
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in the training phase. A similar repeated-measures ANOVA with the within-subjects factor of 
trial type (invalid, baseline, valid) was implemented for PU trials. There was no effect of trial 
type on RT (MValid = 512 ms, SDValid = 34 ms, MInvalid = 513 ms, SDValid = 35 ms, p = 
.893) or accuracy (MValid = 0.93, SDValid = 0.08, MInvalid = 0.93, SDValid = 0.07, p = .734). 








Figure B.1. Orienting effects to PR cues on the cueing task for (A) RT and (B) 
Accuracy. A significant linear orienting effect was found for PR trials on all performance 









 Rewarded Unrewarded Rewarded Unrewarded 
S1 553 (37) 597 (31) 0.85 (0.07) 0.77 (0.09) 





APPENDIX C: STUDY 3 ANALYSIS OF SELF-REPORT MEASURES 
 To identify possible individual differences might account for variance in outcomes of 
interest, some self-report measures were collected. While exploratory in nature, the measures 
collected were identified due to their relationships with reward processing or cognitive control 
and are described below. These measures were then tested for their relationship to reward-biased 
behavior in the reward-association training, the cueing task, and the go/no-go task across 
experiment 1 and experiment 2. To minimize multiple comparisons, one value was analyzed for 
a relationship in each task. For the reward association training in experiment 1, which included 
visual search, the difference in inverse efficiency for the trials with rewarded stimuli relative to 
trials with the unrewarded stimuli served as the reward-associated bias in learning. For the 
reward-associating training in experiment 2, which included the monetary incentive delay task, 
RT difference between the trials with the rewarded and unrewarded stimuli served as the 
measure of reward-associated bias in learning. Across both experiments, reward bias on the 
cueing task was measured as the difference between inverse efficiency on PR Invalid trials 
relative to PR Valid trials. Across both experiments, reward bias on the go/no-go task was 
measured as the difference in accuracy for PR no-go stimuli compared with PU no-go stimuli. 
Socioeconomic Status. Subjective SES was assessed using the MacArthur Scale of 
Subjective Social Status (Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000). For this scale, participants 
place an ‘X’ on a picture of a ‘social’ ladder that best indicates where they stand in relation to 
both the United States and subsequently in their community by reference to income, education, 
and occupational prestige. There were no significant relationships between subjective SES and 
outcomes of interest in experiment 1 or experiment 2 (Table C.1). 
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Alcohol Use. Information regarding alcohol use frequency, amount, and dependency was 
collected using the 10-item Alcohol Use Disorder Identification Test (Saunders, Aasland, Babor, 
Fuente, & Grant, 1993). There were no significant relationships between AUDIT score and 
outcomes of interest in experiment 1 or experiment 2 (Table C.2).  
Self-control. Participants completed the 36-item Self-Control Scale (Tangney, 
Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). There were no significant relationships between Self-control score 
and outcomes of interest in experiment 1 or experiment 2 (Table C.3).   
Age. Participants responded with their age in years. There was a negative relationship 
between age and the degree to which participants demonstrated attentional bias to reward in 
experiment 1 (Table C.4). This would not survive correction for multiple comparisons (α = .017), 
so should be interpreted with caution, yet this result is consistent with previous work indicating 
that value-driven attentional bias is larger in adolescents than in adults (Roper et al., 2014). This 
relationship was not however replicated in experiment 2, and no other outcomes of interest were 
significantly related to age (Table C.4).  
Depression. The depression subscale of the Adult Self-Report Achenbach System of 
Empirically Based Assessment (Rescorla & Achenbach, 2004) was used to assess depression. 
Due to limitations in response of study staff during data collection and anticipation of low rates 
due to screening out for depression, the questions regarding self-harm and suicidal ideation were 
removed from the questionnaire. There were no relationships between depression and any 
outcomes of interest (Table C.5).  
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Table C.1. Relationship between outcome variables and subjective SES. 
 Reward-Association 
Bias 
Attentional Bias Inhibitory Bias 
 r p r p r p 
Experiment 1 .17 .28 -.12 .45 .13 .40 





Table C.2. Relationship between outcome variables and subjective AUDIT score. 
 Reward-Association 
Bias 
Attentional Bias Inhibitory Bias 
 r p r p r p 
Experiment 1 -.31 .05 .07 .65 -.065 .31 





Table C.3. Relationship between outcome variables and self-control. 
 Reward-Association 
Bias 
Attentional Bias Inhibitory Bias 
 r p r p r p 
Experiment 1 -.13 .43 -.11 .52 .23 .15 





Table C.4. Relationship between outcome variables and age. 
 Reward-Association 
Bias 
Attentional Bias Inhibitory Bias 
 r p r p r p 
Experiment 1 -.26 .11 -.34 .03 -.11 .51 





Table C.5. Relationship between outcome variables and depression. 
 Reward-Association 
Bias 
Attentional Bias Inhibitory Bias 
 r p r p r p 
Experiment 1 .20 .22 .17 .30 -.23 .15 







APPENDIX D: STUDY 3 INVERSE EFFICIENCY AND ACCURACY RESULTS 
 For the attention tasks, including experiment 1’s reward association phase and both 
experiments’ cueing phase, there is more than one way to measure performance. Given both that 
speed/accuracy trade-offs could not be characterized within the other tasks (i.e. go/no-go and 
monetary incentive delay) and that there was no evidence of a speed/accuracy tradeoff in the 
cueing paradigm, the representative measure reported in the body of the paper was reaction time. 
Here we additionally report the results of the attention tasks using alternative metrics of accuracy 
and inverse efficiency.   
Experiment 1 Reward Training Visual Search Task. Results indicated that for the 
initial training, participants more accurate [t(40)=8.53, p < .001] and had better inverse 
efficiency [t(40)=8.11, p < .001] when trials included the rewarded color versus trials with the 
unrewarded color (Table B1). Participants remained faster [t(40) = 14.35, p < .001], more 
accurate [t(40)=6.65, p < .001], and with better inverse efficiency [t(40)=7.87, p < .001] for the 
rewarded trials relative to unrewarded trials in the re-training block that occurred prior to the last 
task (Table D.1).  
Experiment 1 Attention Cueing Paradigm. If value-driven attentional bias was 
exhibited in this experiment, it would be expected that participants would perform better when 
the target appeared in the same location as the previously rewarded cue (PR valid) relative to 
when the cue appeared at the opposite location (PR invalid). To test this, a paired t-test was 
conducted for performance on PR trials with the within-subjects factors of trial type (valid or 
invalid). For experiment 1, results indicated there was no effect of validity on accuracy, p = .42 
(MInvalid = 0.89, SDInvalid = .08; MValid = .90, SDValid  = .07). However, better performance as 
measured by inverse efficiency, which accounts for a combination of accuracy and RT, was 
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exhibited for the valid trials (M = 583, SD = 76) compared to invalid trials (M = 600, SD = 90), 
t(40) = 2.23, p = .032.  
To examine whether the orienting effect is value-specific, we tested whether attentional 
bias was exhibited for PU cues, which contained the color that was the unrewarded target color 
in the training phase. A similar paired t-test using the within-subjects factor of trial type (valid 
and invalid) was implemented for PU trials. Within PU trials, there was no effect of validity on 
accuracy (p = .147; MInvalid = 0.89, SDInvalid = .06; MValid = .90, SDValid  = .07) or inverse 
efficiency (p = .136; MInvalid = 600, SDInvalid = 82; MValid = 588, SDValid  = 89). 
Experiment 2 Attention Cueing Paradigm. As in experiment 1, value-driven 
attentional bias was tested by implementing paired t-tests on performance for valid relative to 
invalid PR trialsThere was no validity effect on accuracy (p = .518; MInvalid = 0.91, SDInvalid = 
.06; MValid = .91, SDValid  = .06) or inverse efficiency (p = .121; MInvalid = 569, SDInvalid = 54; 
MValid = 561, SDValid  = 58). As in experiment 1, we tested whether the orienting effect is value-
specific, by testing whether attentional bias was exhibited for PU cues. A similar paired t-test 
using the within-subjects factor of trial type (valid and invalid) implemented on performance for 
PU trials indicated no effect of validity on accuracy (p = .452; MInvalid = 0.90, SDInvalid = .08; 
MValid = .91, SDValid  = .07), or inverse efficiency (p = .163; MInvalid = 573, SDInvalid = 69; MValid = 
566, SDValid  = 62). 
Cross-Experiment Analysis. The cross-experiment analysis conducted on RT was 
subsequently conducted on inverse efficiency and accuracy for the Attention Cueing task. A 
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted separately on inverse efficiency and accuracy with a 
within-subjects factor of validity (PR Invalid, PR valid) and a between subjects factor of study 
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(experiment 1, experiment 2). Results indicate that there was a main effect of validity F(1, 80) = 
7.44, p = .008, η2 = .085 on inverse efficiency. There was no interaction between the validity 
effect and study (p = .313), suggesting that the impact of reward on attention did not differ 
between experiment 1 and experiment 2. With regard to accuracy, there was neither a main effect 




Table D.1. Reward effects on accuracy and inverse efficiency in reward training visual 
search task of experiment 1. 
 Accuracy Inverse Efficiency 
 
Rewarded Unrewarded Rewarded Unrewarded 
Training 
0.89 (0.06) 0.77 (0.12) 613 (75) 811 (184) 
Re-training 
0.92 (0.05) 0.82 (0.11) 571 (53) 750 (159) 
 
